threat-modeling.md

Threat Model Analysis for symfonycasts/reset-password-bundle

Threat: Token Leakage via Logging

• Threat: Token Leakage via Logging

  • Description: The application accidentally logs the raw reset tokens (not the hashed version). An attacker with access to the logs (e.g., through a compromised server, misconfigured log access) could then use these tokens directly. This is a configuration issue directly related to how the bundle's output is handled.
  • Impact: Direct, unauthorized account access. The attacker can immediately reset the password without needing to crack a hash.
  • Affected Component: Application logging configuration (specifically, how it handles data generated by the ResetPasswordHelper and related components).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Never log the raw reset tokens. Audit the application's logging configuration and ensure sensitive data, especially output from the bundle, is excluded. Implement strict access controls on log files.

Threat: Brute-Force Attacks on Reset Token Submission

• Threat: Brute-Force Attacks on Reset Token Submission

  • Description: An attacker repeatedly submits requests to the password reset submission endpoint (where the token is entered), trying different token values. The bundle does not inherently rate-limit this endpoint, making it a direct vulnerability related to the bundle's implementation.
  • Impact: Potential for unauthorized account access if the attacker guesses a valid token.
  • Affected Component: The controller action handling the password reset form submission (where the token, provided by the bundle, is validated). This is a direct interaction point with the bundle.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Implement rate limiting on the password reset submission endpoint. This is essential and is not provided by the bundle for this specific endpoint. Use Symfony's rate limiting features or a dedicated security component. Monitor for a high volume of failed reset attempts.

Threat: Replay Attack

• Threat: Replay Attack
  • Description: An attacker intercepts a valid reset token and reuses it after the legitimate user has already used it. While prevention relies on HTTPS (a general concern), the bundle's responsibility is to ensure single-use tokens. A failure here is a direct bundle issue.
  • Impact: Unauthorized account access. The attacker can reset the password again.
  • Affected Component: ResetPasswordHelper::removeResetRequest() and the logic that marks a token as used (or removes it) within the bundle. This is entirely within the bundle's control.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Ensure the bundle's mechanism for invalidating tokens after a single use is functioning correctly. Rigorously test this functionality, including edge cases and concurrent requests.

Threat: CSRF on password reset form

• Threat: CSRF on password reset form.
  • Description: Attacker creates a malicious website that includes a hidden form that submits a password reset request to the application. If a logged-in user visits the malicious website, their browser will automatically submit the form, potentially resetting their password without their knowledge.
  • Impact: Unauthorized password reset, potentially leading to account takeover.
  • Affected Component: The password reset form (specifically, the lack of CSRF protection).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Ensure that the password reset form is protected by a CSRF token. Symfony forms are protected by default, but verify this configuration.