mitigations.md

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for tymondesigns/jwt-auth

Mitigation Strategy: 1. Strong JWT Secret Key Generation (in JWT-Auth Context)

• Mitigation Strategy: Strong JWT Secret Key Generation (in JWT-Auth Context)
• Description:
  1. Use a cryptographically secure random number generator: Utilize functions like openssl_random_pseudo_bytes in PHP or similar functions to generate a truly random string for the JWT_SECRET used by jwt-auth.
  2. Ensure sufficient length and complexity: The JWT_SECRET should be long (at least 32 characters for HS256, longer for stronger algorithms) and contain a mix of uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers, and symbols.
  3. Avoid predictable patterns or dictionary words: The JWT_SECRET should be completely random and not based on any easily guessable patterns or words. This secret is directly used by jwt-auth for signing and verifying JWTs.
  4. Generate the secret key during application setup or deployment: Ideally, generate the JWT_SECRET automatically during the initial setup or deployment process, rather than manually creating it and ensure it's properly configured for jwt-auth to use.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • JWT Secret Key Brute-Force/Guessing (High Severity): Weak secrets used by jwt-auth are vulnerable to brute-force attacks, allowing attackers to forge valid JWTs.
  • JWT Signature Forgery (High Severity): If the JWT_SECRET used by jwt-auth is compromised, attackers can forge JWTs, bypassing authentication and authorization.
• Impact:
  • JWT Secret Key Brute-Force/Guessing (High Impact): Significantly reduces the likelihood of successful brute-force or guessing attacks against the jwt-auth secret.
  • JWT Signature Forgery (High Impact): Makes signature forgery practically impossible within jwt-auth if the secret remains secure.
• Currently Implemented: Yes, implemented during initial project setup. The JWT_SECRET is generated using openssl_random_pseudo_bytes during deployment and stored in .env file, which is then used by jwt-auth configuration.
• Missing Implementation: No missing implementation currently related to jwt-auth's usage of the secret. Regular review of key generation process is recommended during security audits.

Mitigation Strategy: 2. Secure JWT Secret Key Storage (for JWT-Auth)

• Mitigation Strategy: Secure JWT Secret Key Storage (for JWT-Auth)
• Description:
  1. Utilize Environment Variables: Store the JWT_SECRET used by jwt-auth in environment variables (e.g., .env file in development, server environment variables in production). jwt-auth is configured to read the secret from environment variables by default.
  2. Avoid Hardcoding: Never embed the JWT_SECRET directly within the application code (PHP files, configuration files within the codebase) that jwt-auth uses.
  3. Restrict Access to Environment Variables: Configure server and deployment environments to restrict access to environment variables containing the JWT_SECRET used by jwt-auth to only authorized processes and users.
  4. Consider Secrets Management Systems (Production): For production environments, explore using dedicated secrets management systems like HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, or Azure Key Vault for enhanced security and centralized secret management of the JWT_SECRET used by jwt-auth.
  5. Secure .env file (Development): In development, ensure the .env file containing JWT_SECRET is not committed to version control and is properly secured on developer machines.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • JWT Secret Key Exposure via Code Repository (High Severity): Hardcoding secrets used by jwt-auth in code makes them easily accessible if the code repository is compromised.
  • JWT Secret Key Exposure via Server Misconfiguration (Medium Severity): Improper server configuration could potentially expose environment variables containing the JWT_SECRET used by jwt-auth.
• Impact:
  • JWT Secret Key Exposure via Code Repository (High Impact): Eliminates the risk of secret exposure through code repositories for the JWT_SECRET used by jwt-auth.
  • JWT Secret Key Exposure via Server Misconfiguration (Medium Impact): Reduces the risk of exposure through server misconfigurations by separating secrets from web-accessible files, ensuring jwt-auth reads from secure sources.
• Currently Implemented: Yes, implemented. JWT_SECRET is stored in the .env file (not committed to Git) and accessed via env('JWT_SECRET') in the application, which is the standard way jwt-auth expects to find the secret. In production, it's set as a server environment variable.
• Missing Implementation: Consider migrating to a dedicated secrets management system for production in the future for enhanced security and auditability of the JWT_SECRET used by jwt-auth.

