vulnerabilities-workflow-1.md

Here is the combined list of vulnerabilities, formatted as markdown:

Combined Vulnerability List

Vulnerability: Password Reset Functionality without Rate Limiting

Description: The password reset functionality in django-rest-auth does not implement rate limiting. This allows an attacker to repeatedly request password reset emails for a given email address. By sending numerous password reset requests in a short period, an attacker can flood a user's inbox with password reset emails, causing user annoyance and potentially making legitimate password reset requests harder to find.

Impact:

• User annoyance due to inbox flooding with password reset emails.
• Reduced usability of the password reset functionality as legitimate emails might be buried under a flood of malicious requests.
• Potential for targeted harassment by repeatedly triggering password resets for a specific user.

Vulnerability Rank: High

Currently Implemented Mitigations: None. The code does not implement any rate limiting on password reset requests.

Missing Mitigations:

• Implement rate limiting on the password reset endpoint to restrict the number of password reset requests from a single IP address or for a single email address within a specific time frame.

Preconditions:

• The application must have the password reset functionality enabled and exposed to external users.

Source Code Analysis:

• File: /code/rest_auth/views.py
• Class: PasswordResetView
• The PasswordResetView handles POST requests to initiate the password reset process.
• It uses PasswordResetSerializer to validate the email.
• It calls serializer.save() which internally uses Django's PasswordResetForm to send the password reset email.
• There is no explicit rate limiting mechanism implemented in PasswordResetView or within the PasswordResetSerializer or Django's PasswordResetForm as used here.

class PasswordResetView(GenericAPIView):
    """
    Calls Django Auth PasswordResetForm save method.

    Accepts the following POST parameters: email
    Returns the success/fail message.
    """
    serializer_class = PasswordResetSerializer
    permission_classes = (AllowAny,)

    def post(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
        # Create a serializer with request.data
        serializer = self.get_serializer(data=request.data)
        serializer.is_valid(raise_exception=True)

        serializer.save()
        # Return the success message with OK HTTP status
        return Response(
            {"detail": _("Password reset e-mail has been sent.")},
            status=status.HTTP_200_OK
        )

Security Test Case:

• Step 1: Identify the password reset endpoint. In the provided demo/demo/urls.py, it is /rest-auth/password/reset/.
• Step 2: Open a script or tool capable of sending HTTP POST requests (like curl, Postman, or a simple Python script).
• Step 3: Prepare a list of target email addresses for testing.
• Step 4: Write a loop in the script to repeatedly send POST requests to the password reset endpoint with one of the target email addresses in the request body ({'email': '[email protected]'}).
• Step 5: Execute the script to send a large number of password reset requests (e.g., 100 requests) in a short period (e.g., within a minute) for the same email address.
• Step 6: Check the inbox of the target email address.
• Step 7: Verify that multiple password reset emails (ideally close to the number of requests sent) have been received in the inbox within a short timeframe.
• Step 8: If multiple password reset emails are received, it confirms that the password reset functionality is vulnerable to rate limiting issues.

Vulnerability: Debug Mode Enabled in Production

Description: The demo project’s settings have debugging enabled (i.e. DEBUG = True) and an empty ALLOWED_HOSTS list. An external attacker can deliberately trigger an error (for example, by accessing a non‑existent URL) in order to force Django to display a full debug traceback. This error page will reveal detailed information about the system such as file paths, configuration parameters, versions, and sometimes even environment data.

Impact: An attacker who views the debug output may gain valuable intelligence about the internal application structure and configuration—including sensitive variables—which can be used to engineer further attacks (for example, by targeting other misconfigured endpoints or exploiting hard‑coded keys).

Vulnerability Rank: Critical

Currently Implemented Mitigations: No mitigation is apparent. The settings file (/code/demo/demo/settings.py) hard-codes DEBUG = True and does not restrict permitted hosts.

Missing Mitigations:

• Set DEBUG = False in production deployments.
• Configure proper ALLOWED_HOSTS (including explicit domain names) so that error pages are not exposed.

Preconditions: The vulnerable configuration is active when the application is deployed using the demo settings in a production‑like environment.

