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Attack Tree Analysis for roots/sage

Objective: Compromise Sage Application

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Sage Application [CRITICAL NODE - Root Goal]
├─── Exploit Build Process Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE - Attack Vector] [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   ├─── Dependency Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE - Attack Vector] [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   │   ├─── Vulnerable npm/yarn Packages [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   │   │   ├─── Exploit known vulnerabilities in identified packages (e.g., Prototype Pollution, arbitrary code execution in build tools) [CRITICAL NODE - Code Execution] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Gain control of build process or application runtime [CRITICAL NODE - Build Process Control] [HIGH-RISK PATH END]
│   │   └─── Malicious Dependency Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH START - Supply Chain Attack]
│   │       ├─── Supply chain attack on legitimate dependency (compromised maintainer account) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │       └─── Inject malicious code during `npm install` or `yarn install` [HIGH-RISK PATH END]
│   └─── Build Script Manipulation [CRITICAL NODE - Attack Vector] [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│       ├─── Compromise `bud.config.js` or related build configuration files [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│       │   ├─── Exploit vulnerabilities in server to gain write access to configuration files [CRITICAL NODE - Server Access] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       │   └─── Modify build configuration to inject malicious code into build output (JS/CSS) [CRITICAL NODE - Code Injection] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       │       └─── Trigger rebuild and deploy compromised assets [HIGH-RISK PATH END]
├─── Exploit Templating Engine (Blade) Misuse [CRITICAL NODE - Attack Vector] [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   ├─── Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) via Blade [CRITICAL NODE - Vulnerability Type] [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   │   ├─── Inject malicious Blade syntax into user input (e.g., via GET/POST parameters, database entries) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └─── Execute arbitrary code on the server through Blade template engine [CRITICAL NODE - Code Execution] [HIGH-RISK PATH END]
├─── Exploit Sage Specific Configuration or Features [CRITICAL NODE - Attack Vector] [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   ├─── Misconfigured Environment Variables (.env) [CRITICAL NODE - Misconfiguration] [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   │   ├─── Access sensitive credentials, API keys, database passwords stored in `.env` [CRITICAL NODE - Credential Compromise] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └─── Use compromised credentials to access backend systems or data [HIGH-RISK PATH END]
│   └─── Sage Theme Update Mechanism Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│       ├─── Upload malicious theme update package [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│       └─── Gain code execution upon theme update [CRITICAL NODE - Code Execution] [HIGH-RISK PATH END]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Build Process Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE - Attack Vector]:

  • Attack Vector: Targeting the software build process, which in Sage's case involves Node.js, npm/yarn, and Bud.js.
    • Critical Node Justification: Compromising the build process allows for injecting malicious code early in the application lifecycle, making it harder to detect and potentially impacting all deployments.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Dependency Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE - Attack Vector]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in third-party npm/yarn packages used by Sage and the application. * Critical Node Justification: Sage projects rely heavily on dependencies. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies are a common and easily exploitable attack surface.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1. Vulnerable npm/yarn Packages [HIGH-RISK PATH START]:

  • Attack Vector: Identifying and exploiting known vulnerabilities in outdated or vulnerable npm/yarn packages listed in package.json or yarn.lock. * High-Risk Path Justification: High likelihood due to the constant discovery of new vulnerabilities and medium effort required to identify and exploit them.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.a. Exploit known vulnerabilities in identified packages [CRITICAL NODE - Code Execution] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Using publicly available exploits or crafting custom exploits for known vulnerabilities (e.g., Prototype Pollution, arbitrary code execution) in vulnerable npm/yarn packages. * Critical Node Justification: Achieving code execution is a critical step towards full compromise. * High-Risk Path Justification: Medium likelihood and high impact due to the potential for direct code execution on the build server or in the application runtime.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.b. Gain control of build process or application runtime [CRITICAL NODE - Build Process Control] [HIGH-RISK PATH END]:

  • Attack Vector: Successfully exploiting dependency vulnerabilities to gain control over the build process (e.g., by modifying build scripts, injecting code during build steps) or the application runtime environment. * Critical Node Justification: Control over the build process or runtime is a critical objective, allowing for persistent compromise and data manipulation. * High-Risk Path Justification: High impact as it leads to full control of the application.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2. Malicious Dependency Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH START - Supply Chain Attack]:

  • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious dependencies into the project's dependency tree, either through typosquatting, compromising legitimate package maintainers, or other supply chain attack techniques. * High-Risk Path Justification: While potentially lower likelihood than exploiting known vulnerabilities, supply chain attacks are increasingly prevalent and have a high impact.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2.a. Supply chain attack on legitimate dependency [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Compromising a legitimate dependency by targeting its maintainer accounts or infrastructure and injecting malicious code into the package. * High-Risk Path Justification: Medium to High Impact due to the wide reach of popular dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2.b. Inject malicious code during npm install or yarn install [HIGH-RISK PATH END]:

  • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious code during the dependency installation process (e.g., via man-in-the-middle attacks or local environment manipulation) to execute code during the build process. * High-Risk Path Justification: High impact as it allows for code execution during the build process.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2. Build Script Manipulation [CRITICAL NODE - Attack Vector]:

  • Attack Vector: Directly manipulating build scripts and configuration files, such as bud.config.js, to inject malicious code into the build output. * Critical Node Justification: Build scripts control the entire build process. Compromising them provides a direct way to inject malicious code.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1. Compromise bud.config.js or related build configuration files [HIGH-RISK PATH START]:

