Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
114 lines (98 loc) · 7.38 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

114 lines (98 loc) · 7.38 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for cocos2d/cocos2d-x

Objective: Attacker Achieves RCE or Data Exfiltration on Client Device via Cocos2d-x Application

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      +-------------------------------------------------+
                                      |  **Attacker Achieves RCE or Data Exfiltration**   |
                                      |  **on Client Device via Cocos2d-x Application**  |
                                      +-------------------------------------------------+
                                                       |
                                                       |
                                        +-------------------------------------------------+
                                        |  **Exploit Vulnerabilities**[HIGH RISK]         |
                                        |  **in Cocos2d-x Engine**                       |
                                        +-------------------------------------------------+
                                                       |
          +---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
          |                     |                     |                     |                             |
+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
| **Buffer***| **Format***| **Memory***|  Network  |Integer  |
|**Overflows**|**String***|**Corruption**| **Related***|Overflow/|
|         | **Vulns***  |         | **Vulns***  |Underflow|
+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
    |*        |*        |*        |*        |*
    |*        |*        |* +------+------+  |*
    |*        |*        |* |  **Unsafe*** |  |*
    |*        |*        |* |  **Deserial-***|
    |*        |*        |* |  **ization*** |
    |*        |*        |* |  **of***      |
    |*        |*        |* |  **Network*** |
    |*        |*        |* |  **Data***    |
    |*        |*        |* +------+------+  |*
    |*        |*        |*        |*
    |* +------+------+  |*+------+------+
    |* |  **Exploit***|  |*
    |* |  **CCNode***  |  |*
    |* |  **or***      |  |*
    |* |  **CCSprite***|  |*
    |* |  **Related*** |  |*
    |* |  **Code***    |  |*
    |* +------+------+  |*
    |*        |*        |*
    |*        |*+------+------+
    |*        |*|  **Use-After***|
    |*        |*|  **-Free***   |
    |*        |*|  **in***      |
    |*        |*|  **Resource***|
    |*        |*|  **Manage-*** |
    |*        |*|  **ment***   |
    |*        |*+------+------+
    |*        |*
    +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Vulnerabilities in Cocos2d-x Engine (Critical Node, High-Risk Path)

This is the primary attack vector for achieving RCE or data exfiltration. It encompasses several specific vulnerability types.

Attack Tree Path: Buffer Overflows (Critical Node)

  • Description: Exploiting incorrect handling of string or array sizes in C++ code, allowing an attacker to overwrite adjacent memory. This can occur in Cocos2d-x core code, custom extensions, or third-party libraries used by the game.
  • Example: An attacker provides a crafted string input that exceeds the allocated buffer size for a CCLabelTTF object, overwriting adjacent memory and potentially redirecting code execution.
  • Mitigation:
    • Rigorous code reviews, focusing on string and array manipulation.
    • Use of static analysis tools (Clang Static Analyzer, Coverity).
    • Fuzz testing targeting input handling.
    • Use of AddressSanitizer (ASan) during development.

Attack Tree Path: Format String Vulnerabilities (Critical Node)

  • Description: Exploiting improper use of format string functions (like printf) with user-supplied input, allowing an attacker to read or write arbitrary memory locations.
  • Example: A custom logging function within a Cocos2d-x extension uses sprintf with user-provided input without sanitization, allowing an attacker to inject format string specifiers.
  • Mitigation:
    • Avoid using format string functions directly with user-supplied data.
    • Use safer alternatives or carefully sanitize input.
    • Employ static analysis tools.

Attack Tree Path: Memory Corruption (Use-After-Free, Double-Free, etc.) (Critical Node)

  • Description: Exploiting errors in memory management, such as using memory after it has been freed or freeing the same memory multiple times. This can lead to crashes, data corruption, or RCE.
  • Example: A custom Cocos2d-x component incorrectly manages the lifetime of a CCSprite object, leading to a use-after-free vulnerability when the object is accessed after being released.
  • Mitigation:
    • Use memory debuggers (Valgrind, ASan).
    • Enforce strict coding standards for memory management.
    • Use smart pointers where appropriate.
    • Regular code audits.
  • Exploit CCNode or CCSprite Related Code (Critical Node):
    • Specific exploitation of memory corruption within the handling of these core Cocos2d-x objects.

Attack Tree Path: Network Related Vulnerabilities (Critical Node)

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the networking code of Cocos2d-x or its associated libraries. This includes vulnerabilities in CCHttpClient, WebSocket, or custom networking implementations. Unsafe deserialization is a major concern.
  • Example: An attacker sends a crafted network message containing serialized data that, when deserialized by the Cocos2d-x application, triggers a vulnerability and executes arbitrary code.
  • Mitigation:
    • Use well-vetted and up-to-date networking libraries.
    • Implement robust input validation and sanitization.
    • Use secure protocols (HTTPS) and validate certificates.
    • Avoid unsafe deserialization; use safer formats like JSON with strict schema validation.
  • Exploit CCListener or CCDirector Network Code (Critical Node):
    • Specific exploitation of network vulnerabilities within the handling of network events and director control flow.
  • Unsafe Deserialization of Network Data (Critical Node):
    • A particularly dangerous type of network vulnerability where untrusted data is deserialized without proper validation, potentially leading to code execution.

Attack Tree Path: Integer Overflow/Underflow (Critical Node)

  • Description: Exploiting calculations that result in integer values exceeding their maximum or minimum limits, leading to unexpected behavior or potentially exploitable conditions.
  • Example: Incorrect calculation of sprite positions based on user input, leading to an integer overflow that allows the sprite to be placed outside of expected bounds, potentially triggering other vulnerabilities.
  • Mitigation:
    • Use safe integer arithmetic libraries or techniques.
    • Perform bounds checking before calculations.
    • Utilize static analysis tools.