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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for roots/sage

Attack Surface: 1. Dependency Vulnerabilities (Node.js/npm/Yarn)

  • Description: Vulnerabilities in Node.js packages used during the Sage build process.
    • How Sage Contributes: Sage relies heavily on npm/Yarn for asset compilation (Webpack, Babel, etc.). This is a core part of Sage's functionality.
    • Example: A vulnerability in a Webpack loader (e.g., sass-loader) could allow an attacker to inject malicious code into the compiled CSS, leading to a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack.
    • Impact:
      • Compromise of the development environment.
      • Injection of malicious code into the website (XSS, data exfiltration).
      • Denial of service during the build process.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (if a vulnerability allows code execution in the build environment) to High (if it allows client-side attacks).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regular Updates: Run npm audit or yarn audit frequently and update vulnerable packages immediately.
      • Dependency Pinning: Use a lockfile (package-lock.json or yarn.lock).
      • Dependency Management Tools: Employ tools like Dependabot or Snyk.
      • Isolated Build Environments: Use CI/CD pipelines with isolated build environments (e.g., Docker containers).
      • Review package.json: Periodically review to remove unnecessary dependencies.

Attack Surface: 2. Unescaped Output in Blade Templates

  • Description: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities due to unescaped output in Blade templates.
    • How Sage Contributes: Sage uses the Blade templating engine, which provides automatic escaping but allows developers to bypass it. This is a direct feature of Sage's templating system.
    • Example: A developer uses the {!! !!} directive to output user-supplied data without sanitization, allowing XSS.
    • Impact:
      • Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks.
      • Session hijacking.
      • Data theft.
    • Risk Severity: High.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Use Default Escaping: Always use {{ }} unless absolutely necessary.
      • Sanitize Raw Output: If {!! !!} is required, meticulously sanitize the data using WordPress functions or a sanitization library.
      • Code Review: Thoroughly review all Blade templates.
      • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strong CSP.

Attack Surface: 3. Insecure AJAX Handlers

  • Description: Vulnerabilities in custom AJAX handlers due to insufficient security.
    • How Sage Contributes: Sage's structure encourages the use of custom JavaScript and AJAX, but doesn't inherently provide security for these handlers. This is a common pattern within Sage development.
    • Example: An AJAX endpoint that updates user profiles doesn't check for nonces or capabilities, allowing unauthorized modification.
    • Impact:
      • Cross-site request forgery (CSRF).
      • Unauthorized data access and modification.
      • Privilege escalation.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Nonces: Use WordPress nonces.
      • Capability Checks: Implement checks using current_user_can().
      • Input Validation: Thoroughly validate and sanitize all data on the server-side.
      • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting.

Attack Surface: 4. Hardcoded Secrets in JavaScript

  • Description: Exposure of secrets in client-side JavaScript.
    • How Sage Contributes: Sage's use of Webpack for JavaScript compilation doesn't automatically prevent developers from hardcoding secrets. This is a risk directly related to how Sage handles JavaScript.
    • Example: A developer hardcodes an API key in a JavaScript file, exposed in the compiled asset.
    • Impact:
      • Exposure of API keys and secrets.
      • Unauthorized use of third-party services.
    • Risk Severity: High.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Environment Variables: Use environment variables.
      • Webpack DefinePlugin: Inject environment variables during build.
      • Laravel Mix .env: Use .env file support.
      • Never Commit Secrets: Exclude .env files from version control.
      • Code Scanning: Use static code analysis.

Attack Surface: 5. Data Exposure in Controllers (Sage 9)

  • Description: Sensitive data unintentionally passed from controllers to views.
    • How Sage Contributes: Sage 9's controller-view architecture is the direct mechanism that can lead to this if developers aren't careful.
    • Example: A controller passes a user's full database record, including password hashes, to the view.
    • Impact:
      • Exposure of sensitive user data.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Data Minimization: Only pass necessary data to views.
      • Data Transformation: Transform data in the controller.
      • View Logic: Ensure views only display appropriate data.
      • Code Review: Carefully review controller and view code.