Source Code Analysis: In the file /code/demo/demo/settings.py, the beginning of the file contains:

# SECURITY WARNING: don't run with debug turned on in production!
DEBUG = True
ALLOWED_HOSTS = []

This indicates that the default configuration is meant for development. However, if deployed publicly, any triggered error (for example, by requesting an unknown URL) will cause Django’s debug page—with full stack traces and settings—to be shown.

Security Test Case:

1. Deploy the application using the current production‑like configuration (using demo settings).
2. From an external client (or browser), request a non‑existent route (e.g. https://your-app.example.com/nonexistent).
3. Confirm that the resulting error page displays a detailed traceback with system paths, settings, and other sensitive debugging information.

Vulnerability: Hard‑coded Secret Key in Production

Description: The demo settings include a hard‑coded secret key that is used for cryptographic signing throughout the application. If an attacker gains knowledge of this key, they could forge session cookies, tamper with password reset tokens, and potentially subvert other security‑critical functions provided by Django.

Impact: Disclosure of the secret key can lead to authentication bypass, session hijacking, and other attacks that trivially compromise the integrity of the application.

Vulnerability Rank: Critical

Currently Implemented Mitigations: None. The file /code/demo/demo/settings.py contains a static assignment for the secret key:

SECRET_KEY = 'ma3c@7uu!%e0=tynp+i6+q%$)9v@$t(eulqurym_b=48z82&5n'

Missing Mitigations:

• Do not hard-code the secret key in source code.
• Load the secret key at runtime from an environment variable or secure secrets management system.

Preconditions: The vulnerability is exploitable when the application instance is deployed with the demo settings containing the fixed key, and the source code (or key value) is accessible to an attacker.

Source Code Analysis: In /code/demo/demo/settings.py, the secret key is defined as a literal string. There are no conditional steps or runtime overrides that would allow a dynamically generated or environment‑provided value. This means that in any public deployment using these settings, the same secret key is used over and over.

Security Test Case:

1. Examine the deployed configuration to retrieve the value of SECRET_KEY.
2. Using the known key, attempt to forge or tamper with authentication cookies or password reset tokens.
3. Verify that the application accepts tokens or cookies signed with that key.

Vulnerability: Unsecured JWT Cookie (Missing Secure Flag)

Description: When JWT‑based authentication is enabled (i.e. REST_USE_JWT is True) and a JWT cookie is to be set via the login view, the cookie is created with the httponly attribute but without the secure flag. This means that if the application is served over HTTP—or if there is a misconfiguration in TLS—the token may be exposed to network sniffing.

Impact: An attacker on the same network or a man‑in‑the‑middle attacker could capture the JWT cookie if it is sent over an insecure channel. With the captured JWT, the attacker could impersonate the legitimate user and access protected resources.

Vulnerability Rank: High

Currently Implemented Mitigations: The cookie is marked as httponly in /code/rest_auth/views.py (in the get_response method of LoginView), which helps mitigate client‑side scripting access.

Missing Mitigations:

• The cookie needs to be sent with the secure flag to ensure it is transmitted only over HTTPS.
• Enforce strict transport security on the application.

Preconditions:

• REST_USE_JWT is enabled in the settings.
• The application is accessed over HTTP or on a network where TLS is not guaranteed end‑to‑end.

Source Code Analysis: In /code/rest_auth/views.py, the following snippet is used when setting the JWT cookie:

if getattr(settings, 'REST_USE_JWT', False):
    from rest_framework_jwt.settings import api_settings as jwt_settings
    if jwt_settings.JWT_AUTH_COOKIE:
        from datetime import datetime
        expiration = (datetime.utcnow() + jwt_settings.JWT_EXPIRATION_DELTA)
        response.set_cookie(jwt_settings.JWT_AUTH_COOKIE,
                            self.token,
                            expires=expiration,
                            httponly=True)

Notice that no parameter (e.g. secure=True) is set here.

Security Test Case:

1. Enable JWT‑based authentication in the settings and deploy the application.
2. From an external client, perform a login request over an HTTP (non‑HTTPS) connection.
3. Use browser developer tools or a proxy (such as Burp Suite) to inspect the attributes of the JWT cookie and confirm that it lacks the Secure flag.
4. Optionally simulate a network eavesdropping scenario to demonstrate token capture.

