Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
112 lines (98 loc) · 8.8 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

112 lines (98 loc) · 8.8 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for seldaek/monolog

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Data, Manipulate Logs, or Disrupt Logging

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     +-----------------------------------------------------+
                                     |  Attacker's Goal: Gain Unauthorized Access to      |
                                     |  Sensitive Data, Manipulate Logs, or Disrupt Logging |
                                     +-----------------------------------------------------+
                                                       |
          +---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
          |                                                                                 |
+--------------------+                                                                       |
| Access Sensitive   |                                                                       |
| Log Data           |                                                                       |
+--------------------+                                                                       |
          |
+--------------------+                                                                       
|  Exploit Handler   | [CRITICAL]
|  Vulnerabilities  |
+--------------------+
          |
+--------------------+
|  File Handler      | [HIGH RISK]
|  Vulnerability    |
+--------------------+
          |
+--------------------+
|  Database Handler  | [HIGH RISK]
|  Vulnerability    |
+--------------------+
          |
+--------------------+
|  Misconfiguration  | [HIGH RISK]
+--------------------+
          |
+--------------------+
|  Lack of Input     | [HIGH RISK]
|  Sanitization      |
+--------------------+

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Handler Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]

  • Description: This is the most critical node because it represents the primary attack surface. Monolog's handlers are responsible for sending log data to various destinations, and each handler has its own potential vulnerabilities. Compromising a handler often provides a direct path to accessing or manipulating log data.
  • Likelihood: Variable (Depends on the specific handler and its configuration)
  • Impact: High to Very High (Can lead to direct access to sensitive data or control over logging)
  • Effort: Variable (Depends on the complexity of the vulnerability)
  • Skill Level: Variable (Depends on the complexity of the vulnerability)
  • Detection Difficulty: Variable (Depends on the handler and monitoring in place)
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Exploiting known vulnerabilities in specific handler implementations.
    • Leveraging misconfigurations in handler settings.
    • Taking advantage of insecure communication channels used by the handler (e.g., unencrypted network connections).
    • Exploiting vulnerabilities in the underlying systems or services that the handler interacts with (e.g., database, syslog).

Attack Tree Path: File Handler Vulnerability [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: This path involves exploiting vulnerabilities related to how Monolog's file handler writes log data to the file system. This often requires a separate vulnerability (e.g., path traversal, privilege escalation) to gain access to the file system, or a misconfiguration that exposes the log file.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Requires a separate vulnerability or misconfiguration)
  • Impact: High (Direct access to sensitive log data)
  • Effort: Medium (Depends on the vulnerability exploited)
  • Skill Level: Medium (Requires understanding of file system permissions and potential vulnerabilities)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (File access logs might show unusual activity, but could be missed)
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Path Traversal: If the application uses user-supplied input to construct the log file path without proper sanitization, an attacker might be able to write logs to arbitrary locations or read existing files.
    • Insecure Permissions: If the log file is created with overly permissive permissions (e.g., world-writable), any user on the system could read or modify it.
    • Privilege Escalation: If an attacker can gain elevated privileges on the system (through a separate vulnerability), they could access the log file even if it has restricted permissions.
    • Symlink Attacks: If the application follows symbolic links when writing logs, an attacker might be able to create a symlink that points to a sensitive file, causing the application to overwrite it with log data.

Attack Tree Path: Database Handler Vulnerability [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: This path focuses on vulnerabilities arising from the application's use of Monolog to write logs to a database. The most significant threat here is SQL injection.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Requires a SQL injection vulnerability in the application's code)
  • Impact: Very High (Potential access to the entire database, not just logs)
  • Effort: Medium (Depends on the complexity of the SQL injection)
  • Skill Level: Medium (Requires understanding of SQL injection techniques)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Database monitoring and intrusion detection systems might detect SQL injection attempts)
  • Attack Vectors:
    • SQL Injection: If the application logs unsanitized user input that is then used in SQL queries without proper escaping or parameterization, an attacker could inject malicious SQL code to read, modify, or delete data in the database. This is a vulnerability in how the application uses Monolog, not in Monolog itself.

Attack Tree Path: Misconfiguration [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: This path encompasses various errors in configuring Monolog or its handlers, leading to security vulnerabilities.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Human error is common)
  • Impact: Variable (Depends on the specific misconfiguration, can range from low to very high)
  • Effort: Very Low (Simple mistakes can have significant consequences)
  • Skill Level: Very Low (No specialized skills required)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Configuration audits can detect misconfigurations)
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Logging to an Insecure Location: Configuring a handler to write logs to a world-readable directory or an easily accessible network share.
    • Overly Permissive Log Level: Setting the log level too low (e.g., DEBUG in production) can expose sensitive information that shouldn't be logged.
    • Exposing Sensitive Credentials: Including API keys, database passwords, or other secrets in the Monolog configuration without proper protection (e.g., using environment variables or a secure configuration file).
    • Incorrectly Configuring Network Handlers: Using unencrypted protocols (e.g., plain HTTP) for network-based logging, or failing to validate server certificates.
    • Disabling Security Features: Turning off security features provided by handlers (e.g., disabling TLS for a network handler).

Attack Tree Path: Lack of Input Sanitization [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: This path highlights the risk of logging unsanitized user input. While not a direct vulnerability in Monolog, it can lead to vulnerabilities in log analysis tools or other systems that consume the logs.
  • Likelihood: Medium to High (Common vulnerability in web applications)
  • Impact: Medium (Could lead to vulnerabilities in log analysis tools, not Monolog itself, but can enable other attacks)
  • Effort: Low (Simple to inject malicious input)
  • Skill Level: Low (Basic understanding of web vulnerabilities)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires analyzing log data for malicious patterns)
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): If log data containing unsanitized user input is displayed in a web-based log viewer, an attacker could inject malicious JavaScript code that would be executed in the context of the viewer.
    • Log Injection: An attacker could inject specially crafted log entries that might be misinterpreted by log analysis tools or automated systems, potentially leading to incorrect actions or security breaches.
    • Data Exfiltration: An attacker might be able to use log injection to exfiltrate sensitive data from the application by encoding it in log messages.
    • Command Injection (Indirect): If log data is used in shell commands or other system calls without proper escaping, an attacker might be able to inject malicious commands.