Objective: Compromise Application via BorgBackup Exploitation
Root: Compromise Application via BorgBackup Exploitation
├── 2. Exploit Borg Configuration Weaknesses [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│ ├── 2.1. Weak Repository Passwords/Keyfiles [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ ├── 2.1.1. Brute-force Repository Password [CRITICAL NODE]
│ │ ├── 2.1.2. Dictionary Attack on Repository Password [CRITICAL NODE]
│ │ ├── 2.1.3. Keyfile Theft/Exposure [CRITICAL NODE]
│ ├── 2.2. Insecure Repository Permissions [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ ├── 2.2.1. World-Readable Repository Directory [CRITICAL NODE]
├── 3. Compromise Application Logic via Borg Integration [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│ ├── 3.1. Vulnerabilities in Application's Borg Integration Code [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ ├── 3.1.1. Improper Input Sanitization when Calling Borg [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] --> Root: Compromise Application via BorgBackup Exploitation
│ │ ├── 3.1.2. Storing Borg Credentials Insecurely in Application [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] --> Root: Compromise Application via BorgBackup Exploitation
│ ├── 3.2. Data Exfiltration via Backup Access [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ ├── 3.2.1. Unauthorized Access to Backed-up Application Data [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] <-- 2.1. Weak Repository Passwords/Keyfiles [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├── 4. Social Engineering Attacks Targeting Borg Users [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│ ├── 4.1. Phishing for Borg Repository Credentials [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ ├── 4.1.1. Spear Phishing Emails Targeting Admins [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] --> 3.2.1. Unauthorized Access to Backed-up Application Data [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Attack Tree Path: Exploit Borg Configuration Weaknesses
Attack Vector: Exploiting misconfigurations in how BorgBackup is set up and managed. This path is high-risk because configuration weaknesses are often easier to identify and exploit than software vulnerabilities, and they can directly lead to critical impacts like data breaches.
* **2.1. Weak Repository Passwords/Keyfiles [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]**
* **Threat:** Using easily guessable passwords or failing to adequately protect repository keyfiles.
* **Likelihood:** Medium
* **Impact:** Critical (Full access to backups, data breach)
* **Effort:** Low
* **Skill Level:** Low
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium
* **Mitigations:**
* Enforce strong repository passwords.
* Utilize keyfiles for authentication instead of passwords where possible.
* Implement password complexity requirements and regular password rotation.
* Securely store keyfiles with restricted access.
* Monitor for brute-force attempts and implement rate limiting.
* **2.1.1. Brute-force Repository Password [CRITICAL NODE]**
* **Attack Vector:** Repeatedly guessing passwords to gain access.
* **Mitigations:** Strong passwords, rate limiting, account lockout.
* **2.1.2. Dictionary Attack on Repository Password [CRITICAL NODE]**
* **Attack Vector:** Using lists of common passwords to guess the repository password.
* **Mitigations:** Strong passwords, password complexity requirements, avoiding common or predictable passwords.
* **2.1.3. Keyfile Theft/Exposure [CRITICAL NODE]**
* **Attack Vector:** Stealing or finding exposed keyfiles due to insecure storage or accidental disclosure.
* **Mitigations:** Secure keyfile storage, access control lists, avoiding committing keyfiles to version control, encryption of keyfiles at rest.
* **2.2. Insecure Repository Permissions [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]**
* **Threat:** Setting overly permissive file system permissions on the Borg repository directory and files, allowing unauthorized access.
* **Likelihood:** Low (but misconfigurations happen)
* **Impact:** Critical (Full access to backups, data breach)
* **Effort:** Low
* **Skill Level:** Low
* **Detection Difficulty:** Very Easy
* **Mitigations:**
* Restrict repository directory and file permissions to only authorized users and processes.
* Regularly audit repository permissions.
* Apply the principle of least privilege.
* **2.2.1. World-Readable Repository Directory [CRITICAL NODE]**
* **Attack Vector:** Setting repository directory permissions to be readable by any user on the system.
* **Mitigations:** Restrict permissions to authorized users/groups only.