Mitigation Strategy: 3. JWT Secret Key Rotation (with JWT-Auth)

• Mitigation Strategy: JWT Secret Key Rotation (with JWT-Auth)
• Description:
  1. Implement a Key Rotation Schedule: Define a regular schedule for rotating the JWT_SECRET used by jwt-auth (e.g., every 3-6 months, or triggered by security events).
  2. Generate a New Secret Key: When rotating, generate a new strong secret key using the same secure generation process as initial key creation for jwt-auth.
  3. Update Application Configuration: Update the application's environment variables or secrets management system with the new JWT_SECRET that jwt-auth will use.
  4. Graceful Transition Period: Implement a mechanism to support both the old and new secret keys for a short transition period. This allows existing valid JWTs signed with the old key (by jwt-auth) to remain valid until they expire, preventing immediate session invalidation for all users. jwt-auth might require custom implementation for this graceful transition.
  5. Invalidate Old Keys: After the transition period, remove support for the old secret key in the jwt-auth configuration.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • Prolonged Impact of Secret Key Compromise (Medium Severity): If the JWT_SECRET used by jwt-auth is compromised, regular rotation limits the window of opportunity for attackers to exploit it.
  • Insider Threat (Medium Severity): Reduces the risk if the JWT_SECRET used by jwt-auth is leaked by an insider, as the key will eventually be rotated.
• Impact:
  • Prolonged Impact of Secret Key Compromise (Medium Impact): Significantly reduces the long-term impact of a potential compromise of the JWT_SECRET used by jwt-auth.
  • Insider Threat (Medium Impact): Mitigates the risk associated with long-lived secrets in insider threat scenarios related to jwt-auth.
• Currently Implemented: No, not currently implemented. Key rotation for jwt-auth is a planned feature.
• Missing Implementation: Key rotation logic needs to be implemented specifically for jwt-auth. This includes:
  • A script or process to generate and update the JWT_SECRET used by jwt-auth.
  • Code changes to jwt-auth configuration or custom middleware to handle multiple valid secret keys during the transition period for jwt-auth generated tokens.
  • Documentation and procedures for performing key rotation for jwt-auth.

Mitigation Strategy: 4. Enforce Strong JWT Algorithm (in JWT-Auth Configuration)

• Mitigation Strategy: Enforce Strong JWT Algorithm (in JWT-Auth Configuration)
• Description:
  1. Explicitly Configure Algorithm: In the jwt-auth configuration file (config/jwt.php), explicitly set the algo option to a strong algorithm like HS256 or RS256. This directly dictates the algorithm jwt-auth will use.
  2. Verify Configuration: Double-check the config/jwt.php configuration file to ensure the algo is correctly set and not commented out or set to a weak algorithm for jwt-auth.
  3. Avoid Weak Algorithms: Never use algorithms like none or HS1 in jwt-auth configuration. jwt-auth defaults to HS256, but always explicitly verify the configuration.
  4. Understand Algorithm Choice: Choose between symmetric (HS256) and asymmetric (RS256) algorithms in jwt-auth configuration based on your application's needs and key management capabilities. For most common use cases with jwt-auth, HS256 is sufficient and simpler to manage.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • Algorithm Confusion Attack (High Severity): Using weak or allowing algorithm negotiation in jwt-auth can make the application vulnerable to algorithm confusion attacks where attackers can manipulate the JWT header to use a weaker or none algorithm, bypassing signature verification performed by jwt-auth.
• Impact:
  • Algorithm Confusion Attack (High Impact): Completely eliminates the risk of algorithm confusion attacks when using jwt-auth by enforcing a strong, pre-defined algorithm in its configuration.
• Currently Implemented: Yes, implemented. config/jwt.php is configured to use HS256 algorithm for jwt-auth.
• Missing Implementation: No missing implementation. Configuration should be reviewed during security audits to ensure it remains correctly set for jwt-auth.

