Here is a combined list of vulnerabilities, formatted as markdown, based on the provided lists.
After reviewing the provided vulnerability lists, we have identified the following configuration issues in the test application settings that represent critical and high-rank vulnerabilities. These issues are present in the provided configuration files and could be exploited by an external attacker targeting a publicly available instance of the application.
-
Vulnerability Name: Production DEBUG Mode Enabled
- Description: An external attacker can force an error and cause Django to render a detailed error page. With
DEBUG = True
in the settings file (/code/tests/testapp/settings.py
), internal configuration details (including file paths, stack traces, and variable values) are revealed. This process involves deploying the application with test settings, triggering an application error through a crafted request, and observing the error page that discloses internal details, which can be used to identify further exploitable vulnerabilities. - Impact: Disclosure of sensitive information such as code structure, configuration details, and potentially database information greatly assists attackers in conducting targeted follow-up attacks, potentially leading to complete system compromise.
- Vulnerability Rank: Critical
- Currently Implemented Mitigations: None. The settings file explicitly sets
DEBUG = True
without any conditional switching. - Missing Mitigations: Implement a production settings file that sets
DEBUG = False
. Ensure sensitive error details are hidden from end users in production environments. - Preconditions: The vulnerable configuration is deployed to a production environment (or any publicly accessible instance) without disabling DEBUG mode.
- Source Code Analysis: In
/code/tests/testapp/settings.py
, the lineDEBUG = True
is present. This value is not overridden based on the environment, causing any error page to include detailed Django traceback information. - Security Test Case:
- Deploy the application using the provided settings.
- Manually trigger an error, for example, by accessing a non-existent URL or causing an exception in a view.
- Observe if a detailed error page with debug tracebacks and sensitive configuration information is displayed.
- Description: An external attacker can force an error and cause Django to render a detailed error page. With
-
Vulnerability Name: Missing CSRF Protection
- Description: The application’s middleware configuration in
/code/tests/testapp/settings.py
does not include the CSRF protection middleware. An attacker can craft a malicious HTML page on a remote site to send forged requests to state-changing endpoints (e.g., URLs for changing or deleting a "Book"). By tricking an authenticated user into visiting this page, the attacker can trigger unauthorized actions without the user’s intent. The attack steps are: creating an HTML page that issues a request to a sensitive URL like/1/change/
using the victim’s browser, hosting this page on a controlled domain, and tricking an authenticated user into visiting the page, executing the request without a valid CSRF token. - Impact: This flaw allows attackers to perform unauthorized operations on behalf of trusted users, compromising application integrity and data security.
- Vulnerability Rank: High
- Currently Implemented Mitigations: None. The middleware list in
/code/tests/testapp/settings.py
is missing"django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware"
. - Missing Mitigations: Add
"django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware"
to the middleware configuration. Ensure that all state-changing views require a valid CSRF token and utilize proper HTTP methods like POST. - Preconditions: The application is deployed with settings that omit CSRF protection, and the affected views are accessible to authenticated users.
- Source Code Analysis: In
/code/tests/testapp/settings.py
, theMIDDLEWARE
setting does not include the CSRF middleware. Consequently, Django will not check for a CSRF token in incoming requests, even for views performing sensitive actions. - Security Test Case:
- Deploy the application with the provided settings.
- From an attacker-controlled site, serve an HTML page that automatically submits a request (using the victim’s logged-in browser session) to an endpoint such as
/1/change/
or/1/delete/
. - Confirm that the request is accepted and processed even without a CSRF token.
- Description: The application’s middleware configuration in
-
Vulnerability Name: Missing ALLOWED_HOSTS Configuration
- Description: The settings file (
/code/tests/testapp/settings.py
) does not specify anALLOWED_HOSTS
list. In production, Django uses this setting to validate theHost
header of incoming requests. An attacker can exploit this by sending requests with manipulatedHost
headers, potentially leading to host header injection attacks. Exploitation typically involves deploying the application withDEBUG
turned off but without anALLOWED_HOSTS
configuration, crafting HTTP requests with maliciousHost
header values, and causing unpredictable application behavior such as improper URL generation, cache poisoning, or bypassing security checks. - Impact: Without a whitelist of allowed hosts, the application is vulnerable to host header attacks, leading to misdirected links, improper URL generation, and downstream attacks such as cache poisoning or redirection to malicious sites.
- Vulnerability Rank: High
- Currently Implemented Mitigations: None. The
/code/tests/testapp/settings.py
file does not define anALLOWED_HOSTS
setting. - Missing Mitigations: Define
ALLOWED_HOSTS
with a list of permitted domain names and/or IP addresses in the production settings, for example,ALLOWED_HOSTS = ["yourdomain.com"]
. - Preconditions: The application is deployed in a production-like environment (typically with
DEBUG=False
) without anALLOWED_HOSTS
configuration. - Source Code Analysis: Review of
/code/tests/testapp/settings.py
shows no assignment toALLOWED_HOSTS
. Without this setting, Django’s default behavior (an empty list) will not adequately validate incomingHost
headers in a production scenario. - Security Test Case:
- Deploy the application with
DEBUG
set toFalse
and without settingALLOWED_HOSTS
. - Send an HTTP request with a
Host
header that is not among the legitimate domains, for example, usingcurl
with a customHost
header. - Observe if the application accepts the request without proper host validation, confirming the vulnerability.
- Deploy the application with
- Description: The settings file (