Objective: Compromise Application Using Openpilot to Gain Unauthorized Access, Data Manipulation, or Disrupt Service.
Compromise Application Using Openpilot (OR) ├── 1. Exploit Openpilot Software Vulnerabilities (OR) │ ├── 1.1 Code Injection Vulnerabilities (OR) │ │ ├── 1.1.1 Python Code Injection (AND) │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.2 Inject Malicious Python Code (e.g., via crafted configuration, exploiting insecure deserialization if applicable) │ ├── 1.2 Logic Bugs and Design Flaws (OR) │ │ ├── 1.2.1 Path Planning Logic Exploitation (AND) │ │ │ └── 1.2.1.2 Craft Scenarios to Cause Unexpected Path Planning Behavior (e.g., leading to dangerous maneuvers, system instability) │ │ ├── 1.2.2 Control System Manipulation (AND) │ │ │ └── 1.2.2.2 Inject Data or Conditions to Manipulate Vehicle Controls (e.g., via CAN bus injection, sensor spoofing - see section 2) ├── 2. Manipulate Openpilot Input Data (OR) │ ├── 2.1 Sensor Spoofing (OR) │ │ ├── 2.1.1 Camera Spoofing (AND) │ │ │ └── 2.1.1.2 Inject Fake Camera Data (e.g., using video injection, adversarial patches on physical environment) │ │ ├── 2.1.3 GPS Spoofing (AND) │ │ │ └── 2.1.3.2 Inject Fake GPS Data (e.g., to alter location information) │ │ ├── 2.1.4 CAN Bus Injection (AND) │ │ │ ├── 2.1.4.1 Gain Access to CAN Bus (e.g., via OBD-II port, physical access to vehicle network) │ │ │ └── 2.1.4.2 Inject Malicious CAN Messages (e.g., to control vehicle functions, manipulate sensor data relayed via CAN) │ │ └── 2.1.5 Environmental Manipulation (AND) │ │ └── 2.1.5.1 Alter Physical Environment (e.g., using adversarial stickers, laser pointers to confuse sensors) ├── 3. Exploit Openpilot's External Interfaces (OR) │ ├── 3.1 Network Communication Exploitation (OR) │ │ ├── 3.1.1 WiFi Network Attacks (AND) │ │ │ ├── 3.1.1.1 Identify WiFi Networks Used by Openpilot Device (e.g., for internet access, remote management) │ │ │ └── 3.1.1.2 Exploit WiFi Vulnerabilities (e.g., weak passwords, WPS attacks, vulnerabilities in WiFi stack) to gain network access │ ├── 3.2 Physical Interface Exploitation (OR) │ │ ├── 3.2.1 USB Interface Exploitation (AND) │ │ │ ├── 3.2.1.1 Gain Physical Access to USB Ports on Openpilot Device (e.g., EON) │ │ │ └── 3.2.1.2 Exploit USB Vulnerabilities (e.g., USB drive-by attacks, malicious USB devices, exploiting USB stack vulnerabilities) ├── 5. Physical Access and Device Tampering (OR) │ ├── 5.1 Device Theft (AND) │ │ ├── 5.1.1 Gain Physical Access to Openpilot Device (e.g., EON) │ │ └── 5.1.2 Steal Device to Analyze and Extract Data/Secrets (e.g., access logs, configuration, cryptographic keys) │ ├── 5.3 Data Extraction from Storage (AND) │ │ ├── 5.3.1 Gain Physical Access to Openpilot Device │ │ └── 5.3.2 Extract Data from Storage Media (e.g., SD card, internal storage) to access sensitive information (logs, user data, calibration data)
Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Openpilot Software Vulnerabilities
- Attack Vectors:
- Code Injection Vulnerabilities:
- Python Code Injection:
- Inject Malicious Python Code: Attackers can attempt to inject malicious Python code by exploiting input points to Python interpreters within Openpilot. This could be through:
- Crafted configuration files that are parsed and executed.
- User inputs that are not properly sanitized and are passed to Python modules.
- Exploiting insecure deserialization vulnerabilities if Openpilot uses deserialization of untrusted data.
- Inject Malicious Python Code: Attackers can attempt to inject malicious Python code by exploiting input points to Python interpreters within Openpilot. This could be through:
- Python Code Injection:
- Logic Bugs and Design Flaws:
- Path Planning Logic Exploitation:
- Craft Scenarios to Cause Unexpected Path Planning Behavior: Attackers can analyze path planning algorithms and craft specific scenarios (e.g., adversarial examples, unusual road conditions) to trigger logic bugs. This can lead to:
- Dangerous maneuvers by the vehicle.
