Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
71 lines (60 loc) · 7.85 KB

attack-surface.md

File metadata and controls

71 lines (60 loc) · 7.85 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for thedevdojo/voyager

Attack Surface: Misconfigured Roles and Permissions

  • Description: Incorrectly defined or overly permissive roles and permissions within Voyager's RBAC system, allowing users to access functionality or data they shouldn't.
  • Voyager Contribution: Voyager's core functionality is RBAC. Its ease of use can lead to over-provisioning if not carefully managed. The entire security model hinges on this configuration.
  • Example: A user with the "editor" role is accidentally granted the "browse_admin" permission, allowing them to access the Voyager settings and potentially other sensitive areas. Or, a custom role is created with overly broad permissions like edit_users when it should only have read_users.
  • Impact: Data breaches, unauthorized data modification, privilege escalation, potential for complete system compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant users only the minimum necessary permissions.
    • Regular Audits: Periodically review all roles, permissions, and user assignments.
    • Fine-Grained Permissions: Avoid broad permissions (e.g., "browse_admin"). Use specific permissions (e.g., "browse_posts," "edit_posts," "add_posts").
    • Testing: Thoroughly test all roles and permissions to ensure they function as intended. Use different user accounts to verify access restrictions.
    • Documentation: Clearly document the purpose and scope of each role and permission.

Attack Surface: BREAD Misconfiguration (Overly Permissive CRUD)

  • Description: Voyager's BREAD (Browse, Read, Edit, Add, Delete) interfaces are configured to expose sensitive data or allow unauthorized actions on database tables.
  • Voyager Contribution: BREAD is Voyager's primary mechanism for interacting with the database. Its rapid development capabilities can lead to insecure configurations if not carefully reviewed.
  • Example: A BREAD interface for the "users" table exposes the "password" column (even if hashed), or allows any logged-in user to delete other users. Another example is exposing internal IDs or timestamps that could be used in other attacks.
  • Impact: Data breaches (viewing sensitive data), data corruption (modifying data), denial of service (deleting data), information disclosure.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Column Selection: Carefully select only the necessary columns to be displayed and editable in each BREAD interface. Hide sensitive columns.
    • Validation Rules: Use Voyager's built-in validation rules to enforce data integrity and prevent invalid input.
    • Database Views: Consider using database views to restrict access to sensitive data at the database level, presenting a limited view to Voyager.
    • Relationship Management: Carefully configure how related data is displayed and managed to prevent information leakage.
    • Read-Only Fields: Mark fields that should not be edited as read-only.

Attack Surface: Unrestricted File Uploads (Media Manager)

  • Description: Voyager's media manager allows uploading files without proper restrictions on file types, sizes, or storage locations, leading to potential remote code execution.
  • Voyager Contribution: Voyager provides a built-in media manager, making file uploads a core feature. The default configuration may not be secure for all use cases.
  • Example: An attacker uploads a PHP file disguised as a JPG image, which is then executed by the web server, granting the attacker control. Or, an attacker uploads a massive file, filling up server storage and causing a denial of service.
  • Impact: Remote code execution (RCE), complete system compromise, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict File Type Validation: Implement server-side validation of file types, using MIME types and file signatures (magic numbers), not just file extensions. Do not rely solely on client-side validation.
    • File Size Limits: Enforce strict file size limits to prevent denial-of-service attacks.
    • Storage Location: Store uploaded files outside the web root, if possible, to prevent direct execution. If storing within the web root, use a dedicated directory with restricted access.
    • File Renaming: Rename uploaded files to prevent attackers from predicting file names and accessing them directly.
    • Malware Scanning: Integrate a malware scanner to scan uploaded files for malicious content.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Use CSP to restrict where scripts can be loaded from, mitigating the risk of executing uploaded malicious scripts.

Attack Surface: Bypassing Voyager Authentication

  • Description: Administrative routes or functionalities are accessible without going through Voyager's authentication and authorization checks.
  • Voyager Contribution: Voyager is designed to be the gatekeeper for administrative access. If it's bypassed, its security mechanisms are ineffective.
  • Example: A developer creates a custom route (/admin/secret-function) that performs administrative actions but forgets to apply Voyager's middleware or equivalent authentication checks. An attacker discovers this route and gains unauthorized access.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to administrative functions, data breaches, privilege escalation.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Route Protection: Ensure all administrative routes are protected by Voyager's middleware (VoyagerAuthMiddleware) or a custom middleware that enforces Voyager's permissions.
    • Code Review: Thoroughly review code to identify any routes or functions that bypass Voyager's security checks.
    • Centralized Authentication: Avoid implementing separate authentication mechanisms for administrative functions. Rely on Voyager's authentication or integrate it with a single, secure authentication system.
    • Route Listing: Regularly review the application's route list (php artisan route:list) to identify any unprotected administrative routes.

Attack Surface: Voyager Hooks and Events Abuse

  • Description: Custom code added to Voyager's hooks or event handlers is vulnerable to injection or executes untrusted input, leading to code execution.
  • Voyager Contribution: Voyager's extensibility through hooks and events creates potential entry points for attackers if not handled securely.
  • Example: A developer adds a hook to log user actions, but the logging function is vulnerable to SQL injection because it doesn't properly sanitize user input. Or, a hook executes a shell command based on user-provided data without validation.
  • Impact: Remote code execution, privilege escalation, SQL injection, data breaches.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Sanitization: Carefully sanitize all input used within Voyager hooks and event handlers. Treat all input as potentially malicious.
    • Avoid Arbitrary Code Execution: Do not execute arbitrary code based on user input. Use parameterized queries or ORM methods to interact with the database.
    • Code Review: Thoroughly review all code added to Voyager hooks and event handlers for security vulnerabilities.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Ensure that the code executed within hooks and events has only the minimum necessary permissions.