Objective: Gain unauthorized access to resources or perform actions beyond the attacker's intended privileges by exploiting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations within the spatie/laravel-permission
implementation.
[Attacker's Goal: Gain Unauthorized Access/Actions]
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[1. Bypass Permission Checks] [2. Exploit Role/Permission Assignment]
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[1.1 Logic Flaws] [1.2 Direct Object Ref.] [2.2 Insufficient Auth.]
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***[1.1.1 Incorrect]*** [!] [1.2.1 Bypassing] ***[!] [2.2.1 Weak Admin]***
***[Implementation][!]***[Middleware/Gates] ***[Password][!]***
Attack Tree Path: 1. Bypass Permission Checks
-
1.1 Logic Flaws:
- 1.1.1 Incorrect Implementation (High-Risk Path, Critical Node):
- Description: The developer has made mistakes in how they use the
spatie/laravel-permission
API. This could include:- Typos in permission or role names.
- Incorrect logic in conditional statements using
hasPermissionTo()
,hasRole()
, or similar methods. - Misunderstanding the "and"/"or" behavior when checking for multiple permissions or roles.
- Incorrect use of Blade directives like
@can
and@role
.
- Likelihood: Medium-High
- Impact: High (Directly bypasses security)
- Effort: Low-Medium
- Skill Level: Intermediate-Advanced
- Detection Difficulty: Medium-Hard
- Mitigation:
- Thorough code reviews of all code using the package.
- Comprehensive unit and integration tests, covering both positive and negative cases.
- Clear documentation on how permissions and roles are used.
- Description: The developer has made mistakes in how they use the
- 1.1.1 Incorrect Implementation (High-Risk Path, Critical Node):
-
1.2 Direct Object Reference (DOR) Vulnerabilities:
- 1.2.1 Bypassing Middleware/Gates (Critical Node):
- Description: The attacker directly accesses routes or controller actions, circumventing the middleware or gates that are supposed to enforce permission checks. This happens when routes are not properly protected.
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: High (Unauthorized access)
- Effort: Low
- Skill Level: Intermediate
- Detection Difficulty: Medium
- Mitigation:
- Ensure all routes requiring authorization are protected by
can
middleware,role
middleware, or gates. - Use a "deny-by-default" approach to route protection.
- Regularly audit route definitions.
- Consider centralized authorization logic.
- Ensure all routes requiring authorization are protected by
- 1.2.1 Bypassing Middleware/Gates (Critical Node):
Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Role/Permission Assignment
- 2.2 Insufficient Authorization for Role/Permission Management:
- 2.2.1 Weak Admin Password/Compromised Admin Account (High-Risk Path, Critical Node):
- Description: The attacker gains access to an administrative account, allowing them to manipulate roles and permissions. This is often due to weak passwords, phishing, or other account compromise methods.
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: Very High (Complete control over permissions)
- Effort: Low-High (Varies greatly depending on the attack method)
- Skill Level: Novice-Expert (Varies greatly)
- Detection Difficulty: Easy-Very Hard (Depends on monitoring and intrusion detection)
- Mitigation:
- Enforce strong, unique passwords for all administrative accounts.
- Implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for all administrative accounts.
- Adhere to the principle of least privilege for admin accounts.
- Implement secure session management practices.
- Implement and monitor audit logs for role/permission changes.
- 2.2.1 Weak Admin Password/Compromised Admin Account (High-Risk Path, Critical Node):