- System instability or crashes.
- Craft Scenarios to Cause Unexpected Path Planning Behavior: Attackers can analyze path planning algorithms and craft specific scenarios (e.g., adversarial examples, unusual road conditions) to trigger logic bugs. This can lead to:
- Control System Manipulation:
- Inject Data or Conditions to Manipulate Vehicle Controls: Attackers can inject malicious data or conditions to manipulate the control system. This can be achieved through:
- CAN bus injection (see section 2.1.4).
- Sensor spoofing (see section 2.1).
- Inject Data or Conditions to Manipulate Vehicle Controls: Attackers can inject malicious data or conditions to manipulate the control system. This can be achieved through:
- Path Planning Logic Exploitation:
- Code Injection Vulnerabilities:
Attack Tree Path: 2. Manipulate Openpilot Input Data
- Attack Vectors:
- Sensor Spoofing:
- Camera Spoofing:
- Inject Fake Camera Data: Attackers can intercept and replace the camera input stream with fake data. Methods include:
- Video injection by physically connecting to the camera input.
- Adversarial patches placed in the physical environment to mislead the camera perception.
- Inject Fake Camera Data: Attackers can intercept and replace the camera input stream with fake data. Methods include:
- GPS Spoofing:
- Inject Fake GPS Data: Attackers can use GPS spoofing devices to transmit fake GPS signals, altering the perceived location of the Openpilot system.
- CAN Bus Injection:
- Gain Access to CAN Bus: Attackers can gain access to the vehicle's CAN bus through:
- The OBD-II port, which is often easily accessible.
- Physical access to the vehicle's internal network.
- Inject Malicious CAN Messages: Once on the CAN bus, attackers can inject malicious CAN messages to:
- Control vehicle functions directly (steering, acceleration, braking).
- Manipulate sensor data relayed over CAN, influencing Openpilot's perception.
- Gain Access to CAN Bus: Attackers can gain access to the vehicle's CAN bus through:
- Environmental Manipulation:
- Alter Physical Environment: Attackers can subtly alter the physical environment to confuse Openpilot's sensors, such as:
- Using adversarial stickers to mislead object detection algorithms.
- Using laser pointers to disrupt camera or LiDAR sensors.
- Alter Physical Environment: Attackers can subtly alter the physical environment to confuse Openpilot's sensors, such as:
- Camera Spoofing:
- Sensor Spoofing:
Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Openpilot's External Interfaces
- Attack Vectors:
- Network Communication Exploitation:
- WiFi Network Attacks:
- Identify WiFi Networks Used by Openpilot Device: Attackers can easily scan for and identify WiFi networks used by Openpilot devices.
- Exploit WiFi Vulnerabilities: Attackers can exploit vulnerabilities in WiFi networks to gain access, including:
- Weak passwords.
- WPS attacks.
- Vulnerabilities in the WiFi stack of the Openpilot device or access point.
- WiFi Network Attacks:
- Physical Interface Exploitation:
- USB Interface Exploitation:
- Gain Physical Access to USB Ports on Openpilot Device: USB ports on devices like EON are often physically accessible.
- Exploit USB Vulnerabilities: Attackers can exploit USB vulnerabilities through:
- USB drive-by attacks using malicious USB drives.
- Malicious USB devices that emulate keyboards or network adapters.
- Exploiting vulnerabilities in the USB stack of the Openpilot device.
- USB Interface Exploitation:
- Network Communication Exploitation:
Attack Tree Path: 5. Physical Access and Device Tampering
- Attack Vectors:
- Device Theft:
- Gain Physical Access to Openpilot Device: Physical access to the Openpilot device (e.g., EON) is often possible depending on the deployment scenario.
- Steal Device to Analyze and Extract Data/Secrets: Once stolen, attackers can:
- Analyze the device's software and hardware in detail.
- Extract sensitive data such as logs, configuration files, and cryptographic keys.
- Data Extraction from Storage:
- Gain Physical Access to Openpilot Device: Physical access is required.
- Extract Data from Storage Media: Attackers can remove storage media (SD card, internal storage) and:
- Directly access the data on another system.
- Recover sensitive information like logs, user data, and calibration data if not properly encrypted.
- Device Theft: