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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for walkor/workerman

Attack Surface: Direct Network Exposure via Raw Sockets

  • Description: Workerman applications listen directly on network sockets, bypassing traditional web servers. This exposes the application directly to network traffic and removes default security layers.
    • Workerman Contribution: Workerman's core design is to act as a socket server, inherently requiring direct socket listening, making it a fundamental part of its attack surface.
    • Example: A Workerman application listening on port 8080 directly exposed to the internet without any firewall. Attackers can directly send malicious requests to this port.
    • Impact: Direct exposure increases vulnerability to network-level attacks, including DDoS, port scanning, and direct exploitation of application vulnerabilities.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Use a Reverse Proxy (like Nginx or Apache) in front of Workerman for TLS termination, request filtering, and basic DDoS protection.
      • Configure Firewalls to restrict access to Workerman's port, allowing only necessary traffic.
      • Implement Network Segmentation to isolate Workerman within a secure network.

Attack Surface: Custom Protocol Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Workerman is often used for custom protocols. Insecure or poorly implemented custom protocol parsing in PHP code can introduce critical vulnerabilities.
    • Workerman Contribution: Workerman's flexibility encourages custom protocols. Secure protocol implementation is the developer's responsibility within the Workerman application.
    • Example: A custom protocol parser with a buffer overflow. Crafted messages exceeding buffer size could lead to remote code execution.
    • Impact: Remote Code Execution, Denial of Service, Information Disclosure.
    • Risk Severity: Critical to High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Design protocols with security in mind, including input validation and message size limits.
      • Implement Robust Input Validation and sanitization for all custom protocol data.
      • Conduct Security Audits and Code Reviews of protocol parsing logic.
      • Utilize well-vetted libraries for protocol parsing where possible.

Attack Surface: Application Logic Vulnerabilities in Event Handlers

  • Description: Workerman applications rely on event handlers (onConnect, onMessage, etc.). Vulnerabilities in the code within these handlers are directly exploitable via network requests.
    • Workerman Contribution: Workerman's event-driven architecture places application logic directly in handlers, making them primary entry points and attack targets.
    • Example: An onMessage handler executing user-provided data as a system command without sanitization, leading to command injection.
    • Impact: Remote Code Execution, Data Manipulation, Privilege Escalation, Denial of Service.
    • Risk Severity: Critical to High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Apply Secure Coding Practices, including input validation and output encoding in event handlers.
      • Implement Strict Input Sanitization and Validation for all user inputs in handlers.
      • Adhere to the Principle of Least Privilege for worker processes.
      • Perform Regular Security Testing and vulnerability scanning of application logic.

Attack Surface: Insecure Configuration and Deployment

  • Description: Misconfigurations like running as root or exposing management interfaces directly increase the attack surface and potential impact of vulnerabilities.
    • Workerman Contribution: Workerman's configuration flexibility means incorrect choices can directly lead to security weaknesses.
    • Example: Running a Workerman process as root. Code execution exploits could lead to full system compromise.
    • Impact: Full System Compromise, Denial of Service, Information Disclosure.
    • Risk Severity: Critical to High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Always Run as Non-Root User for Workerman worker processes.
      • Ensure Secure Configuration of all Workerman options, including ports and protocols.
      • Implement Resource Limits (memory, CPU, connections) to prevent resource exhaustion.
      • Secure Management Interfaces with strong authentication and restrict access, or disable them in production.

Attack Surface: Lack of Built-in TLS/SSL Termination

  • Description: Workerman requires manual TLS/SSL implementation. Omission or misconfiguration leads to unencrypted communication of sensitive data.
    • Workerman Contribution: Workerman's design leaves TLS/SSL implementation to the application level, placing the burden of secure implementation on developers.
    • Example: Handling sensitive data over plain TCP without TLS/SSL, exposing data to eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks.
    • Impact: Data Breach, Man-in-the-Middle Attacks, Eavesdropping.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Always Implement TLS/SSL encryption for sensitive communication using well-vetted libraries.
      • Utilize a Reverse Proxy for TLS Termination to offload complexity and leverage robust configurations.
      • Regularly Review and Update TLS Configurations to ensure strong ciphers and protocols are used.