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vulnerabilities-workflow-1.md

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Here is the combined list of vulnerabilities, formatted as markdown:

Combined Vulnerability List

1. Predictable Django SECRET_KEY in default docker-compose configuration

  • Description:
    • The default docker-compose.yml file sets the Django SECRET_KEY environment variable to local.
    • If a user deploys a project generated by this cookiecutter template to a production environment using the default docker-compose.yml without changing this value, the Django application will be using a publicly known and easily guessable secret key.
    • An attacker can exploit this predictable SECRET_KEY to compromise the application's security.
  • Impact:
    • Session Hijacking: Attackers can forge session cookies, gaining unauthorized access to user accounts without needing credentials.
    • CSRF Bypass: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) protection can be bypassed, allowing attackers to perform actions on behalf of legitimate users.
    • Data Tampering: If the application uses the SECRET_KEY for cryptographic signing or encryption (e.g., in custom code or third-party libraries), attackers can forge signatures or decrypt sensitive data.
    • Unpredictable behavior: Some Django applications or third-party libraries might rely on the SECRET_KEY for security in unexpected ways, leading to further vulnerabilities.
  • Vulnerability Rank: Critical
  • Currently implemented mitigations:
    • None. The default template configuration directly introduces this vulnerability.
  • Missing mitigations:
    • Strong SECRET_KEY Generation during Project Setup: The cookiecutter template should automatically generate a strong, random SECRET_KEY during project scaffolding and configure the project to use this generated key.
    • Documentation Warning: The documentation should explicitly warn users against using the default docker-compose.yml configuration in production and strongly emphasize the critical need to change the DJANGO_SECRET_KEY to a strong, randomly generated value.
    • Secure Default docker-compose.yml: The docker-compose.yml should be modified to either:
      • Not include a default SECRET_KEY at all, forcing users to explicitly set it.
      • Instruct users to set the SECRET_KEY via environment variables from outside the docker-compose.yml (e.g., using .env files or system environment variables), making it less likely to be accidentally committed to version control with a default value.
  • Preconditions:
    • The application is deployed to a publicly accessible instance.
    • The deployed instance is running with the default docker-compose.yml configuration without modification of the DJANGO_SECRET_KEY environment variable.
  • Source Code Analysis:
    • File: /code/{{cookiecutter.github_repository_name}}/docker-compose.yml
    • Line: 
      - DJANGO_SECRET_KEY=local
    • Analysis:
      • The docker-compose.yml file, intended for local development and easily mistaken for production deployment configuration, directly sets the DJANGO_SECRET_KEY environment variable to the weak and predictable value local.
      • Django's security relies heavily on the secrecy of the SECRET_KEY. This setting makes the SECRET_KEY publicly known as it is part of the template repository.
      • An attacker can easily find this default configuration by inspecting the template repository or by simply guessing common default values.
  • Security Test Case:
    1. Deploy the Application: Generate a project using the cookiecutter-django-rest template with default settings. Deploy this generated application to a publicly accessible server using the provided docker-compose.yml without modifying the DJANGO_SECRET_KEY in the docker-compose.yml file.
    2. Access the Application: Open a web browser and access the deployed application.
    3. Obtain a CSRF Token (Optional but illustrative): If there is a form in the application, inspect the HTML source code of the page. Look for a CSRF token, usually within a hidden input field named csrfmiddlewaretoken. Copy the value of this token. While not strictly necessary to demonstrate the vulnerability, this step can be used to later show how CSRF protection is compromised.
    4. Predict the SECRET_KEY: The SECRET_KEY is predictably local as defined in the docker-compose.yml.
    5. Attempt to Forge a Session (Advanced and depends on application specifics): This step is more complex and requires knowledge of Django's session signing mechanism. Using the known SECRET_KEY (local), attempt to forge a Django session cookie. If successful, you could potentially gain access to the application as another user.
    6. Attempt CSRF Bypass (Advanced and depends on application specifics): If the application has CSRF protection enabled (which is default in Django), try to bypass it. For example, if you obtained a CSRF token in step 3, try to submit a form without this token or with a modified token, and observe if the application still processes the request due to the compromised SECRET_KEY.