Attack Tree Path: Compromise Application Logic via Borg Integration
Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the application's code that integrates with BorgBackup. This path is high-risk because application-specific code is often less rigorously tested than Borg itself, and vulnerabilities here can directly compromise the application and its data.
* **3.1. Vulnerabilities in Application's Borg Integration Code [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]**
* **Threat:** Flaws in the application's code that interacts with Borg, leading to command injection, credential exposure, or other security issues.
* **Likelihood:** Medium
* **Impact:** Critical (Application compromise, data breach, code execution)
* **Effort:** Low to Medium
* **Skill Level:** Medium
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium
* **Mitigations:**
* Thoroughly review and test application integration code.
* Apply secure coding practices.
* Conduct regular security code reviews and penetration testing.
* **3.1.1. Improper Input Sanitization when Calling Borg [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] --> Root: Compromise Application via BorgBackup Exploitation**
* **Attack Vector:** Failing to sanitize user-supplied or external data before passing it to Borg commands, leading to command injection vulnerabilities.
* **Mitigations:** Sanitize all inputs passed to Borg commands, use parameterized commands or secure libraries to construct commands, avoid shell execution where possible.
* **3.1.2. Storing Borg Credentials Insecurely in Application [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] --> Root: Compromise Application via BorgBackup Exploitation**
* **Attack Vector:** Storing Borg repository passwords or keyfiles in plaintext configuration files, environment variables with broad access, or other insecure locations within the application.
* **Mitigations:** Securely store Borg credentials using dedicated secrets management systems (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager), environment variables with restricted access, or encrypted configuration files.
* **3.2. Data Exfiltration via Backup Access [HIGH-RISK PATH]**
* **Threat:** Gaining unauthorized access to the Borg repository and extracting sensitive application data from backups. This is the ultimate goal of many attacks targeting backup systems.
* **Likelihood:** Medium (if configuration or integration weaknesses exist)
* **Impact:** Critical (Data breach, confidentiality loss)
* **Effort:** Low to Medium (after initial access is gained)
* **Skill Level:** Low to Medium (after initial access is gained)
* **Detection Difficulty:** Hard (Data exfiltration from backups can be stealthy)
* **Mitigations:**
* Secure Borg repository access through strong authentication and authorization.
* Encrypt backups at rest.
* Implement data access controls within the application to limit the sensitivity of data stored in backups.
* Monitor for unusual backup access patterns.
* **3.2.1. Unauthorized Access to Backed-up Application Data [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] <-- 2.1. Weak Repository Passwords/Keyfiles [HIGH-RISK PATH]**
* **Attack Vector:** Exploiting weak repository passwords or keyfiles to gain access and download backups.
* **Mitigations:** Refer to mitigations for "2.1. Weak Repository Passwords/Keyfiles" and "3.2. Data Exfiltration via Backup Access".
Attack Tree Path: Social Engineering Attacks Targeting Borg Users
Attack Vector: Manipulating users through psychological tactics to gain access to Borg credentials or induce them to perform actions that compromise security. Social engineering is a consistently effective attack vector, bypassing technical security controls.
* **4.1. Phishing for Borg Repository Credentials [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]**
* **Threat:** Deceiving users into revealing their Borg repository passwords or keyfiles through phishing emails or websites.
* **Likelihood:** Medium
* **Impact:** Critical (Full access to backups, data breach)
* **Effort:** Low
* **Skill Level:** Low
* **Detection Difficulty:** Hard (Sophisticated phishing can be difficult to detect)
* **Mitigations:**
* Implement security awareness training for users and administrators, focusing on phishing detection.
* Utilize multi-factor authentication for accessing systems and repositories where Borg credentials are managed.
* Implement phishing detection and prevention mechanisms (e.g., email filtering, link analysis).
* **4.1.1. Spear Phishing Emails Targeting Admins [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] --> 3.2.1. Unauthorized Access to Backed-up Application Data [HIGH-RISK PATH]**
* **Attack Vector:** Sending targeted phishing emails to administrators responsible for Borg backups to steal repository credentials.
* **Mitigations:** Refer to mitigations for "4.1. Phishing for Borg Repository Credentials".