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Threat Model Analysis for seldaek/monolog

Threat: Sensitive Data Exposure via Unprotected Log Files

  • Threat: Sensitive Data Exposure via Unprotected Log Files

    • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to log files generated by Monolog. They might achieve this by:
      • Exploiting a web vulnerability (if logs are misconfigured to be within the webroot).
      • Gaining shell access to the server.
      • Exploiting misconfigured file permissions.
      • Monolog is configured to write to a world-readable location.
    • Impact: Leakage of sensitive information logged by the application, including PII, credentials, session tokens, internal system details, and proprietary data. This can lead to identity theft, account takeover, financial loss, reputational damage, and regulatory fines.
    • Affected Monolog Component: StreamHandler, RotatingFileHandler, SyslogHandler (any handler that writes to a file or system log). The core issue is the destination and permissions configured for these handlers.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Store Logs Outside Web Root: Never store log files within the web server's document root.
      • Set Strict File Permissions: Use restrictive file permissions (e.g., 600 or 640 on Unix-like systems). Ensure only the necessary user can read the files.
      • Use a Dedicated Logging User: If possible, have Monolog write logs as a dedicated, low-privilege user.
      • Regularly Rotate and Archive Logs: Use RotatingFileHandler and securely archive old logs (potentially with encryption).
      • Monitor File Access: Implement file integrity monitoring (FIM).

Threat: Log Injection Leading to Log Forgery

  • Threat: Log Injection Leading to Log Forgery

    • Description: An attacker injects malicious data into log entries by manipulating user input that is subsequently logged without proper sanitization by the application before being passed to Monolog. The attacker might:
      • Submit crafted input through web forms, API requests, or other input vectors.
      • Inject newline characters (\n, \r) to create fake log entries.
      • Include control characters that disrupt log parsing.
    • Impact: Compromised log integrity. Attackers can create false log entries to cover their tracks, mislead investigations, or frame others. This undermines the reliability of logs for auditing and security.
    • Affected Monolog Component: Any handler. The vulnerability lies in how the application uses Monolog to log unsanitized data. Monolog's Processors are crucial for mitigation.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Sanitize User Input: Thoroughly sanitize all user-supplied data before logging it. Use a dedicated sanitization library or Monolog Processors (e.g., PsrLogMessageProcessor, custom processors).
      • Use Parameterized Logging: Pass user input as context data to Monolog, not by directly embedding it in the log message string. Example: $logger->info('User login', ['username' => $userInput]);
      • Avoid Direct String Concatenation: Never directly concatenate user input into log messages.

Threat: Credential Exposure in Configuration

  • Threat: Credential Exposure in Configuration

    • Description: An attacker gains access to Monolog configuration files that contain hardcoded credentials (e.g., API keys, database passwords). This could happen through:
      • Source code repository compromise.
      • Server compromise.
      • Misconfigured access controls on configuration files.
    • Impact: Credential compromise. The attacker can use the stolen credentials to access other systems or services.
    • Affected Monolog Component: Any handler that requires credentials (e.g., SwiftMailerHandler, database handlers, cloud service handlers). The issue is with how credentials are provided to the handler within the Monolog configuration.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Use Environment Variables: Store credentials in environment variables and access them from the Monolog configuration.
      • Use a Secure Configuration Management System: Use a dedicated system (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager).
      • Never Commit Credentials to Version Control: Use .gitignore (or equivalent).
      • Restrict Access to Configuration Files: Ensure appropriate permissions.