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Threat Model Analysis for seldaek/monolog

Threat: Sensitive Data Exposure in Logs

  • Description: Unintentional logging of sensitive information (passwords, API keys, PII) by developers using Monolog. Attackers who gain access to these logs (through various means outside of Monolog itself, but the vulnerability is created by how Monolog is used) can extract this sensitive data.
  • Impact: Data breach, privacy violations, compliance violations, severe reputational damage.
  • Monolog Component Affected: Log Handlers (FileHandler, StreamHandler, etc.), Processors, Formatters, overall Logging Configuration. The configuration and usage of Monolog are the direct components involved.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Utilize Monolog\Processor\MaskProcessor to automatically redact sensitive fields before logging.
    • Carefully review and configure log formatters to explicitly exclude sensitive information.
    • Provide mandatory training for developers on secure logging practices and data sensitivity.
    • Implement automated checks in CI/CD pipelines to detect potential logging of sensitive data (e.g., regex patterns).

Threat: Log Injection Attack

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious payloads into log messages through user-controlled input that is logged via Monolog without proper sanitization. This is achieved by manipulating input fields that are subsequently logged. While Monolog itself doesn't execute the injected code, vulnerable log analysis tools or downstream systems processing these logs could be exploited.
  • Impact: Manipulation of log analysis systems, potential exploitation of vulnerabilities in log viewing tools leading to further compromise (e.g., XSS in a log viewer), and in highly specific and less likely scenarios, potential command injection if logs are processed by vulnerable scripts.
  • Monolog Component Affected: Input data being passed to Monolog for logging, Formatters (if they don't handle escaping appropriately). The data handling within Monolog and its formatters is the direct component.
  • Risk Severity: High (can escalate to Critical depending on downstream log processing vulnerabilities).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Sanitize or encode user inputs before passing them to Monolog for logging.
    • Employ parameterized logging or structured logging to clearly separate log messages from variable data, reducing injection risks.
    • Ensure that any log analysis and processing tools used are secure and robust against log injection attacks.
    • Implement strict input validation on data intended for logging, especially from external sources, to reject or sanitize potentially harmful input before it even reaches Monolog.

Threat: Log Flood Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Description: Attackers exploit application logic that utilizes Monolog to generate an excessive volume of log entries. This can be triggered by malicious requests or actions designed to flood the logging system, leading to resource exhaustion (disk space, CPU, I/O) and potentially application or system unavailability. The attacker targets application features that heavily rely on logging via Monolog.
  • Impact: Application downtime, performance degradation, service disruption, resource exhaustion leading to broader system instability.
  • Monolog Component Affected: Log Handlers (especially those writing to disk or network), overall Logging Configuration, Application logic using Monolog. Monolog's handlers and the configuration controlling log volume are directly involved.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement rate limiting on log generation within the application logic before messages are passed to Monolog.
    • Configure appropriate log levels in Monolog (e.g., using WARNING, ERROR, CRITICAL in production) to reduce verbosity.
    • Utilize Monolog handlers with buffering or throttling capabilities to manage log volume spikes.
    • Monitor log volume and resource consumption related to logging to detect and respond to potential log flooding attacks proactively.
    • Ensure sufficient resources are allocated for log storage and processing to handle expected log volumes and potential surges.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in Monolog Handlers and Formatters

  • Description: Security vulnerabilities discovered within specific Monolog handlers (e.g., network handlers, database handlers) or formatters. Attackers could exploit these vulnerabilities if the application uses the affected components. Exploitation could range from information disclosure to remote code execution, depending on the specific vulnerability.
  • Impact: Potentially critical impacts including information disclosure, denial of service, remote code execution, complete system compromise, depending on the nature of the vulnerability and the exploited handler/formatter.
  • Monolog Component Affected: Specific Monolog Handlers (e.g., SocketHandler, SyslogHandler, DoctrineCouchDBHandler, etc.), Formatters, and potentially the core Monolog library if vulnerabilities exist within its core functions.
  • Risk Severity: Critical (depending on the specific vulnerability and exploited component).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Immediately apply updates and patches for Monolog and all its dependencies to address known vulnerabilities.
    • Carefully review and select Monolog handlers and formatters, prioritizing well-maintained and security-conscious options. Avoid using handlers or formatters with known security issues or those that are no longer actively maintained.
    • Actively monitor security advisories and vulnerability databases related to Monolog and its dependencies. Subscribe to security mailing lists and use vulnerability scanning tools.
    • If custom handlers or formatters are developed, ensure they undergo rigorous security testing and code review to minimize the introduction of new vulnerabilities.