Mitigation Strategy: 5. Strict JWT Signature Verification (using JWT-Auth Middleware)

• Mitigation Strategy: Strict JWT Signature Verification (using JWT-Auth Middleware)
• Description:
  1. Utilize jwt-auth Middleware: Ensure that jwt-auth's middleware (e.g., \Tymon\JWTAuth\Http\Middleware\Authenticate::class) is correctly applied to all routes that require JWT authentication provided by jwt-auth.
  2. Avoid Bypassing Middleware: Do not create exceptions or bypass the authentication middleware provided by jwt-auth for any routes that should be protected by JWT authentication.
  3. Review Middleware Configuration: Verify the middleware configuration in your route definitions or middleware groups to confirm jwt-auth's middleware is correctly applied.
  4. Log Signature Verification Failures: Implement logging to capture any instances where JWT signature verification by jwt-auth fails. This can help detect potential attacks or configuration issues related to jwt-auth.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • JWT Signature Bypass (High Severity): If signature verification by jwt-auth is not strictly enforced, attackers can send unsigned or improperly signed JWTs and potentially bypass authentication.
  • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks (Medium Severity): While HTTPS protects against token interception, strict signature verification by jwt-auth ensures that even if a token is somehow modified in transit, it will be rejected.
• Impact:
  • JWT Signature Bypass (High Impact): Completely prevents signature bypass attacks when using jwt-auth by ensuring every JWT is verified by its middleware.
  • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks (Medium Impact): Adds an extra layer of defense against token manipulation even if HTTPS is compromised (though HTTPS is the primary defense), as jwt-auth will verify the signature.
• Currently Implemented: Yes, implemented. \Tymon\JWTAuth\Http\Middleware\Authenticate::class middleware is applied to all API routes requiring authentication in routes/api.php, ensuring jwt-auth handles verification.
• Missing Implementation: Logging of signature verification failures within jwt-auth's middleware is not currently implemented. This should be added for monitoring and security auditing of jwt-auth operations.

Mitigation Strategy: 6. Implement Short-Lived Access Tokens (in JWT-Auth)

• Mitigation Strategy: Implement Short-Lived Access Tokens (in JWT-Auth)
• Description:
  1. Configure Token TTL: In config/jwt.php, adjust the ttl (time-to-live) setting to a short duration (e.g., 15-60 minutes). This setting directly controls the expiration time for access tokens generated by jwt-auth.
  2. Balance Security and User Experience: Choose a TTL value in jwt-auth configuration that balances security (shorter TTL is more secure) with user experience (longer TTL reduces the frequency of token refresh requests when using jwt-auth).
  3. Communicate Token Expiration to Client: Inform the client-side application about the token expiration time of tokens issued by jwt-auth so it can proactively handle token refresh before expiration.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • Access Token Compromise - Reduced Window of Opportunity (Medium Severity): If an access token generated by jwt-auth is compromised, its short lifespan limits the time window during which it can be misused by an attacker.
  • Session Hijacking - Reduced Duration (Medium Severity): Reduces the duration of a successful session hijacking attack if an access token issued by jwt-auth is stolen.
• Impact:
  • Access Token Compromise - Reduced Window of Opportunity (Medium Impact): Significantly reduces the impact of a compromised access token generated by jwt-auth by limiting its validity period.
  • Session Hijacking - Reduced Duration (Medium Impact): Limits the duration of a session hijacking attack involving tokens from jwt-auth.
• Currently Implemented: Yes, implemented. ttl in config/jwt.php is set to 60 minutes for tokens generated by jwt-auth.
• Missing Implementation: Client-side application needs to be improved to proactively handle token expiration and refresh more gracefully, potentially using token expiration information from the JWT payload issued by jwt-auth.

