Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
96 lines (80 loc) · 11.2 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

96 lines (80 loc) · 11.2 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for bottlepy/bottle

Objective: To achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) or gain unauthorized access to sensitive data within a Bottle application by exploiting Bottle-specific weaknesses.

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Bottle Application (RCE or Data Access) [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[OR]─ Exploit Bottle Framework Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ Exploit Template Engine Vulnerabilities (if used) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Template Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ Inject malicious template code (e.g., Jinja2, Bottle's SimpleTemplate) to execute OS commands or access sensitive data. [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ Exploit Request Handling Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[AND]─ File Upload Vulnerabilities (If application uses Bottle's file upload features) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ ├───[AND]─ Upload malicious files (e.g., web shells, executables) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ Achieve file execution (e.g., by accessing the uploaded file via web server if in webroot, or exploiting other application logic). [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Path Traversal via Static File Serving (If application uses Bottle's static file serving) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ ├───[AND]─ Craft requests with manipulated paths (e.g., ../../../../etc/passwd) to access files outside the intended static directory. [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ Read sensitive files from the server file system. [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ Exploit Error Handling Vulnerabilities (Bottle's default error handling might be too verbose in development) │ │ ├───[AND]─ Analyze error messages for sensitive information disclosure (e.g., file paths, configuration details, database connection strings in development mode). [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ Exploit Insecure Dependencies (Indirectly related to Bottle, but important in any application) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Exploit identified vulnerabilities in dependencies to compromise the application. [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[OR]─ Exploit Misconfiguration/Insecure Deployment (Common web application issue, but relevant to Bottle deployments) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[AND]─ Identify insecure configurations (e.g., debug mode enabled in production, weak secret keys, exposed administrative interfaces). [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[AND]─ Exploit these misconfigurations to gain unauthorized access or control. [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Template Engine Vulnerabilities -> Template Injection

  • Attack Vector: Template Injection.
    • Description: An attacker injects malicious code into template variables or template directives that are processed by the template engine (e.g., Bottle's SimpleTemplate or Jinja2 if used). When the template is rendered, this malicious code is executed on the server.
    • Bottle Context: If the Bottle application uses templates to dynamically generate web pages and incorporates user-controlled input directly into templates without proper sanitization, it becomes vulnerable.
    • Potential Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE). An attacker can execute arbitrary operating system commands on the server, leading to full system compromise, data breaches, and service disruption.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Sanitize user inputs before passing them to template rendering.
      • Use parameterized queries for database access within templates (if applicable, though discouraged).
      • Consider using a safer templating engine or escaping user input by default.
      • Regularly audit template usage for potential injection points.
      • Implement Content Security Policy (CSP) to mitigate some XSS risks from template injection.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Request Handling Vulnerabilities -> File Upload Vulnerabilities -> Upload malicious files & Achieve file execution

  • Attack Vector: Malicious File Upload and Execution.
    • Description: An attacker uploads a malicious file (e.g., a web shell, executable, or script) to the Bottle application. If the application does not properly validate file types, sizes, and contents, and if the uploaded file can be accessed and executed by the web server or application, the attacker can gain control.
    • Bottle Context: If the Bottle application implements file upload functionality (using Bottle's request handling for file uploads), and if it lacks robust validation and secure storage practices, it is vulnerable.
    • Potential Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE). By executing a web shell or other malicious code, the attacker can gain control of the web server, potentially compromising the entire system and accessing sensitive data.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement robust file upload validation (type, size, content).
      • Store uploaded files outside the webroot to prevent direct access and execution via the web server.
      • Use a dedicated file server if possible.
      • Scan uploaded files for malware.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Request Handling Vulnerabilities -> Path Traversal via Static File Serving -> Craft requests with manipulated paths & Read sensitive files

  • Attack Vector: Path Traversal (Local File Inclusion).
    • Description: An attacker crafts HTTP requests with manipulated file paths (e.g., using ../ sequences) to bypass intended directory restrictions when the Bottle application serves static files. This allows them to access files outside the designated static file directory, potentially including sensitive system files or application code.
    • Bottle Context: If the Bottle application uses bottle.static_file or bottle.run(server='auto') to serve static files, and if file path validation is insufficient, it becomes vulnerable to path traversal.
    • Potential Impact: Information Disclosure. Attackers can read sensitive files from the server's file system, such as configuration files, source code, or even system files like /etc/passwd. This information can be used for further attacks or direct data breaches.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Carefully configure static file serving directories. Avoid serving sensitive directories.
      • Sanitize and validate file paths in static_file calls to prevent traversal sequences.
      • Consider disabling static file serving in production if it is not a necessary feature.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Error Handling Vulnerabilities -> Analyze error messages for sensitive information disclosure

  • Attack Vector: Information Disclosure via Error Messages.
    • Description: When errors occur in the Bottle application, the default error handling (especially in development mode) might display verbose error messages that contain sensitive information. This information can include file paths, configuration details, database connection strings, or internal application logic.
    • Bottle Context: Bottle's default error handling can be verbose. If debug mode is enabled in production or if custom error handling is not implemented to prevent information leakage, the application is vulnerable.
    • Potential Impact: Information Disclosure. Sensitive information revealed in error messages can aid attackers in understanding the application's architecture, configuration, and potential vulnerabilities, making further attacks easier.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement custom error handling to avoid exposing sensitive information in error messages, especially in production.
      • Log errors securely for debugging purposes, but do not display detailed error messages to users in production.
      • Disable debug mode in production.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Insecure Dependencies -> Exploit identified vulnerabilities in dependencies

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting Vulnerable Dependencies.
    • Description: Bottle applications rely on various dependencies (including Bottle itself and other libraries). If any of these dependencies have known security vulnerabilities, attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities to compromise the application.
    • Bottle Context: Like any Python application, Bottle applications use external libraries. If these libraries are not regularly updated and scanned for vulnerabilities, the application becomes susceptible to attacks targeting those vulnerabilities.
    • Potential Impact: Varies. The impact depends on the specific vulnerability in the dependency. It can range from Denial of Service (DoS) to Remote Code Execution (RCE) and data breaches.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regularly update Bottle and all application dependencies to the latest secure versions.
      • Use dependency vulnerability scanning tools in the CI/CD pipeline to automatically detect and address vulnerable dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Misconfiguration/Insecure Deployment -> Identify insecure configurations & Exploit these misconfigurations

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting Misconfigurations and Insecure Deployment.
    • Description: Insecure configurations and deployment practices can introduce vulnerabilities. Common examples include leaving debug mode enabled in production, using weak secret keys, exposing administrative interfaces without proper protection, or having overly permissive firewall rules.
    • Bottle Context: Bottle applications, like any web application, need to be deployed securely. Misconfigurations in the Bottle application itself, the web server it runs on, or the surrounding infrastructure can be exploited.
    • Potential Impact: Varies. The impact depends on the specific misconfiguration. It can range from information disclosure and unauthorized access to Remote Code Execution (e.g., if debug mode allows code execution) and full system compromise.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Follow secure deployment practices.
      • Disable debug mode in production.
      • Use strong, randomly generated secret keys for any cryptographic operations.
      • Properly configure the web server and firewall to restrict access to only necessary ports and services.
      • Regularly review and harden application configuration and deployment settings.