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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for uvdesk/community-skeleton

Attack Surface: Dependency Vulnerabilities (Symfony Framework)

  • Description: The community-skeleton is built upon the Symfony framework. Using an outdated skeleton version inherently means using an outdated Symfony version, which may contain known critical or high severity vulnerabilities.
  • Community-Skeleton Contribution: The skeleton dictates the base Symfony version and its initial dependencies. Failing to update the skeleton means failing to update the core framework.
  • Example: A critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability is discovered in Symfony version X. A project started with an older community-skeleton based on Symfony version X-1 remains vulnerable until the skeleton and its Symfony dependency are updated.
  • Impact: Full system compromise, data breach, denial of service, website defacement.
  • Risk Severity: Critical to High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regularly update the community-skeleton itself. Updates often include Symfony version upgrades and security patches.
    • Follow the uvdesk/community-skeleton release notes and security advisories for recommended update procedures.
    • Utilize Symfony's security advisories to understand the security status of the underlying framework version used by the skeleton.

Attack Surface: Default Secret Keys and Salts

  • Description: The community-skeleton might include default, placeholder, or weak secret keys and salts in its initial configuration files (like .env or security.yaml). If developers fail to change these defaults, it creates a critical vulnerability.
  • Community-Skeleton Contribution: The skeleton provides these default configurations as part of its initial setup, potentially leading developers to overlook the necessity of changing them.
  • Example: The skeleton's .env file contains a default APP_SECRET. If this default secret is not changed in a deployed application, attackers can potentially decrypt sensitive data, forge user sessions, or bypass CSRF protection mechanisms.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access, data decryption, session hijacking, CSRF bypass, account compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Immediately change all default secret keys, salts, and application secrets provided in the skeleton's configuration files during the initial setup process.
    • Generate strong, unique, and unpredictable secrets.
    • The skeleton's documentation should explicitly warn against using default secrets and guide developers on secure secret management.

Attack Surface: Default User Roles and Permissions

  • Description: The community-skeleton might pre-define overly permissive default user roles and permissions, or include default administrative accounts with weak or easily guessable credentials.
  • Community-Skeleton Contribution: The skeleton's initial security configuration (e.g., in security.yaml or database fixtures) sets the baseline for user roles and permissions. If these defaults are insecure, applications built upon it inherit this vulnerability.
  • Example: The skeleton sets up a default "ROLE_ADMIN" with broad access and creates a default administrator account with credentials like "admin/password". If these defaults are not modified, attackers can easily gain administrative privileges.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to administrative functionalities, data manipulation, privilege escalation, full system control, data breach.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Thoroughly review and restrict default user roles and permissions defined by the skeleton to adhere to the principle of least privilege.
    • Remove or disable any default administrative accounts provided by the skeleton.
    • Enforce strong password policies for all user accounts created within the application.
    • The skeleton's documentation should emphasize the importance of reviewing and customizing default roles and permissions.

Attack Surface: Debug Mode Enabled in Production (Potentially by Default)

  • Description: If the community-skeleton's default configuration or setup process inadvertently leads to debug mode being enabled in production environments, it exposes sensitive information.
  • Community-Skeleton Contribution: The skeleton's initial .env configuration or lack of clear guidance might result in developers deploying with debug mode unintentionally enabled.
  • Example: With debug mode active, detailed error messages, stack traces, and internal application paths are exposed. Attackers can leverage this information for reconnaissance, vulnerability identification, and crafting more effective attacks.
  • Impact: Information disclosure, enhanced reconnaissance for attackers, potential path traversal vulnerabilities revealed through error messages, exposure of application internals.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Ensure the community-skeleton's documentation clearly instructs developers to disable debug mode in production.
    • Verify that the skeleton's default .env configuration sets APP_DEBUG=0 or APP_ENV=prod for production environments, or provides clear instructions on how to configure this correctly.
    • Developers must explicitly verify and enforce debug mode being disabled in their production deployments, regardless of the skeleton's defaults.