Mitigation Strategy: 7. Utilize Refresh Tokens (with JWT-Auth)

• Mitigation Strategy: Utilize Refresh Tokens (with JWT-Auth)
• Description:
  1. Implement Refresh Token Flow: Implement the refresh token flow provided by jwt-auth or a custom refresh token mechanism that works with jwt-auth. This typically involves issuing a refresh token along with the access token upon successful login using jwt-auth's functionalities.
  2. Longer Refresh Token Expiration: Configure refresh tokens with a longer expiration time than access tokens (e.g., days or weeks) when using jwt-auth's refresh token features.
  3. Secure Refresh Token Storage: Store refresh tokens securely, preferably using HttpOnly, Secure cookies or secure server-side storage linked to user sessions. This is crucial for refresh tokens managed in conjunction with jwt-auth. Avoid storing refresh tokens in localStorage or sessionStorage if possible.
  4. Refresh Token Rotation: Implement refresh token rotation: when a new access token is issued using a refresh token (via jwt-auth's refresh endpoint), invalidate the old refresh token and issue a new one. This limits the lifespan of a compromised refresh token used with jwt-auth.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • Long-Lived Access Token Necessity (Medium Severity): Without refresh tokens, developers might be tempted to issue long-lived access tokens with jwt-auth, increasing the risk of compromise. Refresh tokens allow for short-lived access tokens while maintaining user session persistence when used with jwt-auth.
  • Refresh Token Compromise - Reduced Impact (Medium Severity): Refresh token rotation limits the impact of a compromised refresh token used with jwt-auth by invalidating it upon use.
• Impact:
  • Long-Lived Access Token Necessity (High Impact): Eliminates the need for long-lived access tokens generated by jwt-auth, significantly improving security.
  • Refresh Token Compromise - Reduced Impact (Medium Impact): Reduces the impact of a compromised refresh token used with jwt-auth by limiting its reusability.
• Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Refresh token generation and usage for access token renewal is implemented using jwt-auth's refresh functionality. Refresh tokens are currently stored in HttpOnly, Secure cookies.
• Missing Implementation: Refresh token rotation is not yet implemented for jwt-auth's refresh tokens. This needs to be added to further enhance refresh token security. Server-side storage of refresh tokens (managed alongside jwt-auth) could also be considered for enhanced control and revocation capabilities.

Mitigation Strategy: 8. Invalidate Tokens on Logout and Security Events (related to JWT-Auth)

• Mitigation Strategy: Invalidate Tokens on Logout and Security Events (related to JWT-Auth)
• Description:
  1. Implement Logout Functionality: Create a logout endpoint that invalidates both access and refresh tokens associated with the user's session. This should include invalidating tokens issued and managed by jwt-auth. For cookie-based storage, this involves clearing the cookies where jwt-auth stores tokens. For server-side storage, it involves removing the token record associated with jwt-auth's tokens.
  2. Token Invalidation on Password Change: When a user changes their password, invalidate all active access and refresh tokens associated with their account that were issued by jwt-auth.
  3. Token Invalidation on Account Compromise: Implement a mechanism to invalidate tokens issued by jwt-auth if an account is suspected of being compromised (e.g., through administrative actions or automated security alerts).
  4. Consider Token Blacklisting (Optional): For immediate revocation needs of tokens issued by jwt-auth, consider implementing a token blacklist or revocation list. This adds complexity and performance overhead but allows for immediate invalidation of specific tokens generated by jwt-auth.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • Persistent Session After Logout (Medium Severity): Without token invalidation on logout, access and refresh tokens issued by jwt-auth might remain valid, allowing continued access even after a user intends to log out.
  • Session Persistence After Security Events (High Severity): If tokens from jwt-auth are not invalidated after password changes or account compromises, attackers could potentially continue to use compromised tokens.
• Impact:
  • Persistent Session After Logout (Medium Impact): Ensures proper session termination upon logout, including invalidating tokens from jwt-auth.
  • Session Persistence After Security Events (High Impact): Significantly reduces the risk of continued unauthorized access after security-related events by invalidating tokens from jwt-auth.
• Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Logout functionality clears cookies, effectively invalidating tokens stored in cookies by jwt-auth. Token invalidation on password change is implemented, targeting tokens issued by jwt-auth.
• Missing Implementation: Token invalidation on account compromise (e.g., administrative account suspension) is not fully implemented for tokens issued by jwt-auth. Token blacklisting for jwt-auth tokens is not implemented and might be considered for future enhancement if immediate revocation becomes a critical requirement.

