Attack Surface: CAN Bus Injection (via openpilot)
- Description: Unauthorized modification of messages on the vehicle's CAN bus through the compromised openpilot device.
- openpilot Contribution: openpilot's required CAN bus access for core functionality creates the direct pathway. It acts as a potentially compromised bridge.
- Example: An attacker, having gained RCE on the openpilot device, sends CAN messages to disable the brakes.
- Impact: Loss of vehicle control, unintended actions (acceleration, braking, steering), disabling safety systems, vehicle damage, injury/death.
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Developers:
- Secure Boot: Prevent unauthorized firmware execution.
- Strict CAN Message Filtering: Implement rigorous input validation and filtering (both inbound and outbound) on the CAN bus. Whitelist allowed messages; blacklist/reject all others.
- CAN Bus Intrusion Detection (IDS): Monitor for anomalous CAN traffic patterns.
- Hardware Security Module (HSM): Protect cryptographic keys and enable secure CAN message signing/verification.
- Code Hardening (CAN Interface): Focus secure coding practices specifically on the CAN communication code.
- Users:
- Physical Device Security: Prevent unauthorized physical access to the openpilot hardware.
- Developers:
Attack Surface: Remote Code Execution (RCE) on openpilot Device
- Description: An attacker gains the ability to execute arbitrary code on the openpilot device itself.
- openpilot Contribution: openpilot's software complexity, reliance on external libraries (C++, Python, OS components), and network connectivity (Wi-Fi, cloud) create the vulnerability surface.
- Example: Exploiting a buffer overflow in openpilot's image processing code via a crafted image sent over Wi-Fi.
- Impact: Complete device compromise, leading to CAN bus injection (see above), data exfiltration, and potential lateral movement within the vehicle's network.
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Developers:
- Secure Coding Practices (OWASP): Adhere rigorously to secure coding guidelines.
- Memory Safety: Prioritize memory-safe languages (e.g., Rust) or robust memory management in C/C++.
- Regular Vulnerability Scanning: Employ static and dynamic analysis tools.
- Dependency Management (SBOM): Track, vet, and update all dependencies.
- Sandboxing: Isolate openpilot components (sensor processing, control, networking) to contain breaches.
- Secure Update Mechanism: Implement robust, cryptographically verified updates.
- Principle of Least Privilege: Minimize privileges for openpilot processes.
- Users:
- Prompt Software Updates: Install updates immediately when available.
- Strong Wi-Fi Security: Use a strong, unique password for the connected Wi-Fi network.
- Developers:
- Description: Manipulating sensor data (camera, radar) to cause openpilot's specific machine learning models and control algorithms to make incorrect driving decisions.
- openpilot Contribution: This is not general sensor spoofing; it's about exploiting the unique way openpilot processes and reacts to sensor data. The vulnerability lies in openpilot's specific model architecture, training data, and sensor fusion logic.
- Example: Projecting a fake lane marking that specifically triggers a misclassification in openpilot's lane detection model, causing a lane departure.
- Impact: Incorrect lane keeping, false obstacle detection/avoidance, incorrect speed control, leading to potential accidents.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Developers:
- Sensor Fusion with Redundancy: Cross-validate data from multiple, independent sensors.
- Adversarial Training: Train models with adversarial examples to improve robustness.
- Anomaly Detection (Sensor Data): Detect physically impossible or highly improbable sensor readings.
- Contextual Awareness: Integrate map data, time of day, and other contextual information to validate sensor input.
- Out-of-Distribution (OOD) Detection: Identify when sensor inputs deviate significantly from training data.
- Users:
- Maintain Sensor Cleanliness: Ensure sensors are unobstructed.
- Situational Awareness: Remain attentive and ready to take over control.
- Developers:
Attack Surface: Model Poisoning / Data Poisoning (Targeting openpilot's Models)
- Description: Tampering with the training data used to create openpilot's machine learning models, causing them to misbehave in specific, attacker-controlled ways. This targets the specific models used by openpilot.
- openpilot Contribution: The vulnerability exists because openpilot relies on machine learning and updates to those models. The attack targets the integrity of openpilot's training pipeline.
- Example: Subtly modifying a dataset of driving images to cause openpilot's lane-keeping model to consistently drift left under specific, rare conditions.
- Impact: Subtle but potentially dangerous misbehavior of openpilot, difficult to detect until triggered, leading to accidents in specific scenarios.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Developers:
- Data Provenance and Integrity: Securely track and verify the origin and integrity of all training data.
- Data Sanitization: Thoroughly inspect and clean training data.
- Robust Training Techniques: Employ methods less susceptible to data poisoning (adversarial training, differential privacy).
- Model Monitoring: Continuously monitor deployed model performance for anomalies.
- Red Team Exercises (Data Poisoning): Simulate poisoning attacks to test defenses.
- Secure Model Storage: Protect trained models from unauthorized access.
- Users: (Limited direct mitigation; relies on developer actions)
- Install Only Official Updates: Ensure updates come directly from comma.ai and are verified.
- Developers: