Objective: To gain unauthorized access to resources or privileges within the application protected by tymondesigns/jwt-auth
by exploiting high-risk vulnerabilities or critical weaknesses.
Compromise Application using jwt-auth
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | |
1. Token Forgery/Manipulation 2. Token Leakage/Interception 3. Exploit Library Vulnerabilities
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--------------------- ----------------------------------- ---------------------------------------
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1.1 Weak Secret 1.2 Algorithm 2.1 MITM 2.2 Client-Side 2.3 Server-Side 3.1 Known CVEs 3.3 Configuration
Key [CRITICAL] Substitution (Implicitly Storage Storage (Past/Present) Errors in jwt-auth
| | Critical) Vulnerabilities Vulnerabilities | |
------- --------- | | ------- ---------
| | | ------- ------- | |
1.1.1 1.1.2 1.2.2 2.2.1 XSS 2.3.1 Log Files 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.3.1 3.3.2
Brute Predictable None [CRITICAL] [HIGH RISK] [HIGH RISK] Specific Specific Invalid Incorrect
Force Secret Algorithm | | CVE CVE TTL Refresh
[HIGH [HIGH RISK] ------- ------- [HIGH [HIGH RISK] Settings Token
RISK] RISK] [HIGH [HIGH RISK]
RISK]
Attack Tree Path: 1. Token Forgery/Manipulation
-
1.1 Weak Secret Key [CRITICAL]
- Description: The foundation of JWT security. A weak or compromised secret key allows attackers to forge valid tokens.
- 1.1.1 Brute Force [HIGH RISK]
- Description: The attacker tries many different keys until one works. Feasible if the secret is short or has low entropy.
- Likelihood: Low (if a strong key is used), High (if a weak key is used)
- Impact: Very High (complete compromise)
- Effort: High (for strong keys), Low (for weak keys)
- Skill Level: Beginner (for weak keys), Advanced (for strong keys)
- Detection Difficulty: Medium (failed login attempts might be logged)
- 1.1.2 Predictable Secret [HIGH RISK]
- Description: The secret is based on something easily guessable (e.g., "secret", the application name, a dictionary word).
- Likelihood: Low (if developers follow best practices), Medium (if poor practices are used)
- Impact: Very High (complete compromise)
- Effort: Low
- Skill Level: Beginner
- Detection Difficulty: Hard (unless the secret is exposed publicly)
-
1.2 Algorithm Substitution
- 1.2.2 None Algorithm [CRITICAL]
- Description: The attacker sets the algorithm to "none," indicating no signature. A poorly configured server might accept this, bypassing all signature verification.
- Likelihood: Very Low (if the library is properly configured)
- Impact: Very High (complete compromise)
- Effort: Low
- Skill Level: Beginner
- Detection Difficulty: Easy (if the server logs invalid tokens)
- 1.2.2 None Algorithm [CRITICAL]
Attack Tree Path: 2. Token Leakage/Interception
-
2.1 MITM (Implicitly Critical)
- Description: Although not explicitly in the sub-tree if HTTPS is correctly implemented, the absence of HTTPS or a misconfiguration makes this a critical and easily exploitable vulnerability. The attacker intercepts the token during transmission.
- Likelihood: Low (if HTTPS is properly implemented), High (if HTTP is used or HTTPS is misconfigured)
- Impact: High (token compromise)
- Effort: Medium
- Skill Level: Intermediate
- Detection Difficulty: Hard (without specialized network monitoring)
-
2.2 Client-Side Storage Vulnerabilities
- 2.2.1 XSS [HIGH RISK]
- Description: An attacker injects malicious JavaScript into the application, which can then access the token if it's stored in a place accessible to JavaScript (e.g.,
localStorage
,sessionStorage
, or a non-HttpOnly cookie). - Likelihood: Medium (depends on the application's overall security)
- Impact: High (token compromise)
- Effort: Medium
- Skill Level: Intermediate
- Detection Difficulty: Medium (if WAF or security tools are in place)
- Description: An attacker injects malicious JavaScript into the application, which can then access the token if it's stored in a place accessible to JavaScript (e.g.,
- 2.2.1 XSS [HIGH RISK]
-
2.3 Server-Side Storage Vulnerabilities
- 2.3.1 Log Files [HIGH RISK]
- Description: The token is accidentally logged (e.g., in request logs).
- Likelihood: Low (if logging is properly configured), Medium (if developers are careless)
- Impact: High (token compromise)
- Effort: Low
- Skill Level: Beginner
- Detection Difficulty: Medium (if logs are regularly reviewed)
- 2.3.1 Log Files [HIGH RISK]
Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Library Vulnerabilities
-
3.1 Known CVEs (Past/Present)
- 3.1.1, 3.1.2 Specific CVE [HIGH RISK]
- Description: Publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in the
jwt-auth
library. - Likelihood: Medium (if the library is not updated), Very Low (if the library is updated)
- Impact: Varies (depends on the specific CVE), potentially Very High
- Effort: Varies (depends on the specific CVE), potentially Low
- Skill Level: Varies (depends on the specific CVE), potentially Script Kiddie
- Detection Difficulty: Varies (depends on the specific CVE), potentially Easy (if intrusion detection systems are in place)
- Description: Publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in the
- 3.1.1, 3.1.2 Specific CVE [HIGH RISK]
-
3.3 Configuration Errors in jwt-auth
- 3.3.1 Invalid TTL Settings [HIGH RISK]
- Description: Tokens are valid for too long, increasing the window of opportunity for an attacker if a token is compromised.
- Likelihood: Medium (if developers don't understand token lifetimes)
- Impact: Medium (increased window of opportunity for attackers)
- Effort: Low
- Skill Level: Beginner
- Detection Difficulty: Hard (unless token usage patterns are closely monitored)
- 3.3.2 Incorrect Refresh Token Handling [HIGH RISK]
- Description: Refresh tokens are not properly validated or are vulnerable to replay attacks, leading to persistent unauthorized access.
- Likelihood: Medium (if developers don't understand refresh token best practices)
- Impact: High (potential for long-term unauthorized access)
- Effort: Low
- Skill Level: Intermediate
- Detection Difficulty: Hard (unless refresh token usage patterns are closely monitored)
- 3.3.1 Invalid TTL Settings [HIGH RISK]