Here is the combined list of vulnerabilities, formatted as markdown with main paragraphs and subparagraphs for each vulnerability, with duplicates removed and descriptions merged where applicable:

Combined Vulnerability List

Vulnerability Name: Potential XSS vulnerability due to insufficient SVG Sanitization
Description: The application allows uploading SVG files and attempts to sanitize them to prevent XSS attacks. However, the sanitization process might be insufficient and could be bypassed by crafted SVG files containing malicious code. An attacker could upload a specially crafted SVG file that bypasses the sanitization and executes Javascript code in the victim's browser when the SVG file is viewed or processed by the application. Specifically, an attacker crafts a malicious SVG file containing embedded JavaScript code designed to bypass sanitization. The attacker uploads this SVG file through the file upload functionality in the application (e.g., via the admin panel). The application's backend uses a sanitization function (likely sanitize_svg in filer/validation.py) to process the uploaded SVG. Due to weaknesses in the sanitization logic (using svglib and reportlab which might not be comprehensive) or the use of bypass techniques in the malicious SVG, the sanitization is not effective. When an administrator or user views or previews the uploaded SVG file within the application (e.g., in the admin file browser, media library, or if the SVG is displayed on a public page), the unsanitized malicious JavaScript code embedded in the SVG gets executed in their web browser. This execution of arbitrary JavaScript code constitutes a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability.
Impact: Cross-site scripting (XSS). If an attacker successfully uploads a malicious SVG, they could potentially execute arbitrary Javascript code in the browsers of users who view or interact with the uploaded file. This could lead to session hijacking, cookie theft, defacement, or redirection to malicious websites, account takeover, or theft of sensitive information.
Vulnerability Rank: high
Currently Implemented Mitigations: SVG files are sanitized using custom logic within the sanitize_svg function in filer/validation.py. The validate_svg function in the same file performs basic validation by checking for the presence of <script> tags, javascript: directives, and event handlers like onclick. The project includes a sanitize_svg function (in filer/validation.py) which is intended to sanitize uploaded SVG files to prevent XSS. This function uses svglib to parse SVG and reportlab to re-render it, aiming to remove malicious scripts. File validation is performed during upload, including checks for potentially malicious content in SVG files (based on tests/test_validation.py and filer/validation.py). The validate_svg function in filer/validation.py checks for presence of event attributes and <script> tags using simple string matching.
Missing Mitigations:
- Strengthen SVG sanitization by replacing the custom logic with a robust and actively maintained library specifically designed for SVG sanitization (e.g., defusedxml, svgcleaner, or a similar dedicated library). The current custom logic might be easily bypassed. Regularly update the chosen sanitization library to address new bypass techniques.
- Implement a Content Security Policy (CSP) header to further mitigate the impact of XSS vulnerabilities, even if sanitization fails.
- Consider disabling SVG uploads entirely if the risk outweighs the benefit.
- Regularly review and update the sanitization and validation logic, or the chosen sanitization library, to address new XSS bypass techniques.
- Robust SVG Sanitization Library: The current sanitize_svg function relies on svglib and reportlab. While these libraries help, they might not cover all possible XSS vectors in SVGs. A more robust and actively maintained SVG sanitization library, specifically designed for security, like defusedxml or a dedicated SVG sanitizer, should be considered.
- Content Security Policy (CSP): CSP is not explicitly mentioned in the provided files. Implementing CSP would significantly reduce the impact of XSS vulnerabilities, even if sanitization is bypassed. CSP can restrict the sources from which the browser is allowed to load resources and execute scripts, limiting the attacker's ability to inject and run malicious code.
- Regular Security Audits and Updates: SVG sanitization is a complex task, and new bypass techniques are constantly being discovered. Regular security audits focusing on SVG handling and updates to the sanitization mechanisms are crucial.
Preconditions:
- The application must allow uploading SVG files as image/svg+xml mime type.
- The application must serve or process uploaded SVG files in a way that allows SVG rendering and Javascript execution (e.g., displaying them in the browser, using them in image processing that triggers rendering).
- The SVG sanitization and validation logic must be vulnerable to bypass.
- The application must allow users (especially administrators) to upload SVG files.
- The application must process or render these uploaded SVG files in a web browser context (e.g., display them in the admin panel, use them on public pages).
- There must be a bypass in the sanitize_svg function allowing malicious JavaScript to remain after sanitization. The current sanitization might be bypassed with sophisticated SVG structures or encoding techniques that are not handled by svglib and reportlab effectively.

