attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for spatie/laravel-permission

Objective: Elevate Privileges in Application (via Laravel-Permission) [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Elevate Privileges in Application (via Laravel-Permission) [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[AND] Exploit Application Logic Flaws Related to Permission Checks [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├───[OR] Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) on Permission Management [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[AND] Bypass Authentication/Authorization to Access Endpoints [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├───[OR] Find Logic Flaws in Authentication/Authorization Middleware (related to Laravel-Permission usage) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[AND] Manipulate Request Parameters to Modify Permissions/Roles [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───[Insight] **Actionable Insight:** Implement robust authorization checks on all permission management endpoints. Use parameterized queries/ORM to prevent injection. Validate user inputs thoroughly. [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[OR] Insecure Permission Checks in Application Code [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[AND] Bypass or Circumvent Permission Checks [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├───[OR] Logic Errors in `can()` Gates/Policies [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├───[OR] Missing Permission Checks [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├───[OR] Parameter Tampering to Influence Permission Checks [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───[Insight] **Actionable Insight:**  Conduct thorough code reviews focusing on permission check implementations. Ensure all critical actions are protected by appropriate permissions. Write unit/integration tests specifically for authorization logic. [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[AND] Exploit Misconfiguration of Laravel-Permission [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├───[OR] Insecure Default Roles/Permissions [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[AND] Identify Overly Permissive Default Settings [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───[Insight] **Actionable Insight:**  Review and customize default roles and permissions to follow the principle of least privilege. Ensure default settings are secure and appropriate for the application's needs. [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[OR] Incorrect Middleware Application [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[AND] Identify Routes/Controllers Lacking Middleware Protection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───[Insight] **Actionable Insight:**  Ensure all routes and controller actions requiring authorization are properly protected by relevant Laravel-Permission middleware. Use route groups and resource controllers to manage middleware consistently. [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[AND] API Manipulation for Role/Permission Management (if APIs exposed) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[AND] Bypass API Authentication/Authorization [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[AND] Manipulate API Requests to Modify Roles/Permissions [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   └───[Insight] **Actionable Insight:**  Secure all API endpoints with robust authentication and authorization mechanisms. Validate all API requests and inputs. Implement API rate limiting and monitoring. [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Application Logic Flaws Related to Permission Checks [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) on Permission Management [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Directly accessing permission management endpoints without proper authorization: Attacker attempts to access URLs or API endpoints intended for administrators (e.g., /admin/roles, /api/permissions) without being authenticated as an administrator or having the necessary permissions.
    • Manipulating object IDs in requests: Attacker changes IDs in requests (e.g., user ID, role ID, permission ID) to access or modify resources they should not have access to. For example, changing the user ID in a request to assign a role to a different user.
    • Predictable resource IDs: If resource IDs are predictable (e.g., sequential integers), attacker can iterate through IDs to discover and access unauthorized resources related to permissions.

• Insecure Permission Checks in Application Code [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Logic Errors in can() Gates/Policies [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Incorrect conditional logic: Flaws in the logic of can() gates or policies that lead to unintended authorization bypass. For example, using incorrect operators (e.g., OR instead of AND), missing conditions, or flawed logic flow.
      • Edge cases not handled: Gates or policies not accounting for specific edge cases or unusual scenarios, allowing bypass in those situations.
      • Race conditions or timing issues: In complex scenarios, logic errors might arise due to race conditions or timing dependencies in permission checks.
    • Missing Permission Checks [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Critical functionalities unprotected: Developers forget to implement permission checks for certain critical functionalities, leaving them accessible to unauthorized users. This could include actions like data modification, sensitive information access, or administrative functions.
      • Assumptions of implicit authorization: Incorrectly assuming that authorization is handled elsewhere and neglecting to implement explicit checks where needed.
    • Parameter Tampering to Influence Permission Checks [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Manipulating parameters used in can() checks: Attacker modifies request parameters that are directly used within can() gates or policies to influence the outcome of the authorization check. For example, changing a user role parameter or resource identifier to bypass the check.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Misconfiguration of Laravel-Permission [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Insecure Default Roles/Permissions [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Overly permissive default roles: Default roles (e.g., "user", "guest") are configured with excessive permissions, granting unintended access to functionalities.
    • Default "admin" role too powerful: The default "admin" role might have overly broad permissions, increasing the impact if an attacker compromises an admin account.
    • Publicly accessible permission management: Permission management features are unintentionally made accessible to standard users or even unauthenticated users due to misconfiguration.
    • Lack of principle of least privilege: Default configurations not adhering to the principle of least privilege, granting more permissions than necessary.

• Incorrect Middleware Application [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Missing middleware on critical routes: Forgetting to apply Laravel-Permission middleware (role, permission, role_or_permission) to routes or controller actions that require authorization.
    • Incorrect middleware type: Applying the wrong type of middleware (e.g., using role middleware when permission middleware is needed, or vice versa).
    • Middleware applied to wrong routes: Accidentally applying middleware to routes that should be publicly accessible, or not applying it to routes that require protection.
    • Bypassable middleware configuration: Misconfiguring middleware in a way that allows attackers to bypass it, for example, through incorrect route ordering or middleware priority.
    • Inconsistent middleware application: Applying middleware inconsistently across the application, leading to some areas being protected while others are vulnerable.

Attack Tree Path: API Manipulation for Role/Permission Management (if APIs exposed) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vectors:
  • Bypass API Authentication/Authorization [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Weak or missing API authentication: APIs for permission management lack proper authentication mechanisms, allowing unauthorized access.
    • Broken API authorization: Authorization checks on API endpoints are flawed or missing, allowing users to perform actions beyond their intended permissions.
    • API key leakage or compromise: If API keys are used, they might be leaked or compromised, granting attackers unauthorized access to API endpoints.
    • Session hijacking or token theft: Attackers might steal or hijack user sessions or API tokens to gain authenticated access to APIs.
  • Manipulate API Requests to Modify Roles/Permissions [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • API parameter tampering: Attacker manipulates API request parameters (e.g., in JSON or XML payloads) to modify roles or permissions in an unauthorized way.
    • Mass assignment vulnerabilities: APIs might be vulnerable to mass assignment, allowing attackers to modify unintended fields related to roles or permissions by including them in API requests.
    • API injection vulnerabilities: APIs might be susceptible to injection vulnerabilities (e.g., command injection, code injection) if input validation is insufficient, potentially allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code or commands to manipulate roles and permissions.
    • API logic flaws: Logic errors in the API endpoints for permission management that allow attackers to bypass intended authorization controls or escalate privileges through API calls.