2. Insecure ALLOWED_HOSTS Configuration (Host Header Injection)

  • Description:
    • The Django settings (in both config/common.py and config/production.py) are configured with ALLOWED_HOSTS = ["*"]. This means that the application will accept requests with any Host header. An attacker can spoof the Host header when sending HTTP requests to the publicly available instance.
    • Trigger Steps:
      1. Identify a publicly available API endpoint (e.g. /api/v1/users/).
      2. Craft an HTTP request that includes a malicious Host header (for example, Host: malicious.example.com).
      3. Send the request and observe that the request is processed normally despite the spoofed header.
  • Impact:
    • The acceptance of arbitrary Host headers can lead to host header injection. This may enable cache poisoning, abuse of dynamically generated links (e.g. in password-reset emails), or other unforeseen downstream attacks that rely on the host value.
  • Vulnerability Rank: High
  • Currently Implemented Mitigations:
    • None. The configuration explicitly allows all hosts via the wildcard without additional validation.
  • Missing Mitigations:
    • • Restrict ALLOWED_HOSTS to the actual, expected host names or domains used in production.
    • • Optionally add middleware or filters to sanitize or validate the Host header further.
  • Preconditions:
    • The application must be deployed in an environment that is accessible from the public Internet while using the default insecure ALLOWED_HOSTS setting.
  • Source Code Analysis:
    • • In {{cookiecutter.app_name}}/config/common.py, the line: ALLOWED_HOSTS = ["*"]
    • • In {{cookiecutter.app_name}}/config/production.py, the inherited setting from Common is retained without further restriction.
    • This means that no matter what Host header is sent, Django accepts the request as long as the remainder of the request is valid.
  • Security Test Case:
    1. Deploy the application using the production settings.
    2. Using a tool such as curl or Postman, send an HTTP request to a known endpoint while deliberately setting a rogue Host header (e.g., 
      curl -H "Host: attacker.com" http://<public-ip>:8000/api/v1/users/
      ).
    3. Verify that the response is processed without error and that the system does not reject the request due to an invalid host.
    4. Optionally, inspect any links in the response that may reflect the malicious Host header.

3. Use of Django Development Server in Production

  • Description:
    • Although the Dockerfile’s final CMD uses gunicorn for production, the docker-compose file overrides this by launching the Django development server with the command: python3 wait_for_postgres.py && ./manage.py migrate && ./manage.py runserver 0.0.0.0:8000.
    • Django’s built‑in development server is not hardened for production, lacks robust security features, and may inadvertently expose debugging or sensitive information if errors occur.
  • Impact:
    • Running the insecure development server in a production environment can make the service more vulnerable to attacks. Its lack of advanced request handling, limited logging, and absence of production-grade security features (such as proper error pages and throttling) increase the attack surface. Furthermore, unexpected error pages might leak sensitive data.
  • Vulnerability Rank: High
  • Currently Implemented Mitigations:
    • The Dockerfile specifies a production command using gunicorn. However, the docker-compose configuration (which is what is used to run the container) explicitly overrides this with a command that launches runserver.
  • Missing Mitigations:
    • • Modify the docker-compose configuration for production deployments to use the production command (i.e. gunicorn via the Dockerfile CMD).
    • • Ensure that automated migration (and similar startup tasks) are handled externally from the command that starts the application server.
  • Preconditions:
    • The deployment must use the docker-compose configuration as-is (or its production equivalent) so that the web container is started with the runserver command rather than a production WSGI server.
  • Source Code Analysis:
    • • In Dockerfile the final stage sets the command to: CMD newrelic-admin run-program gunicorn --bind 0.0.0.0:$PORT --access-logfile - {{cookiecutter.app_name}}.wsgi:application
    • • In docker-compose.yml under the “web” service the command is overridden with:
    command: >
    bash -c "python3 wait_for_postgres.py &&
             ./manage.py migrate &&
             ./manage.py runserver 0.0.0.0:8000"
    • This override forces the use of Django’s development server.
  • Security Test Case:
    1. Deploy the application using the provided docker-compose file.
    2. From an external network, access the application on port 8000 and inspect response headers or error pages to confirm that Django’s development server is in use (e.g., by its distinctive error page format or verbose logging).
    3. Attempt to trigger an error (for example, by sending a malformed request) and verify if debugging information or stack traces are leaked.

