Mitigation Strategy: Strict Input Validation and Sanitization (Within the Command)
Description:
- Identify All Input Points: Within each console command, meticulously list every argument and option. Document the expected data type, format, and any constraints (e.g., maximum length, allowed values).
- Implement Validation (using
Assert\
constraints): Inside the command'sconfigure()
method (for defining options/arguments) and theexecute()
method (for processing input), leverage Symfony's Validation component.- For each input, add appropriate
Assert\
constraints:Assert\Type
: Ensure correct data type (integer, string, boolean, array).Assert\NotBlank
: Prevent empty values for required inputs.Assert\Length
: Set minimum/maximum string lengths.Assert\Choice
: Restrict input to a predefined set of allowed values.Assert\Regex
: Enforce specific patterns using regular expressions.Assert\Email
: Validate email addresses.Assert\Url
: Validate URLs.Assert\Range
: Validate numeric ranges.
- For complex validation, create custom validator classes.
- For each input, add appropriate
- Handle Validation Errors (within
execute()
): In theexecute()
method, check for validation errors. If errors are found, display informative error messages to the user (using theOutputInterface
) and exit the command gracefully (non-zero exit code). Do not proceed if validation fails. - Sanitize Output (if necessary, within
execute()
): If the command's output includes user-supplied data, sanitize it before displaying it to prevent potential issues (though XSS is less common in console applications). Use appropriate escaping functions.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Command Injection (Argument/Option Manipulation): (Severity: Critical) - Prevents attackers from injecting malicious code or altering command behavior.
- SQL Injection (subset of Command Injection): (Severity: Critical) - If the command interacts with a database, validation helps prevent SQL injection.
- Denial of Service (DoS): (Severity: High) - Length/type checks prevent excessively large or malformed inputs.
- Information Disclosure: (Severity: Medium) - Output sanitization prevents accidental data exposure.
-
Impact:
- Command Injection: Risk reduced from Critical to Low.
- SQL Injection: Risk reduced from Critical to Low (with parameter binding, which is a separate, but related, mitigation).
- DoS: Risk reduced from High to Medium.
- Information Disclosure: Risk reduced from Medium to Low.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Basic type checking (
Assert\Type
) inApp\Command\UserCreateCommand
forusername
andemail
. - Length restrictions (
Assert\Length
) forusername
.
- Basic type checking (
-
Missing Implementation:
App\Command\ProcessDataCommand
: No validation for thefile
argument (a critical vulnerability). NeedsAssert\NotBlank
,Assert\File
(or custom validator).App\Command\UserCreateCommand
: MissingAssert\Email
foremail
. MissingAssert\Choice
for the optionalrole
argument.- No commands sanitize output; review on a case-by-case basis.
Mitigation Strategy: Avoid Direct Shell Execution (Use Symfony's Process
Component Within Commands)
Description:
- Identify Shell Commands (within command code): Search the codebase within your console commands for uses of
exec()
,shell_exec()
,system()
,passthru()
, or backticks. - Replace with
Process
: Refactor each instance to use Symfony'sProcess
component. - Use Array Arguments (with
Process
): Always pass command arguments as an array toProcess
, never as a concatenated string. This is the key to preventing injection. - Handle Output and Errors (within
execute()
): UseProcess
methods (getOutput()
,getErrorOutput()
,isSuccessful()
,getExitCode()
) to manage the command's output and status. - Set Timeouts (on the
Process
object): UsesetTimeout()
andsetIdleTimeout()
on theProcess
object to prevent long-running processes.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Command Injection (Argument/Option Manipulation): (Severity: Critical) - Eliminates the primary vector for command injection.
-
Impact:
- Command Injection: Risk reduced from Critical to Very Low.
-
Currently Implemented:
App\Command\BackupDatabaseCommand
usesProcess
correctly (with array arguments).
-
Missing Implementation:
App\Command\ProcessDataCommand
usesshell_exec()
(a critical vulnerability). Needs refactoring to useProcess
.
Mitigation Strategy: Environment-Specific Commands (Conditional Registration)
Description:
- Categorize Commands: Determine which commands are safe for each environment (development, staging, production). Document this.
- Conditional Registration (in console configuration): Modify the console application's configuration (e.g.,
config/services.yaml
or a dedicated console config file) to conditionally register commands based on the environment (%kernel.environment%
).- Use service tags and autoconfiguration.
- Alternatively, add logic within the command's
configure()
method to disable it based on the environment. This is less preferred, as it clutters the command itself.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Unauthorized Command Execution: (Severity: High) - Prevents unauthorized execution of sensitive commands.
- Accidental Data Modification/Deletion (in Production): (Severity: High) - Prevents accidental execution of dangerous commands in production.
-
Impact:
- Unauthorized Command Execution: Risk reduced from High to Low (depending on authentication/authorization, which are separate mitigations).
- Accidental Data Modification/Deletion: Risk reduced from High to Low.
-
Currently Implemented:
App\Command\ClearCacheCommand
is disabled in production via a conditional service definition inconfig/services.yaml
.
-
Missing Implementation:
- A comprehensive review of all commands and their environment suitability is needed.
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Error Handling (Within the Command's execute()
Method)
Description:
try-catch
Blocks: Wrap potentially error-prone code within theexecute()
method of each command intry-catch
blocks.- Generic Error Messages (to
OutputInterface
): In thecatch
block, display a generic error message to the user (using the command'sOutputInterface
) that does not reveal sensitive information. - Detailed Logging (separate from console output): Log full exception details (including stack traces) to a secure log file (using Monolog or similar). This is separate from the console output.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Information Disclosure: (Severity: Medium) - Prevents sensitive information from being exposed through error messages displayed on the console.
-
Impact:
- Information Disclosure: Risk reduced from Medium to Low.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Basic
try-catch
blocks are used in some commands, but not consistently.
- Basic
-
Missing Implementation:
- Consistent use of
try-catch
blocks is missing in several commands.
- Consistent use of
Mitigation Strategy: Resource Limits (Within the Command's execute()
Method)
Description:
- Identify Resource-Intensive Commands: Determine which commands might consume significant resources.
- Set PHP Limits (within
execute()
): Use PHP'sset_time_limit()
andmemory_limit()
functions within theexecute()
method of resource-intensive commands to set appropriate limits. Be aware of their limitations.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (DoS): (Severity: High) - Limits the impact of resource-intensive commands.
-
Impact:
- DoS: Risk reduced from High to Medium.
-
Currently Implemented:
set_time_limit(60)
is used inApp\Command\ProcessDataCommand
.
-
Missing Implementation:
memory_limit
is not explicitly set in any commands. A review of resource usage is needed.