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Attack Tree Analysis for seldaek/monolog

Objective: Compromise Application via Monolog Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Monolog Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[AND]─> Exploit Monolog Functionality [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─> 1. Log Injection Attacks [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[OR]─> 1.1. Code Injection via Logs │ │ │ ├───[OR]─> 1.1.1. Control Log Message Content [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ │ └───[OR]─> 1.1.1.1. Input Field Manipulation [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[OR]─> 1.3. Information Disclosure via Logs │ │ │ ├───[AND]─> 1.3.1. Sensitive Data Logging [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ │ └───[OR]─> 1.3.1.1. Misconfiguration of Log Levels [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─> 4. Configuration Exploitation │ │ ├───[OR]─> 4.1. Access to Monolog Configuration Files [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─> 5. Dependency Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[OR]─> 5.1. Vulnerabilities in Monolog Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.1. Input Field Manipulation (Code Injection via Logs)

  • Attack Vector: An attacker injects malicious code (e.g., shell commands, scripting code) into input fields of the application.
  • Mechanism: This malicious input is then logged by the application using Monolog without proper sanitization or encoding.
  • Exploitation: If the logs are processed by a vulnerable system (e.g., log analysis tools, scripts, or even the application itself if it reads back logs), the injected code can be executed.
  • Example: Injecting "; system('rm -rf /');" into a username field, hoping a vulnerable log processor will execute this command when processing the log entry.
  • Risk: High likelihood due to common input validation weaknesses in web applications, and high impact due to potential code execution and full system compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1.1. Misconfiguration of Log Levels (Information Disclosure)

  • Attack Vector: The application is misconfigured to use overly verbose log levels (e.g., DEBUG or INFO) in production environments.
  • Mechanism: Due to the verbose log level, sensitive information that should only be logged in development or testing (e.g., passwords, API keys, personal data, internal paths, error details) is inadvertently included in production logs.
  • Exploitation: If an attacker gains access to these production logs (e.g., via web-accessible log files, compromised server, or insecure log storage), they can easily extract the sensitive information.
  • Example: Logging database queries in DEBUG mode, which might include sensitive data in query parameters or results.
  • Risk: Medium likelihood due to common misconfigurations, and medium to high impact due to potential disclosure of sensitive data leading to further attacks or compliance violations.

Attack Tree Path: 5.1. Vulnerabilities in Monolog Dependencies

  • Attack Vector: The application uses an outdated version of Monolog or its dependencies that contain known security vulnerabilities.
  • Mechanism: Publicly known vulnerabilities exist in the dependencies used by Monolog (or Monolog itself if outdated).
  • Exploitation: Attackers can leverage readily available exploits or vulnerability information to target these known weaknesses. This can lead to various outcomes depending on the specific vulnerability, including code execution, denial of service, or other forms of compromise.
  • Example: A vulnerability in a network library used by a Monolog handler (e.g., SocketHandler) could be exploited to gain remote code execution.
  • Risk: Medium likelihood because many applications fail to keep dependencies updated, and high impact as dependency vulnerabilities can often lead to direct code execution and full application compromise.