Vulnerability: Lack of Rate Limiting on Authentication Endpoints (Login Brute-Force)

Description: The login and related authentication views in the project do not implement any form of rate limiting or brute‑force protection. An attacker may send a high volume of login attempts with differing credentials without being throttled or blocked. This includes the login endpoint /rest-auth/login/, which is vulnerable to brute-force attacks. An attacker can attempt to log in to user accounts by repeatedly sending POST requests with incorrect passwords. Since there is no rate limiting or account lockout mechanism, the attacker can make unlimited login attempts to guess user credentials.

Impact: This lack of protection exposes the system to brute‑force attacks. Using automated tools, an attacker may try many username/password combinations to eventually break into a user’s account, particularly if weak passwords are in use. Successful brute-force attacks can lead to unauthorized access to user accounts, allowing attackers to steal sensitive information, perform actions on behalf of the user, or cause other malicious damage.

Vulnerability Rank: High

Currently Implemented Mitigations: There is no evidence of any rate‑limiting logic in any of the authentication endpoints (for example, in /code/rest_auth/views.py in the LoginView). The code does not include any rate limiting or account lockout mechanisms for the login endpoint.

Missing Mitigations:

• Implement a rate limiting mechanism on login and password reset endpoints (for example, using middleware or third‑party packages such as Django Ratelimit or Axes).
• Consider account lockout policies or CAPTCHA challenges after a defined number of failed attempts.
• Implement rate limiting on the /rest-auth/login/ endpoint to restrict the number of login attempts from a single IP address or user account within a specific time frame. Consider implementing account lockout after a certain number of failed login attempts after too many incorrect attempts.

Preconditions:

• The endpoints for login, password reset, and related actions are publicly available and accept unauthenticated requests.
• The application must have user accounts.
• The /rest-auth/login/ endpoint must be publicly accessible.

Source Code Analysis:

• File: /code/rest_auth/views.py
• Class: LoginView
• The LoginView class processes POST requests to validate user credentials. There is no code that tracks the number of failed attempts or delays subsequent authentication attempts based on failure counts. This absence means that an attacker can continuously attempt logins without any rate‑limiting intervention.
• The LoginView is a GenericAPIView that handles user login.
• It uses LoginSerializer to validate the input data (username/email and password).
• The post method in LoginView calls the login method after serializer validation.
• The login method authenticates the user and generates a token.
• Vulnerability: There is no rate limiting or brute-force protection implemented in the LoginView or related serializers. This allows unlimited login attempts.

class LoginView(GenericAPIView):
    # ... (rest of the LoginView code as provided previously) ...
    def post(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
        self.request = request
        self.serializer = self.get_serializer(data=self.request.data,
                                             context={'request': request})
        self.serializer.is_valid(raise_exception=True)

        self.login()
        return self.get_response()

Security Test Case:

• Step 1: Automate a series of login requests targeting the login endpoint (e.g. using a tool like Burp Suite Intruder or a custom script).
• Step 2: Use an invalid username/password combination in rapid succession.
• Step 3: Observe that the system does not slow down, block, or otherwise throttle the requests after repeated authentication failures.
• Step 4: Verify that the same endpoint continues to respond in a timely manner to each request despite numerous failed attempts.
• Step 5: Open a terminal and use curl or a similar tool to send POST requests to the login endpoint (/rest-auth/login/).
• Step 6: Prepare a list of common passwords or use a password dictionary.
• Step 7: For each password in the list, send a POST request with a valid username and the current password from the list.
• Step 8: Observe the HTTP response codes. If the login is vulnerable to brute-force, you will not observe any delays or blocks after multiple failed attempts. You should receive HTTP 400 responses for incorrect passwords and potentially HTTP 200 if you guess a valid password.
• Step 9: Example curl command for a single attempt (repeat with different passwords):

  curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"username":"testuser", "password":"wrongpassword"}' http://your-app-domain/rest-auth/login/

• Step 10: To automate the test, you can use a scripting tool like bash or python to loop through a password list and send requests.
• Step 11: Expected result: You should be able to send multiple failed login attempts in quick succession without being blocked or rate-limited, demonstrating the brute-force vulnerability.