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Threat Model Analysis for vlucas/phpdotenv

Threat: .env File Exposure via Web Server Misconfiguration

  • Threat: .env File Exposure via Web Server Misconfiguration

    • Description: An attacker directly accesses the .env file through a web browser by requesting its URL (e.g., https://example.com/.env). This occurs if the webserver (Apache, Nginx) is not configured to deny access to files starting with a dot (.) or if the .env file is placed within the webroot and accessible. phpdotenv's reliance on this file for configuration makes it a direct target.
    • Impact: Complete disclosure of all sensitive information stored in the .env file, including database credentials, API keys, and application secrets. This can lead to complete system compromise.
    • Affected phpdotenv Component: The .env file itself, and the overall concept of storing secrets in a file loaded by phpdotenv. The library's design choice to use a file is the core issue.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Web Server Configuration: Configure the webserver (Apache, Nginx) to explicitly deny access to .env files (and all files starting with a dot).
      • File Placement: Store the .env file outside the webroot (document root). This is the most secure option.

Threat: .env File Inclusion via File Inclusion Vulnerability

  • Threat: .env File Inclusion via File Inclusion Vulnerability

    • Description: Although the vulnerability itself is in the application code (not phpdotenv), the attacker exploits a Local File Inclusion (LFI) or Remote File Inclusion (RFI) vulnerability to read the contents of the .env file, which phpdotenv uses. phpdotenv's reliance on a file makes it a target.
    • Impact: Disclosure of all sensitive information in the .env file, leading to potential system compromise.
    • Affected phpdotenv Component: The .env file and the library's reliance on it. The vulnerability is in the application, but phpdotenv's file-based approach makes the .env file a valuable target.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure Coding Practices: Prevent LFI/RFI vulnerabilities in the application code.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Ensure the web server user has minimal file system permissions.

Threat: .env File Modification via Server Compromise

  • Threat: .env File Modification via Server Compromise

    • Description: While this is a general server security issue, the .env file, used by phpdotenv, becomes a high-value target. An attacker gains server access and modifies the .env file to change credentials, alter application settings, or inject malicious code.
    • Impact: Complete control over the application's behavior and access to all connected resources.
    • Affected phpdotenv Component: The .env file and the library's reliance on it. The vulnerability is a server issue, but the .env file is a key target due to phpdotenv.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strong Server Security: Implement robust server security measures.
      • File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): Detect unauthorized changes to the .env file.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Limit web server user permissions.

Threat: .env File Leakage via Source Code Repository

  • Threat: .env File Leakage via Source Code Repository

    • Description: The .env file, central to phpdotenv's operation, is accidentally committed to a source code repository. Anyone with access to the repository can view the sensitive information.
    • Impact: Disclosure of all sensitive information in the .env file.
    • Affected phpdotenv Component: The .env file and the practice of using it, as encouraged by phpdotenv.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • .gitignore: Always include .env in the .gitignore file.
      • Pre-commit Hooks: Prevent accidental commits of .env files.
      • Repository Scanning: Scan for accidentally committed secrets.

Threat: .env File Tampering to Enable Debug Mode

  • Threat: .env File Tampering to Enable Debug Mode

    • Description: An attacker modifies the .env file, used by phpdotenv, to set APP_DEBUG=true (or similar) in production, exposing sensitive information through error messages.
    • Impact: Disclosure of sensitive information through verbose error messages.
    • Affected phpdotenv Component: The .env file and the application's reliance on it for configuration, as facilitated by phpdotenv. The env() function or similar.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): Detect unauthorized changes.
      • Server-Level Environment Variables: Set APP_DEBUG=false in server configuration, overriding the .env file.
      • Robust Error Handling: Prevent sensitive information exposure in errors.

Threat: .env File Used for Authorization Decisions

  • Threat: .env File Used for Authorization Decisions

    • Description: The application (incorrectly) uses environment variables loaded from the .env file (via phpdotenv) for authorization. An attacker modifying the .env file could elevate privileges.
    • Impact: An attacker could gain unauthorized access.
    • Affected phpdotenv Component: The .env file and the application's (mis)use of it, facilitated by phpdotenv's env() function or similar.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Do Not Use Environment Variables for Authorization: Use a database-backed authorization system.
      • Input Validation and Sanitization: If environment variables must be used, validate them thoroughly.