Attack Surface: User-Agent Spoofing for Restriction Bypass
Description: Attackers manipulate the User-Agent
header to impersonate a different device or browser type to bypass restrictions enforced based on device detection.
* mobile-detect
Contribution: The library's core function is to interpret the User-Agent
, making it the direct enabler of this attack surface if the application relies solely on its output for security decisions.
* Example: An application offers a premium feature only to mobile users. An attacker on a desktop spoofs a mobile User-Agent
to gain unauthorized access to the feature.
* Impact: Unauthorized access to features, data, or functionality; potential violation of licensing or terms of service.
* Risk Severity: High (if used for access control).
* Mitigation Strategies:
* Never solely rely on User-Agent
for security: Implement server-side authorization and validation that does not depend on the User-Agent
. Use mobile-detect
for UX enhancements, not security enforcement.
* Combine with other factors: If device-specific behavior is needed, combine User-Agent
detection with other client-side checks (e.g., screen size, touch capabilities) but still validate on the server.
* Session Management: Ensure proper session management and authentication are in place, regardless of the detected device.
Attack Surface: User-Agent Manipulation for Unexpected Code Paths
Description: Attackers craft malicious User-Agent
strings to force the application into untested or less secure code paths.
* mobile-detect
Contribution: The library's parsing of the User-Agent
determines which code path is executed based on the detected device. A manipulated User-Agent
can trigger unintended paths.
* Example: An application has a special code path for a legacy mobile browser with known vulnerabilities. An attacker spoofs the User-Agent
of that browser to trigger the vulnerable code.
* Impact: Potential exposure of vulnerabilities in less-tested code; unexpected application behavior; possible security bypass.
* Risk Severity: High (if untested paths contain vulnerabilities).
* Mitigation Strategies:
* Thorough Testing: Test all code paths, including those for less common or legacy devices. Use fuzzing techniques with various User-Agent
strings.
* Input Validation (of Results): Validate the output of mobile-detect
(e.g., check if the detected device is within an expected range) before using it to make decisions.
* Default to Secure Path: If the User-Agent
is unrecognized or invalid, default to the most secure code path.
* Least Privilege: Ensure that different code paths operate with the least necessary privileges.
Attack Surface: Dependency Chain Vulnerabilities
Description: Vulnerabilities in libraries that mobile-detect
depends on could be exploited.
* mobile-detect
Contribution: Indirectly contributes by relying on external dependencies.
* Example: A dependency of mobile-detect
has a known remote code execution vulnerability.
* Impact: Varies depending on the vulnerability in the dependency, potentially ranging from information disclosure to remote code execution.
* Risk Severity: Varies depending on the vulnerability, potentially Critical or High.
* Mitigation Strategies:
* Regular Updates: Keep mobile-detect
and all its dependencies updated.
* Vulnerability Scanning: Use software composition analysis (SCA) tools to identify known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
* Dependency Pinning: Consider pinning dependency versions to prevent unexpected updates that might introduce new vulnerabilities (but balance this with the need to apply security updates).