Mitigation Strategy: 9. Validate Essential JWT Claims (in Application Logic using JWT-Auth)

• Mitigation Strategy: Validate Essential JWT Claims (in Application Logic using JWT-Auth)
• Description:
  1. Verify iss (Issuer) Claim: Validate that the iss claim in the JWT generated by jwt-auth matches the expected issuer of your application. This helps prevent token reuse from other applications, even if they are using jwt-auth.
  2. Verify aud (Audience) Claim: If applicable, validate the aud claim to ensure the token from jwt-auth is intended for your application or service.
  3. Verify exp (Expiration) Claim: jwt-auth handles expiration automatically, but it's good practice to be aware of this and potentially add explicit checks in critical authorization logic if needed, especially when working with tokens from jwt-auth.
  4. Custom Claim Validation: Validate any custom claims included in your JWTs generated by jwt-auth that are relevant to your application's authorization logic.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • Token Replay Attacks (Medium Severity): Validating iss and aud claims helps mitigate token replay attacks where tokens issued for one application (even if using jwt-auth) might be reused in another.
  • Expired Token Usage (Low Severity): While jwt-auth handles expiration, explicit checks can provide an extra layer of assurance when dealing with tokens from jwt-auth.
  • Claim Manipulation (Medium Severity): Validating custom claims ensures that authorization decisions are based on expected and valid claim values within tokens from jwt-auth.
• Impact:
  • Token Replay Attacks (Medium Impact): Reduces the risk of token replay attacks across different applications, even those potentially using jwt-auth.
  • Expired Token Usage (Low Impact): Provides a minor additional check against expired tokens generated by jwt-auth.
  • Claim Manipulation (Medium Impact): Ensures authorization logic relies on valid and expected claim data within tokens from jwt-auth.
• Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. jwt-auth handles exp claim validation. iss and aud claims are not explicitly validated in application logic beyond what jwt-auth might do internally.
• Missing Implementation: Explicit validation of iss and aud claims should be added to the application's authentication middleware or authorization logic for enhanced security, especially if the application interacts with other services or applications and relies on tokens from jwt-auth.

Mitigation Strategy: 10. Sanitize and Validate User Data in Claims (Used with JWT-Auth)

