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Attack Tree Analysis for symfonycasts/reset-password-bundle

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to a user's account by exploiting vulnerabilities in the symfonycasts/reset-password-bundle implementation or configuration.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                 Gain Unauthorized Account Access
                                            (via Reset Password)
                                                  |
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    |													       |

Abuse Token Generation/Handling Abuse Reset Request Process | |

| | | | Token Prediction Token Leakage Brute-Force Replay Attacks | | | --------- --------- ------ | | | | DB Config Get Get Leak Exposure Token Token [CRITICAL] [CRITICAL] From From Logs Network [HIGH-RISK] [HIGH-RISK] | --------------------------------- | | Configuration Errors Bundle Bugs | ---------------- | Weak Token Lifetime (Too Long) [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: Abuse Token Generation/Handling -> Token Leakage -> DB Leak [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The attacker gains unauthorized access to the database where reset tokens are stored. This could be through SQL injection, a compromised database user account, or other database vulnerabilities.
  • Likelihood: Low (Requires a separate, successful attack on the database)
  • Impact: Very High (Access to all valid reset tokens, enabling immediate account takeover)
  • Effort: Varies greatly (Depends on the database vulnerability)
  • Skill Level: Varies greatly (Depends on the database vulnerability)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to High (Depends on database security monitoring)
  • Mitigation:
    • Implement robust database security measures (strong passwords, least privilege, input validation, parameterized queries, regular patching).
    • Hash reset tokens before storing them in the database.
    • Monitor database access logs for suspicious activity.

Attack Tree Path: Abuse Token Generation/Handling -> Token Leakage -> Config Exposure [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The attacker gains access to sensitive configuration information, such as the secret key used to generate reset tokens. This could happen if the secret is accidentally committed to version control, stored in a publicly accessible file, or exposed through an insecure environment variable configuration.
  • Likelihood: Low (Requires misconfiguration or accidental exposure)
  • Impact: Very High (Attacker can generate valid tokens at will)
  • Effort: Low (If the secret is exposed, it's easy to use)
  • Skill Level: Low (Basic understanding of configuration)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Might be detectable through configuration audits)
  • Mitigation:
    • Store secrets securely using environment variables, a secrets management system (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager), or Symfony's secrets management features.
    • Never commit secrets to version control.
    • Regularly rotate secrets.
    • Implement strict access controls to configuration files.

Attack Tree Path: Abuse Reset Request Process -> Replay Attacks -> Get Token From Logs [HIGH-RISK]

  • Description: The attacker gains access to server logs that, improperly, contain valid reset tokens. This could occur if the application logs sensitive information, including request parameters or full URLs.
  • Likelihood: Low (Requires access to server logs, which should be protected)
  • Impact: High (Account takeover)
  • Effort: Medium (Depends on access to logs)
  • Skill Level: Low to Medium (Depends on log access methods)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires log analysis)
  • Mitigation: * Prevent sensitive information (especially tokens) from being logged. Use proper logging levels and sanitize log data. * Implement strict access controls to server logs. * Regularly audit log configurations. * Use a centralized logging system with security monitoring.

Attack Tree Path: Abuse Reset Request Process -> Replay Attacks -> Get Token From Network [HIGH-RISK]

  • Description: The attacker intercepts a valid reset token by sniffing network traffic. This is most likely to occur if the reset link is sent over an unencrypted channel (e.g., plain HTTP) or if the user's email is compromised.
  • Likelihood: Low (Requires network sniffing, assuming HTTPS is used for email)
  • Impact: High (Account takeover)
  • Effort: Medium (Requires network access and sniffing tools)
  • Skill Level: Medium (Requires understanding of network protocols)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to High (Requires network traffic analysis)
  • Mitigation:
    • Always use HTTPS for all communication, including sending emails containing reset links.
    • Use TLS for email transport.
    • Educate users about the risks of using public Wi-Fi networks.
    • Consider using email encryption (e.g., PGP, S/MIME) for added security, although this is less common.

Attack Tree Path: Abuse Reset Request Process -> Replay Attacks -> Configuration Errors -> Weak Token Lifetime (Too Long) [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The reset token lifetime is configured to be excessively long, giving attackers a larger window of opportunity to use intercepted or leaked tokens.
  • Likelihood: Medium (If defaults are not overridden securely)
  • Impact: High (Increases the success rate of replay attacks)
  • Effort: Low (Exploiting a long-lived token is trivial once obtained)
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires monitoring token usage and expiration)
  • Mitigation:
    • Configure the token lifetime to be as short as reasonably possible (e.g., 15-60 minutes).
    • Follow the bundle's documentation for secure configuration.
    • Regularly review the configuration.