4. Missing Enforcement of HTTPS and Secure Cookie Settings

  • Description:
    • In the production configuration (as seen in config/production.py), there is no explicit enforcement of HTTPS traffic (e.g. via SECURE_SSL_REDIRECT) and secure cookie settings (such as SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE or CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE). This omission makes it possible for an attacker intercepting unsecured HTTP traffic to capture session cookies or tokens, especially if TLS is not terminated by a reverse proxy.
  • Impact:
    • Without enforced HTTPS and secure cookies, communications (including session IDs and auth tokens) can be intercepted or modified by a man‑in‑the‑middle attacker. This compromises user session integrity and the confidentiality of sensitive transactions.
  • Vulnerability Rank: High
  • Currently Implemented Mitigations:
    • Some security middleware is present (for example, SecurityMiddleware), but the lack of explicit HTTPS redirection and cookie-security settings leaves this area unprotected if the application is deployed without a properly configured reverse proxy or load balancer handling TLS.
  • Missing Mitigations:
    • • Set SECURE_SSL_REDIRECT = True in production to force HTTPS.
    • • Define SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE = True and CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE = True so that cookies are only sent over secure channels.
    • • Optionally set HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) headers (e.g. SECURE_HSTS_SECONDS) to enforce HTTPS even if a user requests HTTP.
  • Preconditions:
    • The risk applies when the public instance is accessed over plain HTTP or when TLS termination is not properly handled by an upstream proxy.
  • Source Code Analysis:
    • • In config/common.py and config/production.py, while the security middleware is included, there are no settings enforcing SSL redirection or marking cookies as secure.
    • This means that if the application is deployed without TLS offloading elsewhere, cookies and sessions are at risk.
  • Security Test Case:
    1. Deploy the application in a production-like environment without an external TLS termination proxy.
    2. Access the application via HTTP (not HTTPS) and verify that the application does not automatically redirect to HTTPS.
    3. Inspect the cookies in the browser (or via curl) to check that the Secure attribute is missing.
    4. Capture network traffic to demonstrate that sensitive tokens or session cookies are sent in clear text.

5. Insecure Database Trust Authentication Configuration

  • Description:
    • The docker-compose configuration for the PostgreSQL service uses the environment variable POSTGRES_HOST_AUTH_METHOD=trust and the connection string in the Django settings defaults to a connection without a password (e.g. postgres://postgres:@postgres:5432/postgres). Although by default the postgres container has no port mapping (thus not directly exposed), if the container network is misconfigured or exposed, an attacker may connect to the database without credentials.
  • Impact:
    • In scenarios where the database container becomes reachable from the public network (whether inadvertently or by network misconfiguration), an attacker could connect without authentication and read or modify sensitive data stored in the database.
  • Vulnerability Rank: High
  • Currently Implemented Mitigations:
    • The docker-compose file does not expose the PostgreSQL port externally in its current configuration; however, the use of trust authentication remains very risky if network boundaries are not properly enforced.
  • Missing Mitigations:
    • • Use strong database authentication (set a proper password and use PostgreSQL’s standard authentication methods rather than trust).
    • • Ensure that the database ports are not exposed beyond the necessary internal Docker networks.
    • • Consider enforcing network-level restrictions (for example via firewall rules) on database access.
  • Preconditions:
    • The vulnerability is triggered only if the PostgreSQL container’s network is misconfigured (or deliberately exposed) to include external access.
  • Source Code Analysis:
    • • In docker-compose.yml, the postgres service sets: environment: - POSTGRES_HOST_AUTH_METHOD=trust
    • • The default connection string in config/common.py (via dj_database_url.config) does not specify a password, thereby relying on trust authentication.
    • While this might be safe for an isolated local development environment, it is dangerous if deployed in a production setting with broader network exposure.
  • Security Test Case:
    1. Deploy the docker-compose stack in an environment where the Postgres container is (or can be made) accessible from an external network (for testing purposes only).
    2. Attempt to establish a connection to the PostgreSQL service using a PostgreSQL client from an external host without specifying a password.
    3. Verify whether the connection is accepted and then attempt to read or modify data in the database.
    4. Confirm that the absence of proper authentication allows unauthorized database access.