• Mitigation Strategy: Sanitize and Validate User Data in Claims (Used with JWT-Auth)
• Description:
  1. Sanitize Data Before Adding to Claims: Before adding user data to JWT claims (e.g., user roles, permissions) that will be included in tokens generated by jwt-auth, sanitize the data to prevent injection vulnerabilities (e.g., escaping special characters).
  2. Validate Data Retrieved from Claims: When retrieving user data from JWT claims (from tokens generated by jwt-auth) for authorization decisions, validate the data to ensure it conforms to expected formats and values.
  3. Minimize Data in Claims: Avoid storing excessive or sensitive user data directly in JWT claims within tokens generated by jwt-auth. Store only essential information needed for authentication and basic authorization.
  4. Fetch User Details from Backend: Consider using JWTs (from jwt-auth) primarily for authentication and fetching detailed user information from a secure backend service based on the user ID in the token, rather than embedding all user details in the JWT claims generated by jwt-auth.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • Data Injection via Claims (Medium Severity): If user data in claims of tokens from jwt-auth is not sanitized, attackers might be able to inject malicious data that could be exploited in application logic.
  • Authorization Bypass via Claim Manipulation (Medium Severity): If claim data in tokens from jwt-auth is not validated, attackers might be able to manipulate claims to gain unauthorized access.
  • Information Disclosure via Claims (Low Severity): Storing excessive user data in claims of tokens from jwt-auth increases the potential for information disclosure if JWTs are intercepted or logged improperly.
• Impact:
  • Data Injection via Claims (Medium Impact): Reduces the risk of data injection vulnerabilities through JWT claims in tokens from jwt-auth.
  • Authorization Bypass via Claim Manipulation (Medium Impact): Reduces the risk of authorization bypass due to manipulated claim data in tokens from jwt-auth.
  • Information Disclosure via Claims (Low Impact): Minimizes the amount of potentially sensitive data exposed in JWT claims of tokens from jwt-auth.
• Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. User roles added to claims are validated for format, but explicit sanitization of user data before adding to claims in tokens generated by jwt-auth is not consistently applied.
• Missing Implementation: Implement consistent sanitization of user data before adding it to JWT claims in tokens generated by jwt-auth. Review and minimize the amount of user data stored in claims within tokens from jwt-auth. Consider fetching user details from a backend service instead of embedding them in JWTs generated by jwt-auth.

Mitigation Strategy: 11. Limit JWT Claim Size (in JWT-Auth Tokens)

• Mitigation Strategy: Limit JWT Claim Size (in JWT-Auth Tokens)
• Description:
  1. Store Minimal Data in Claims: Only include essential information in JWT claims of tokens generated by jwt-auth, such as user ID, roles (if necessary for basic authorization), and expiration time.
  2. Avoid Storing Large Objects or Arrays: Do not store large objects, arrays, or extensive lists of permissions directly in JWT claims of tokens generated by jwt-auth.
  3. Use References Instead of Data: Instead of embedding data in JWT claims of tokens from jwt-auth, consider using references (e.g., user ID) and fetching detailed user information from a backend service when needed.
  4. Compress JWTs (Less Common): In very specific scenarios where JWT size of tokens from jwt-auth is a significant concern, consider JWT compression techniques, but be aware of potential complexity and compatibility issues.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • Increased Request Overhead (Low Severity): Large JWTs generated by jwt-auth increase the size of HTTP requests, potentially impacting performance, especially on mobile networks.
  • Information Disclosure - Increased Exposure (Low Severity): Larger JWTs from jwt-auth expose more data if intercepted or logged, increasing the potential for information disclosure.
• Impact:
  • Increased Request Overhead (Low Impact): Reduces request overhead by minimizing JWT size of tokens generated by jwt-auth.
  • Information Disclosure - Increased Exposure (Low Impact): Minimizes the amount of data exposed in JWTs generated by jwt-auth.
• Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Efforts are made to keep claims minimal in tokens from jwt-auth, but there's no strict enforcement or monitoring of JWT size.
• Missing Implementation: Implement guidelines and code reviews to ensure JWT claims in tokens from jwt-auth are kept minimal. Consider monitoring JWT size in development and production to identify and address any potential issues related to tokens generated by jwt-auth.

