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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for symfonycasts/reset-password-bundle

Attack Surface: Token Prediction/Brute-Forcing

  • Description: Guessing or brute-forcing a valid password reset token due to weak token generation.
  • How reset-password-bundle Contributes: The bundle's token generation logic is entirely responsible for this vulnerability. Weak random number generators or short tokens directly enable this attack.
  • Example: If tokens are only 6 characters long and use a predictable sequence, an attacker can quickly generate and try all possible combinations.
  • Impact: Complete account takeover. The attacker can set a new password and gain full access.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Ensure the bundle uses a cryptographically secure random number generator (CSPRNG) and generates tokens with sufficient length (at least 128 bits of entropy, preferably more). Configure the bundle's token generation settings accordingly. This is the most critical mitigation for this bundle.
    • User: N/A (Server-side issue).

Attack Surface: Token Leakage (Bundle's Direct Role)

  • Description: Exposure of the reset token. While leakage can occur through many channels, the bundle's direct involvement is in generating the token and including it in the reset link.
  • How reset-password-bundle Contributes: The bundle creates the token and constructs the reset URL. While it doesn't control all leakage vectors, it's the source of the sensitive data.
  • Example: The bundle generates a token and includes it in a URL. While the leakage itself might happen elsewhere (referrer, logs), the bundle is responsible for the token's existence.
  • Impact: Account takeover. An attacker who obtains the token can reset the password.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: The bundle should, by default, generate secure tokens and provide clear documentation on secure usage (e.g., emphasizing HTTPS). While the developer using the bundle is responsible for overall application security (HTTPS, etc.), the bundle should encourage best practices.
    • User: N/A (Primarily a server-side and application-level issue).

Attack Surface: Token Expiration Bypass

  • Description: Circumventing the token expiration mechanism to use an expired token.
  • How reset-password-bundle Contributes: The bundle's token expiration logic is entirely responsible for this vulnerability. Flaws in this logic are directly exploitable.
  • Example: An attacker manipulates the system clock or finds a flaw in the server-side validation to use a token that should have expired.
  • Impact: Account takeover (if successful).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Ensure the bundle implements robust, server-side token expiration using a reliable time source. Store the expiration timestamp securely alongside the token. Configure a reasonable expiration time. The bundle's implementation must be correct.
    • User: N/A (Server-side issue).

Attack Surface: Missing CSRF Protection on Reset Form (Direct Bundle Integration)

  • Description: Lack of Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) protection on the form where the user enters their new password.
  • How reset-password-bundle Contributes: The bundle, in its integration with Symfony's form handling, should ensure CSRF protection is applied to the reset form. While Symfony often handles this automatically, the bundle's configuration and templates are directly involved.
  • Example: An attacker tricks a user into submitting a new password via a malicious site, exploiting a valid token but bypassing the intended form submission.
  • Impact: Account takeover.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Verify that the bundle correctly integrates with Symfony's CSRF protection. Ensure the reset form includes and validates a CSRF token. This is often automatic, but must be confirmed in the bundle's context.
    • User: N/A (Primarily a server-side issue).

Attack Surface: Token Reuse

  • Description: Using the same reset token multiple times to change the password.
    • How reset-password-bundle Contributes: The bundle is entirely responsible for managing token validity and preventing reuse. This is a core function of the bundle.
    • Example: An attacker intercepts a valid reset token. They use it to change the password. Later, they (or someone else) use the same token again.
    • Impact: Account takeover; allows an attacker to regain control even after the legitimate user has reset their password.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Ensure the bundle invalidates the token immediately after the first successful password reset. This is a fundamental security requirement for one-time tokens, and the bundle must implement this correctly.
      • User: N/A (Server-side issue).

Attack Surface: Request Flooding (DoS) - Direct Bundle Handling

  • Description: Overwhelming the application with password reset requests, leading to denial of service.
    • How reset-password-bundle Contributes: The bundle's request handling mechanism is the direct target of this attack. Without built-in rate limiting, the bundle is inherently vulnerable.
    • Example: An attacker sends thousands of reset requests, preventing legitimate users from using the service.
    • Impact: Denial of service; resource exhaustion.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: The bundle must provide configurable rate limiting options. The developer using the bundle must configure these options appropriately (limits per IP, per email, etc.).
      • User: N/A (Server-side issue).