6. Insecure Default Permissions in REST Framework

  • Description:

    1. The project template sets DEFAULT_PERMISSION_CLASSES in Django REST Framework to IsAuthenticated in common.py configuration file.
    2. This configuration makes authentication mandatory by default for all API endpoints defined using Django REST Framework.
    3. If a developer using this template creates a new ViewSet and forgets to explicitly configure permission_classes, the endpoint will inherit this default IsAuthenticated permission.
    4. This can lead to unintended access control behavior. Endpoints intended to be publicly accessible might be unintentionally protected, requiring authentication, or endpoints intended to be protected might be misconfigured if the developer misunderstands the default behavior.
    5. While the provided UserViewSet correctly overrides this default for user creation to allow public registration, the global default setting introduces a risk of misconfiguration for newly added endpoints.

  • Impact:

    • High risk of misconfiguration in applications built using this template, potentially leading to unintended exposure of sensitive data or unintended restriction of access to public resources.
    • If developers are not fully aware of the default IsAuthenticated setting, they might incorrectly assume endpoints are publicly accessible when they are actually protected, or vice-versa.

  • Vulnerability Rank: High

  • Currently Implemented Mitigations:

    • None directly mitigate the risk of misconfiguration stemming from the default permission setting.
    • The UserViewSet in the template explicitly sets permission_classes = (IsUserOrCreatingAccountOrReadOnly,), showing awareness of permission configuration for user creation.

  • Missing Mitigations:

    • Documentation Enhancement: Clearly document the default IsAuthenticated setting in the project's documentation. Emphasize the importance of explicitly setting permission_classes for each new ViewSet, especially when public access is intended. Provide examples of how to set different permission classes.
    • Consider a More Permissive Default: Evaluate changing the default DEFAULT_PERMISSION_CLASSES to a more permissive setting like AllowAny. Then, developers would need to explicitly add permission restrictions for endpoints that require authentication. This approach is often considered more secure-by-default, as it reduces the risk of unintentionally exposing protected endpoints due to forgotten permission settings. However, this would be a significant change and might not be suitable for all use cases of the template.
    • Linting/Code Analysis: Integrate a linter or code analysis tool into the development workflow that can detect and warn developers when a new Django REST Framework ViewSet is created without explicitly defining permission_classes.

  • Preconditions:

    • A developer uses the cookiecutter-django-rest template to generate a new Django REST Framework project.
    • The developer adds a new Django app with a new ViewSet to the generated project.
    • The developer either forgets to configure permission_classes for the new ViewSet or is unaware of the default IsAuthenticated setting.

