attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for symfony/finder

Objective: Compromise Application Using Symfony Finder

Attack Tree Visualization

Root: Compromise Application Using Symfony Finder
├───[OR]─ **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** 1. Exploit Path Traversal Vulnerabilities
│   ├───[OR]─ **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** 1.1. Direct Path Traversal via User Input
│   │   ├───[AND]─ **[CRITICAL NODE]** 1.1.1. User Input Controls `in()` Path
│   │   │       ├───[AND]─ **[CRITICAL NODE]** 1.1.1.1. Application Directly Uses User Input in `in()`
│   │   │       └───[AND]─ **[CRITICAL NODE]** 1.1.1.2. No Input Validation/Sanitization
│   ├───[OR]─ **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** 1.2. Path Traversal via Configuration Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Path Traversal Vulnerabilities

• Description: This path represents the exploitation of vulnerabilities that allow an attacker to access files and directories outside of the intended scope of the application, by manipulating file paths used by Symfony Finder. Path traversal is a common and often critical web application vulnerability.

Attack Tree Path: Direct Path Traversal via User Input

• Description: This path focuses on path traversal vulnerabilities arising from directly using user-provided input to define the directory path for the Finder->in() method. This is a particularly dangerous scenario as it directly exposes Finder's file access to user manipulation.

  • [CRITICAL NODE] 1.1.1. User Input Controls in() Path
    • Description: This node represents the core vulnerability where user input is used to control the path provided to the Finder->in() method.
    • Attack Vectors:
      • 1.1.1.1. [CRITICAL NODE] Application Directly Uses User Input in in()
        • Description: The application code directly incorporates unsanitized user input (e.g., from GET/POST parameters, URL segments) as the directory path in Finder->in().
        • Likelihood: High
        • Impact: Critical (Full file system access, potential data breach, code execution, complete system compromise)
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Low
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
        • Mitigation Strategies:
          • Strictly validate and sanitize all user-provided path inputs.
          • Use whitelisting for allowed paths instead of blacklisting traversal sequences.
          • Utilize Finder->depth() to limit directory traversal depth.
          • Consider using absolute paths for Finder->in().
      • 1.1.1.2. [CRITICAL NODE] No Input Validation/Sanitization
        • Description: The application fails to validate or sanitize user-provided path input before using it in Finder->in(), allowing path traversal sequences like "../" or "..\".
        • Likelihood: High
        • Impact: Critical (Same as 1.1.1.1)
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Low
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
        • Mitigation Strategies: (Same as 1.1.1.1)

Attack Tree Path: User Input Controls in() Path

• Description: This node represents the core vulnerability where user input is used to control the path provided to the Finder->in() method. * Attack Vectors: * 1.1.1.1. [CRITICAL NODE] Application Directly Uses User Input in in() * Description: The application code directly incorporates unsanitized user input (e.g., from GET/POST parameters, URL segments) as the directory path in Finder->in(). * Likelihood: High * Impact: Critical (Full file system access, potential data breach, code execution, complete system compromise) * Effort: Low * Skill Level: Low * Detection Difficulty: Medium * Mitigation Strategies: * Strictly validate and sanitize all user-provided path inputs. * Use whitelisting for allowed paths instead of blacklisting traversal sequences. * Utilize Finder->depth() to limit directory traversal depth. * Consider using absolute paths for Finder->in(). * 1.1.1.2. [CRITICAL NODE] No Input Validation/Sanitization * Description: The application fails to validate or sanitize user-provided path input before using it in Finder->in(), allowing path traversal sequences like "../" or "..\". * Likelihood: High * Impact: Critical (Same as 1.1.1.1) * Effort: Low * Skill Level: Low * Detection Difficulty: Medium * Mitigation Strategies: (Same as 1.1.1.1)

Attack Tree Path: Application Directly Uses User Input in in()

• Description: The application code directly incorporates unsanitized user input (e.g., from GET/POST parameters, URL segments) as the directory path in Finder->in(). * Likelihood: High * Impact: Critical (Full file system access, potential data breach, code execution, complete system compromise) * Effort: Low * Skill Level: Low * Detection Difficulty: Medium * Mitigation Strategies: * Strictly validate and sanitize all user-provided path inputs. * Use whitelisting for allowed paths instead of blacklisting traversal sequences. * Utilize Finder->depth() to limit directory traversal depth. * Consider using absolute paths for Finder->in().

Attack Tree Path: No Input Validation/Sanitization

• Description: The application fails to validate or sanitize user-provided path input before using it in Finder->in(), allowing path traversal sequences like "../" or "..\". * Likelihood: High * Impact: Critical (Same as 1.1.1.1) * Effort: Low * Skill Level: Low * Detection Difficulty: Medium * Mitigation Strategies: (Same as 1.1.1.1)

Attack Tree Path: Path Traversal via Configuration Vulnerabilities

• Description: This path explores path traversal vulnerabilities that arise from insecure application configuration related to Symfony Finder. Even if user input is not directly used, misconfiguration can lead to broadened access for Finder.