Source Code Analysis:

File Upload and Validation: When a user uploads a file through the admin interface, specifically using the AJAX upload functionality (e.g., drag and drop upload in folder directory listing), the ajax_upload function in filer/admin/clipboardadmin.py is invoked.

# filer/admin/clipboardadmin.py
@csrf_exempt
def ajax_upload(request, folder_id=None):
    # ... permission checks ...

    if len(request.FILES) == 1:
        # don't check if request is ajax or not, just grab the file
        upload, filename, is_raw, mime_type = handle_request_files_upload(request)
    else:
        # else process the request as usual
        upload, filename, is_raw, mime_type = handle_upload(request)
    # ... file type detection ...
    uploadform = FileForm({'original_filename': filename, 'owner': request.user.pk},
                          {'file': upload})
    uploadform.request = request
    uploadform.instance.mime_type = mime_type
    if uploadform.is_valid():
        try:
            validate_upload(filename, upload, request.user, mime_type) # SVG validation and sanitization is called here
            file_obj = uploadform.save(commit=False)
            # ...

validate_upload Function: Inside ajax_upload, the validate_upload function from filer/validation.py is called. This function is responsible for validating and sanitizing the uploaded file based on its mime type. For image/svg+xml, it calls validate_svg and sanitize_svg.

# filer/validation.py
def validate_upload(file_name: str, file: typing.IO, owner: User, mime_type: str) -> None:
    # ...
    if mime_type == 'image/svg+xml':
        validate_svg(file_name=file_name, file=file, owner=owner, mime_type=mime_type)
        sanitize_svg(file_name=file_name, file=file, owner=owner, mime_type=mime_type)
        return
    # ...

validate_svg Function: This function, as previously described, performs a basic check for potential XSS vectors by looking for specific byte strings.

# filer/validation.py
TRIGGER_XSS_THREAD = (
    # ... (XSS trigger byte strings) ...
    b"<script",
    b"javascript:",
)

def validate_svg(file_name: str, file: typing.IO, owner: User, mime_type: str) -> None:
    """SVG files must not contain script tags or javascript hrefs.
    This might be too strict but avoids parsing the xml"""
    content = file.read().lower()
    if any(map(lambda x: x in content, TRIGGER_XSS_THREAD)):
        # If any element of TRIGGER_XSS_THREAD is found in file, raise FileValidationError
        raise FileValidationError(
            _('File "{file_name}": Rejected due to potential cross site scripting vulnerability')
            .format(file_name=file_name)
        )

  - File: `/code/filer/validation.py`
  - **`validate_svg` function:**
      - This function performs a basic check for potential XSS vectors in SVG files using string matching.
      - It checks for the presence of event attributes (like `onclick`, `onload`), base64 encoded content, and `<script>` tags or `javascript:` URLs in the SVG content using `TRIGGER_XSS_THREAD`.
      - If any of these patterns are found, it raises a `FileValidationError`, rejecting the upload.
      - **Vulnerability:** This validation method is not robust and can be easily bypassed. Attackers can use various encoding techniques, different event handlers, or SVG features not covered by `TRIGGER_XSS_THREAD` to inject malicious JavaScript. For example, it does not seem to block `<foreignObject>` which can embed XHTML and execute JavaScript.

sanitize_svg Function: This function attempts to sanitize SVG files by re-rendering them using svglib and reportlab.