Mitigation Strategy: 12. Keep jwt-auth Library Updated

• Mitigation Strategy: Keep jwt-auth Library Updated
• Description:
  1. Regularly Check for Updates: Periodically check for updates to the tymondesigns/jwt-auth library on GitHub or Packagist.
  2. Monitor Release Notes and Security Advisories: Review release notes and security advisories for each update to identify bug fixes, security patches, and new features in jwt-auth.
  3. Apply Updates Promptly: Apply updates to the jwt-auth library promptly, especially security-related updates.
  4. Use Dependency Management Tools: Utilize dependency management tools like Composer to easily update the jwt-auth library and manage dependencies.
  5. Automate Dependency Updates (Consideration): Explore automated dependency update tools or processes to streamline the update process for jwt-auth and ensure timely patching.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • Exploitation of Known Library Vulnerabilities (High Severity): Outdated jwt-auth library might contain known security vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit. Keeping the library updated ensures that known vulnerabilities in jwt-auth are patched.
• Impact:
  • Exploitation of Known Library Vulnerabilities (High Impact): Significantly reduces the risk of exploitation of known vulnerabilities in the jwt-auth library.
• Currently Implemented: Yes, implemented as part of regular maintenance. Dependency updates are checked and applied periodically using Composer, including updates for jwt-auth.
• Missing Implementation: Consider implementing automated dependency vulnerability scanning and update notifications to proactively identify and address library vulnerabilities in jwt-auth and other dependencies.

Mitigation Strategy: 13. Review JWT-Auth Library Configuration and Defaults

• Mitigation Strategy: Review JWT-Auth Library Configuration and Defaults
• Description:
  1. Thoroughly Review Configuration: Carefully review all configuration options in config/jwt.php for jwt-auth and understand their security implications.
  2. Avoid Relying on Defaults Blindly: Do not assume default configurations of jwt-auth are secure for your specific application. Assess if default settings are appropriate or if they need to be adjusted for enhanced security when using jwt-auth.
  3. Document Configuration Choices: Document the chosen configuration settings for jwt-auth and the rationale behind them, especially security-related settings.
  4. Regular Configuration Audits: Periodically audit the jwt-auth configuration to ensure it remains secure and aligned with security best practices for jwt-auth.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • Misconfiguration Vulnerabilities (Medium Severity): Incorrect or insecure configuration of the jwt-auth library can introduce vulnerabilities.
  • Default Setting Exploitation (Medium Severity): Relying on insecure default settings of jwt-auth can leave the application vulnerable to attacks.
• Impact:
  • Misconfiguration Vulnerabilities (Medium Impact): Reduces the risk of vulnerabilities arising from misconfiguration of jwt-auth.
  • Default Setting Exploitation (Medium Impact): Mitigates the risk associated with insecure default settings in jwt-auth.
• Currently Implemented: Yes, implemented. Initial configuration of jwt-auth was reviewed and adjusted based on security best practices. Configuration is documented.
• Missing Implementation: Implement a schedule for regular configuration audits of jwt-auth as part of security reviews to ensure ongoing secure configuration.

Mitigation Strategy: 14. Error Handling and Information Disclosure (in JWT-Auth Context)

• Mitigation Strategy: Error Handling and Information Disclosure (in JWT-Auth Context)
• Description:
  1. Implement Generic Error Messages (Production): In production environments, configure error handling related to jwt-auth operations to return generic error messages to clients, avoiding detailed technical information about jwt-auth or its internal workings.
  2. Detailed Error Logging (Server-Side): Implement detailed error logging on the server-side to capture technical error information related to jwt-auth for debugging and security monitoring.
  3. Avoid Exposing Stack Traces to Clients: Never expose stack traces or detailed error messages from jwt-auth or related code directly to clients in production.
  4. Review jwt-auth Error Handling: Understand how jwt-auth handles errors and exceptions and customize error responses if necessary to prevent information leakage related to jwt-auth.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • Information Disclosure via Error Messages (Low Severity): Detailed error messages from jwt-auth or related code can leak sensitive information about the application's internal workings, configuration, or vulnerabilities to attackers.
• Impact:
  • Information Disclosure via Error Messages (Low Impact): Reduces the risk of information disclosure through error messages related to jwt-auth.
• Currently Implemented: Yes, implemented. Generic error messages are returned to clients in production for jwt-auth related errors. Detailed error logging is enabled on the server-side. Stack traces are not exposed to clients for jwt-auth errors.
• Missing Implementation: Regularly review error handling logic and logs related to jwt-auth to ensure no sensitive information is inadvertently being leaked through error messages or logs.