  • Source Code Analysis:

    1. Open the file /code/{{cookiecutter.github_repository_name}}/{{cookiecutter.app_name}}/config/common.py.
    2. Locate the REST_FRAMEWORK dictionary within the Common class.
    3. Find the 'DEFAULT_PERMISSION_CLASSES' key.
    4. Observe that its value is set to ['rest_framework.permissions.IsAuthenticated']. This line configures Django REST Framework to enforce authentication for all API endpoints by default.
    5. Examine the file /code/{{cookiecutter.github_repository_name}}/{{cookiecutter.app_name}}/users/views.py.
    6. Notice that the UserViewSet explicitly defines permission_classes = (IsUserOrCreatingAccountOrReadOnly,). This explicit setting overrides the default IsAuthenticated for this specific ViewSet, allowing unauthenticated users to create new user accounts (as intended for a registration endpoint).
    7. Consider a scenario where a developer adds a new app, for example, a products app, and creates a ProductViewSet without setting permission_classes:
    # /code/{{cookiecutter.github_repository_name}}/{{cookiecutter.app_name}}/products/views.py
from rest_framework import viewsets
from .models import Product
from .serializers import ProductSerializer

class ProductViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet): # permission_classes is NOT set
    queryset = Product.objects.all()
    serializer_class = ProductSerializer
    1. In this case, because permission_classes is not explicitly defined in ProductViewSet, it will inherit the default IsAuthenticated permission from common.py. This means that access to the /api/v1/products/ endpoint (assuming it's correctly configured in urls.py) will require authentication, even if the developer intended it to be publicly accessible for listing products, for example.

  • Security Test Case:

    1. Generate a new project using the cookiecutter-django-rest template.
    2. Create a new Django app named public_api within the generated project: ./manage.py startapp public_api.
    3. In public_api/models.py, create a simple model:
    # /code/{{cookiecutter.github_repository_name}}/{{cookiecutter.app_name}}/public_api/models.py
from django.db import models

class PublicData(models.Model):
    name = models.CharField(max_length=255)
    description = models.TextField()
    1. In public_api/serializers.py, create a serializer for this model:
    # /code/{{cookiecutter.github_repository_name}}/{{cookiecutter.app_name}}/public_api/serializers.py
from rest_framework import serializers
from .models import PublicData

class PublicDataSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
    class Meta:
        model = PublicData
        fields = '__all__'
    1. In public_api/views.py, create a PublicDataViewSet without setting permission_classes:
    # /code/{{cookiecutter.github_repository_name}}/{{cookiecutter.app_name}}/public_api/views.py
from rest_framework import viewsets
from .models import PublicData
from .serializers import PublicDataSerializer

class PublicDataViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet): # permission_classes is NOT set
    queryset = PublicData.objects.all()
    serializer_class = PublicDataSerializer
    1. In public_api/urls.py, register the ViewSet:
    # /code/{{cookiecutter.github_repository_name}}/{{cookiecutter.app_name}}/public_api/urls.py
from rest_framework import routers
from .views import PublicDataViewSet

router = routers.DefaultRouter()
router.register(r'public-data', PublicDataViewSet)

urlpatterns = router.urls
    1. Include public_api.urls in the main project's urls.py:
    # /code/{{cookiecutter.github_repository_name}}/{{cookiecutter.app_name}}/urls.py
from django.urls import path, include
from rest_framework.routers import DefaultRouter
from .users.views import UserViewSet

router = DefaultRouter()
router.register(r'users', UserViewSet)

urlpatterns = [
    path('api/v1/', include(router.urls)),
    path('api/v1/', include('public_api.urls')), # Include public_api urls
    # ... other urls
]
    1. Run migrations: ./manage.py migrate. Create some PublicData objects via Django admin or shell.
    2. Start the development server: docker-compose up.
    3. Access the endpoint http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1/public-data/ in a web browser or using curl without any authentication headers.
    4. Expected Result: The API should return a 403 Forbidden or 401 Unauthorized error along with content like {"detail":"Authentication credentials were not provided."}. This indicates that the default IsAuthenticated permission is being enforced.
    5. Vulnerability Confirmation: The 403/401 response confirms that the default IsAuthenticated permission is active and is applied to the PublicDataViewSet because permission_classes was not explicitly set. This demonstrates the potential for misconfiguration where endpoints intended to be public are unintentionally protected due to the template's default permission settings.