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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for ramsey/uuid

Threat: Predictable UUID Generation

  • Description: An attacker might predict or guess UUIDs if the generation process is not cryptographically secure, or if older, predictable UUID versions are mistakenly used. This could be achieved through brute-force attempts or by analyzing patterns if the randomness is weak. Successful prediction allows bypassing intended security measures relying on UUID uniqueness and randomness.
    • Impact:
      • Unauthorized Access (Critical): If UUIDs are used as session identifiers, API keys, or access tokens, predictable UUIDs enable attackers to gain unauthorized access to user accounts, protected resources, or sensitive data. This can lead to complete account takeover or data breaches.
      • Data Manipulation/Deletion (High): If UUIDs are used to identify data records, predictable UUIDs allow attackers to target specific data for modification or deletion, potentially leading to data corruption or integrity violations.
      • Circumvention of Security Controls (High): Predictable UUIDs can bypass security mechanisms that rely on the unguessability of UUIDs, such as password reset tokens or temporary access grants.
    • UUID Component Affected: UUID Generation Module, Random Number Generation
    • Risk Severity: Critical (if UUIDs are used for authentication/authorization) to High (if used for sensitive data identification or security controls).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Mandatory Version 4 UUIDs: Enforce the exclusive use of Version 4 UUIDs throughout the application. Configure ramsey/uuid to default to Version 4 and explicitly prevent the use of older, less secure versions.
      • Robust CSPRNG Verification: Rigorous testing and verification to ensure the PHP environment and underlying system are consistently providing a cryptographically secure random number generator (CSPRNG) for random_bytes(). Monitor for any degradation in randomness.
      • Aggressive Rate Limiting & Brute-Force Prevention: Implement strong rate limiting and brute-force detection mechanisms specifically targeting UUID-based authentication or authorization endpoints. Employ CAPTCHA or account lockout after failed attempts.
      • Secret UUID Generation Logic: Treat the UUID generation process as security-sensitive. Avoid exposing any details about the implementation or configuration that could aid in prediction.
      • Regular Rotation of Critical UUIDs: For highly sensitive UUIDs like API keys or long-lived access tokens, implement mandatory and frequent rotation schedules to minimize the window of opportunity if a UUID is compromised or predicted. Consider short expiration times.

Threat: Information Disclosure via Version 1 UUIDs (in specific high-sensitivity contexts)

  • Description: If Version 1 UUIDs are unintentionally or mistakenly used in a context where information disclosure is highly sensitive, an attacker could analyze these UUIDs to extract embedded timestamp and MAC address information. While Version 4 is the default and Version 1 usage should be deliberate, misconfiguration or legacy code could introduce this risk. This is critical only if the disclosed information is highly sensitive in the application's specific context.
    • Impact:
      • Exposure of Sensitive Infrastructure Details (High to Critical, Context-Dependent): In highly secure environments, leaking MAC addresses or timestamps could reveal critical information about the server infrastructure, internal network layout, or geographical location. This could aid sophisticated attackers in further targeted attacks or physical security breaches. The severity depends entirely on the sensitivity of the environment and the value of this information to an attacker.
      • Reduced Anonymity in High-Privacy Scenarios (High): In applications prioritizing user or server anonymity, Version 1 UUIDs can undermine these efforts by providing identifiable information.
    • UUID Component Affected: UUID Version 1 Generation, Timestamp and MAC Address Encoding
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (in specific high-security or high-privacy contexts where infrastructure details or anonymity are paramount). Generally Low to Medium in typical web applications where infrastructure details are less sensitive.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strictly Prohibit Version 1 UUIDs: Implement code analysis tools or linters to actively prevent the use of Version 1 UUIDs in the application codebase. Treat Version 1 usage as a critical code defect.
      • Security Awareness Training: Educate developers about the information disclosure risks associated with Version 1 UUIDs and the importance of using Version 4.
      • Contextual Risk Assessment: Thoroughly assess the sensitivity of the application's environment and data. If infrastructure details or anonymity are critical, treat Version 1 UUID information disclosure as a high or critical risk and implement stringent preventative measures.
      • Network Segmentation & Monitoring (for legacy systems using Version 1): If Version 1 UUIDs are unavoidable due to legacy system constraints, implement strict network segmentation to limit exposure and actively monitor for any attempts to extract or exploit information from these UUIDs.