  • Attack Vector: Gaining write access to bud.config.js or other build configuration files, often by exploiting server vulnerabilities or misconfigurations. * High-Risk Path Justification: Medium likelihood due to potential server vulnerabilities and misconfigurations, and high impact as it enables build script manipulation.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.a. Exploit vulnerabilities in server to gain write access to configuration files [CRITICAL NODE - Server Access] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting server-side vulnerabilities (e.g., file upload vulnerabilities, directory traversal, remote code execution in web server or related services) to gain write access to the server's filesystem and modify build configuration files. * Critical Node Justification: Server access is a critical escalation point, allowing for broader system compromise. * High-Risk Path Justification: Medium likelihood and high impact due to potential for server compromise and subsequent build configuration manipulation.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.b. Modify build configuration to inject malicious code into build output (JS/CSS) [CRITICAL NODE - Code Injection] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Modifying bud.config.js to inject malicious JavaScript or CSS code into the application's assets during the build process (e.g., by adding custom build steps, modifying webpack configurations). * Critical Node Justification: Code injection directly into application assets is a highly effective way to compromise the application's frontend and potentially backend. * High-Risk Path Justification: High impact as it leads to malicious code in the deployed application.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.b.i. Trigger rebuild and deploy compromised assets [HIGH-RISK PATH END]:

  • High-Risk Path Justification: High likelihood due to automated deployment processes and high impact as it deploys the compromised application to production.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Templating Engine (Blade) Misuse [CRITICAL NODE - Attack Vector]:

  • Attack Vector: Misusing the Blade templating engine, specifically through Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI). * Critical Node Justification: Blade is a core component of Sage for rendering dynamic content. Misuse can lead to direct server-side code execution.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1. Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) via Blade [CRITICAL NODE - Vulnerability Type] [HIGH-RISK PATH START]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting Server-Side Template Injection vulnerabilities in Blade templates by injecting malicious Blade syntax into user-controlled input that is directly rendered without proper escaping. * Critical Node Justification: SSTI is a well-known and critical vulnerability type in template engines. * High-Risk Path Justification: Medium likelihood due to common developer mistakes in handling user input in templates, and high impact as it can lead to code execution.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1. Inject malicious Blade syntax into user input [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Crafting malicious payloads containing Blade syntax (e.g., {{ }}) and injecting them into user input fields (GET/POST parameters, database entries) that are then rendered by vulnerable Blade templates. * High-Risk Path Justification: Medium likelihood if vulnerable templates exist, and high impact as it sets up SSTI exploitation.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.2. Execute arbitrary code on the server through Blade template engine [CRITICAL NODE - Code Execution] [HIGH-RISK PATH END]:

  • Attack Vector: Successfully exploiting SSTI vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code on the server by leveraging Blade's functionalities or underlying PHP execution capabilities. * Critical Node Justification: Code execution on the server is a critical objective, leading to full server compromise. * High-Risk Path Justification: High impact as it leads to full server compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Sage Specific Configuration or Features [CRITICAL NODE - Attack Vector]:

  • Attack Vector: Targeting misconfigurations or vulnerabilities specific to Sage's configuration or features, focusing on .env file exposure and theme update mechanisms. * Critical Node Justification: Sage introduces specific configuration elements and potentially custom features that can become attack vectors if not secured properly.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1. Misconfigured Environment Variables (.env) [CRITICAL NODE - Misconfiguration] [HIGH-RISK PATH START]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting misconfigurations that lead to the exposure of the .env file, which often contains sensitive credentials and API keys. * Critical Node Justification: Misconfiguration is a common issue, and .env files are prime targets for credential theft. * High-Risk Path Justification: Medium likelihood due to common misconfigurations, and high impact if sensitive credentials are exposed.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.1. Access sensitive credentials, API keys, database passwords stored in .env [CRITICAL NODE - Credential Compromise] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Accessing the exposed .env file to retrieve sensitive credentials, API keys, and database passwords stored within. * Critical Node Justification: Credential compromise is a critical step towards unauthorized access to backend systems and data. * High-Risk Path Justification: High impact as it leads to credential compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.2. Use compromised credentials to access backend systems or data [HIGH-RISK PATH END]:

  • Attack Vector: Using the compromised credentials obtained from the .env file to gain unauthorized access to backend systems, databases, APIs, or other sensitive resources. * High-Risk Path Justification: High likelihood if credentials are valid and backend systems are accessible, and critical impact due to potential data breaches and backend system compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 3.2. Sage Theme Update Mechanism Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH START]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in a custom theme update mechanism (if implemented in the Sage application), such as insecure file uploads or lack of integrity checks. * High-Risk Path Justification: Medium likelihood if a custom update mechanism is poorly implemented, and high impact as it can lead to code execution.

Attack Tree Path: 3.2.1. Upload malicious theme update package [HIGH-RISK PATH START]:

  • Attack Vector: Uploading a malicious theme update package containing backdoors or malicious code by exploiting vulnerabilities in the theme update mechanism (e.g., insecure file uploads, lack of authentication or authorization). * High-Risk Path Justification: Medium likelihood if vulnerabilities exist in the update mechanism, and high impact as it allows for malicious code upload.

Attack Tree Path: 3.2.2. Gain code execution upon theme update [CRITICAL NODE - Code Execution] [HIGH-RISK PATH END]:

  • Attack Vector: Achieving code execution on the server when the malicious theme update package is installed or processed by the vulnerable update mechanism. * Critical Node Justification: Code execution on the server is a critical objective, leading to full server compromise. * High-Risk Path Justification: High impact as it leads to full control of the application.