# filer/validation.py
def sanitize_svg(file_name: str, file: typing.IO, owner: User, mime_type: str) -> None:
    from easy_thumbnails.VIL.Image import Image
    from reportlab.graphics import renderSVG
    from svglib.svglib import svg2rlg
    drawing = svg2rlg(file)
    if not drawing:
        raise FileValidationError(
            _('File "{file_name}": SVG file format not recognized')
            .format(file_name=file_name)
        )
    image = Image(size=(drawing.width, drawing.height))
    renderSVG.draw(drawing, image.canvas)
    xml = image.canvas.svg.toxml(encoding="UTF-8")  # Removes non-graphic nodes ->  sanitation
    file.seek(0)  # Rewind file
    file.write(xml)  # write to binary file with utf-8 encoding

  - **`sanitize_svg` function:**
      - This function attempts to sanitize SVG files using `svglib` to parse the SVG and `reportlab` to re-render it.
      - It converts the SVG to a ReportLab drawing object and then renders it back to XML using `image.canvas.svg.toxml()`.
      - The comment indicates that `toxml()` removes "non-graphic nodes", which is intended to sanitize the SVG by removing potentially malicious elements.
      - **Vulnerability:** While using parsing and re-rendering is a better approach than string-based filtering, the effectiveness of `svglib` and `reportlab` as sanitizers is not guaranteed. There might be SVG features or complex structures that can bypass this sanitization process and still allow for XSS.  The documentation and security considerations of `svglib` and `reportlab` regarding SVG sanitization should be reviewed to understand the limitations.

Vulnerability: The analysis remains the same. The rudimentary checks in validate_svg and the re-rendering approach in sanitize_svg are likely insufficient to prevent sophisticated SVG-based XSS attacks. Attackers can use various bypass techniques to circumvent these sanitization attempts.
- File: /code/tests/test_validation.py
- The test_svg_sanitizer test in tests/test_validation.py shows that the project is testing SVG sanitization.
- However, the tests are based on simple string checks (assertNotIn) after applying sanitize_svg, which might not be sufficient to guarantee robust sanitization against all XSS vectors.
- The tests use basic attack vectors like <script>, <a> with javascript:, and simple event handlers. More sophisticated bypasses might not be covered by these tests.

Security Test Case:
1. Log in to the admin panel of the django-filer application as a user with file upload permissions.
2. Create a new folder or navigate to an existing folder where file uploads are allowed.
3. Craft a malicious SVG file that attempts to bypass the validate_svg and sanitize_svg sanitization. Example of a malicious SVG using case variation and event handler obfuscation to bypass validate_svg:
```
<?xml version="1.0" standalone="no"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD SVG 1.1//EN" "http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd">
<svg version="1.1" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <svg onload="JAVASCRIPT:alert('XSS Vulnerability')"/>
  <rect width="300" height="100" style="fill:rgb(0,0,255);stroke-width:3;stroke:rgb(0,0,0)"/>
</svg>
```
Alternatively, craft a malicious SVG file designed to bypass the current sanitize_svg function. This example uses <foreignObject> and inline JavaScript within an event handler, a common bypass technique against basic sanitizers:
```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1">
  <foreignObject width="100%" height="100%">
    <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
      <div id="xss" style="width: 200px; height: 200px; background-color: lightblue; border: 1px solid black; padding: 20px; text-align: center; font-size: 16px;" onclick="alert('XSS via foreignObject and onclick: Document URI: ' + document.documentURI);">
        Click here to trigger XSS
      </div>
    </body>
  </foreignObject>
</svg>
```
1. Upload the crafted malicious SVG file through the file upload interface, preferably using drag and drop upload in the folder directory listing in admin panel to trigger ajax_upload view.
2. After successful upload, attempt to view or process the uploaded SVG file. This might involve viewing the file in the admin panel's file browser or embedding the SVG file into a page managed by django-filer (if that functionality is available). For the <foreignObject> example, locate the uploaded SVG file in the file browser or media library within the django-filer admin panel and attempt to preview or view the uploaded SVG file. Click on the light blue box in the preview.
3. Observe if the Javascript code embedded in the SVG file is executed in the browser. If an alert box with "XSS Vulnerability" or "XSS via foreignObject and onclick: Document URI: ..." appears, it indicates a successful XSS vulnerability. Observe if the JavaScript code (alert('XSS via foreignObject and onclick: ' + document.documentURI);) is executed when the SVG is previewed or interacted with. If an alert box appears showing the document URI, it indicates a successful XSS vulnerability due to an SVG sanitization bypass.

