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Threat Model Analysis for uvdesk/community-skeleton

Threat: Agent Account Spoofing via Session Fixation

  • Description: An attacker tricks an agent into using a known session ID. The attacker could pre-create a session, then send a link containing that session ID to the agent (e.g., via a phishing email). If the UVdesk skeleton doesn't properly invalidate old sessions or regenerate session IDs upon login, the attacker can then use that same session ID to impersonate the agent. This relies on the skeleton's session handling being flawed.
  • Impact: The attacker gains full access to the agent's account, allowing them to view, modify, and delete tickets, access customer data, and potentially escalate privileges if further vulnerabilities exist.
  • Affected Component: FrameworkBundle (specifically, the session management components within, likely related to security.yaml configuration and the handling of Request and Response objects). The core authentication logic provided by the skeleton is the direct target.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Ensure the framework's session management is configured to regenerate session IDs upon successful authentication. Verify that security.yaml is configured with strong session security settings (e.g., cookie_secure: true, cookie_httponly: true, appropriate cookie_lifetime). Explicitly invalidate any existing session before creating a new one on login. This is a critical check of the skeleton's implementation.
    • Developer: Implement robust CSRF protection, which can indirectly help mitigate some session fixation attacks.
    • User/Admin: Enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all agent accounts.

Threat: Email Spoofing via Misconfigured Mailer (Skeleton's Default Configuration)

  • Description: The attacker sends emails that appear to come from the helpdesk, exploiting a default configuration within the UVdesk skeleton's mailer setup that doesn't enforce proper sender validation. This is distinct from general mailer misconfiguration; we're focusing on a vulnerability introduced by the skeleton's initial setup. If the skeleton ships with insecure defaults, this is a direct threat.
  • Impact: Users may be tricked into revealing sensitive information or downloading malware. The organization's reputation is damaged. The helpdesk could be blacklisted.
  • Affected Component: MailerBundle (or equivalent) and its default configuration as provided by the skeleton. Specifically, the initial from address settings and any transport configurations present in the skeleton's default setup files.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer (of the Skeleton): Ensure the skeleton ships with secure default mailer configurations. This might involve providing clear instructions and warnings in the documentation, or even enforcing secure settings by default.
    • Admin (of the deployed system): Immediately after installation, review and configure SPF, DKIM, and DMARC records for the domain. This is crucial regardless of the skeleton's defaults, but especially important if the defaults are weak.
    • Developer (of the deployed system): Ensure application code does not allow users to specify arbitrary "from" addresses.

Threat: Ticket Data Tampering via Weak Input Validation (in Core TicketBundle)

  • Description: An attacker submits a specially crafted ticket with malicious content in a field that is not properly validated by the UVdesk skeleton's core TicketBundle. This is not about custom fields, but about a vulnerability in the validation logic provided by the skeleton itself for standard ticket fields.
  • Impact: Depending on where the unvalidated data is used, this could lead to XSS (if displayed unsanitized), data corruption, or potentially even code execution.
  • Affected Component: TicketBundle (or equivalent), specifically the entities, forms, and controllers related to ticket creation and modification within the core skeleton. This focuses on the code provided by UVdesk, not extensions.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer (of the Skeleton): Implement strict input validation for all core ticket fields. Use whitelisting where possible. Leverage Symfony's Form component and its built-in validation constraints. This is a fundamental security requirement for the skeleton.
    • Developer (of the Skeleton): Implement output encoding (e.g., using Twig's auto-escaping) to prevent XSS when displaying ticket data. This should be a default behavior of the skeleton.
    • Developer (of the deployed system): While the skeleton should handle this, it's prudent to verify the validation and encoding are correctly implemented.

Threat: Information Disclosure via Debug Mode Enabled in Production (Default .env)

  • Description: If the UVdesk skeleton, as provided, defaults to APP_ENV=dev in the .env file or doesn't strongly warn against this in the installation instructions, it creates a direct vulnerability. Detailed error messages and debugging information would be exposed.
  • Impact: Attackers gain insights into vulnerabilities, making exploitation easier. This can lead to data breaches and system compromise.
  • Affected Component: The entire application; specifically, the Symfony framework's error handling and the default .env file configuration provided by the skeleton.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer (of the Skeleton): Ensure the skeleton ships with APP_ENV=prod as the default in the .env file, or provides extremely prominent warnings and instructions to change this during installation.
    • Admin/Developer (of the deployed system): Immediately after installation, verify that APP_ENV=prod is set.