Vulnerability Name: Folder Permission Cache Key Collision
Description: The folder permission caching code uses a cache key that is generated using only the permission name (for example, "filer:perm:can_read") rather than a key unique to each user. As a result, when cache entries are updated (or even “polluted”) by one user, the cached permission dictionary becomes shared among multiple users. Step by step, an attacker could:
1. Log in with a low‑privileged account that can trigger folder operations which update the permission cache.
2. Trigger an operation that causes the cache update helper to write a list of folder IDs for a permission (e.g. "filer:perm:can_read")—this list can be manipulated to include additional (restricted) folder IDs.
3. Cause a subsequent permission check (using the same key) to use the attacker‑controlled list, thereby erroneously granting access.
Impact: Unauthorized access to restricted folders and sensitive files. In the worst case, it may lead to privilege escalation and disclosure of confidential data.
Vulnerability Rank: High
Currently Implemented Mitigations: Although a developer comment in filer/cache.py suggests that the cache key should include the user ID, the production code still uses:
```
def get_folder_perm_cache_key(user, permission):
    return f"filer:perm:{permission}"
```
No runtime controls prevent a low‑privileged user from updating the shared cache.
Missing Mitigations: The cache key should incorporate the user’s identity (e.g. user ID) so that entries remain isolated per user. Additional safeguards on cache update operations would further mitigate the risk.
Preconditions:
- The attacker must be authenticated (even with minimal privileges) and able to trigger folder permission–updating operations.
- The caching backend is shared among sessions so that all users rely on the same cache key.
Source Code Analysis:
- In filer/cache.py, the key is generated as:
```
def get_folder_perm_cache_key(user, permission):
    return f"filer:perm:{permission}"
```
  The key depends solely on the permission name.
- Both the permission check and cache update functions use this key. A malicious update by one user overwrites the same cache entry used by others.
Security Test Case:
1. Setup:
  - Create two test accounts: a low‑privileged “attacker” and a victim (or another user whose access rights are normally restricted).
2. Manipulation:
  - Log in as the attacker and perform an operation (or directly invoke the helper) that updates the cache via update_folder_permission_cache(user, "can_read", id_list), replacing or merging the proper folder IDs with extra IDs.
3. Verification:
  - Initiate a permission check (via get_folder_permission_cache(user, "can_read")) from either account and verify that the returned folder IDs include the attacker‑supplied, unauthorized IDs.
  - In an integration test, attempt to list or access folders that should normally be restricted and observe that access is improperly granted.
4. Expected Result:
  - The permission check returns the manipulated folder IDs, granting unauthorized access. With a unique key per user, the attack would fail.

Vulnerability Name: CSRF Protection Bypass on AJAX File Upload Endpoint
Description: The AJAX file upload endpoint (implemented in the ajax_upload view in /code/filer/admin/clipboardadmin.py) is decorated with @csrf_exempt, which bypasses Django’s built‑in CSRF protection. Step by step, an attacker could:
1. Craft a malicious webpage that automatically submits a POST request (with a file payload in the FILES field) to the AJAX upload endpoint (for example, /admin/filer/operations/upload/no_folder/ or /admin/filer/operations/upload/<folder_id>/).
2. Lure an authenticated user (with the filer.add_file permission) to visit this malicious page.
3. The user’s browser, carrying valid session cookies, sends the POST request without a CSRF token, causing the file upload to occur without proper verification.
Impact: The attacker can force an authenticated user to upload arbitrary files. Malicious files uploaded to the system could serve as a base for further exploitation, such as hosting malware or enabling stored cross‑site scripting (XSS).
Vulnerability Rank: High
Currently Implemented Mitigations:
- The view verifies that the requesting user has the required permission (filer.add_file) and that the target folder allows adding children (folder.has_add_children_permission(request)).
- These permission checks limit the functionality to authorized users; however, they do not compensate for the missing CSRF protection.
Missing Mitigations:
- Enforce CSRF token validation on the AJAX endpoint. Either remove the @csrf_exempt decorator or integrate a secure AJAX file upload mechanism that validates a CSRF token with each request.
Preconditions:
- An attacker must be able to lure an authenticated user (with file‑upload privileges) to a phishing or malicious site.
- The AJAX upload endpoint must be publicly reachable within the context of the authenticated session.
Source Code Analysis:
- In /code/filer/admin/clipboardadmin.py, the view is defined as:
```
@csrf_exempt
def ajax_upload(request, folder_id=None):
    ...
```
  This decorator removes all CSRF checks.
- After validating file‑upload permissions, the view processes the file (using helpers like handle_request_files_upload(request)). No CSRF token is validated, leaving the endpoint open to cross-site forgery.
Security Test Case:
1. Setup:
  - Use a test account with the filer.add_file permission and log in via a browser.
2. Attack:
  - Host an external HTML page that automatically submits a POST request to the AJAX file upload endpoint (e.g., https://<your-domain>/admin/filer/operations/upload/no_folder/) with a valid file payload. The request intentionally omits any CSRF token.
3. Execution:
  - Have the authenticated user (or a simulated environment with valid session cookies) visit the malicious page.
4. Verification:
  - Check the file storage or administrative logs to confirm that a new file entry has been created despite the missing CSRF token.
5. Expected Result:
  - The file upload completes successfully despite the absence of a valid CSRF token, confirming that the endpoint is vulnerable to CSRF attacks.

Vulnerability Name: Arbitrary File Overwrite via Unvalidated Filename in MultiStorageFileField
Description: In /code/filer/fields/multistorage_file.py, the custom field MultiStorageFileField implements a to_python method designed to convert file-upload input provided as a list (with two elements, where the first element is the filename and the second is a base64‑encoded payload). This method takes the provided filename and passes it directly to the storage backend without any sanitization or validation. Step by step, an attacker could:
1. Exploit the previously identified CSRF Protection Bypass on the AJAX file upload endpoint (or any other file upload mechanism) to submit a malicious file‑upload request.
2. Instead of supplying a conventional file object, supply a specially crafted list payload such as:
  - [ "../../malicious.txt", "<base64_encoded_payload>" ] where "../../malicious.txt" includes directory traversal sequences designed to escape the intended upload directory.
3. The to_python method decodes the payload and, without checking the filename, calls:
```
if self.storage.exists(filename):
    self.storage.delete(filename)
self.storage.save(filename, ContentFile(payload))
```
  thereby writing the file to an arbitrary location within the storage backend.
Impact:
- An attacker may overwrite arbitrary files in the media storage. Depending on the storage configuration and file location, this could lead to a compromise of system integrity or even remote code execution if, for example, a critical file is overwritten.
- Even if remote code execution is not immediately achievable, unauthorized file overwrite can be used for further escalation and damage to system integrity.
Vulnerability Rank: High
Currently Implemented Mitigations:
- The method verifies that the input is a list of exactly two elements, but it performs no validation or sanitization on the filename element.
- It relies on the underlying storage backend for file saving but does not ensure that the storage restricts path traversal or malicious path injections.
Missing Mitigations:
- Implement strict sanitization and validation on the filename to prevent directory traversal (e.g. using Django’s get_valid_filename) and ensure that the file is saved only within a designated safe directory.
- Enforce additional checks to verify that the file upload input conforms to the expected format and filename constraints.
Preconditions:
- The attacker must be able to trigger the file upload process (for example, via the CSRF‑exempt AJAX file upload endpoint).
- The storage backend must not independently sanitize or reject filenames containing path traversal patterns.
- The file field must accept input in the unvalidated list format that bypasses the usual file object handling.

Source Code Analysis:

In /code/filer/fields/multistorage_file.py, the to_python method is implemented as follows:

def to_python(self, value):
    if isinstance(value, list) and len(value) == 2 and isinstance(value[0], str):
        filename, payload = value
        try:
            payload = base64.b64decode(payload)
        except TypeError:
            pass
        else:
            if self.storage.exists(filename):
                self.storage.delete(filename)
            self.storage.save(filename, ContentFile(payload))
            return filename
    return value

The filename (first element of the list) is used directly in the calls to self.storage.exists(filename) and self.storage.save(filename, ContentFile(payload)) without checking for malicious content (such as directory traversal sequences).

Security Test Case:
1. Setup:
  - Ensure that the application (for example, via the AJAX file upload endpoint) is running with the CSRF bypass enabled and that the storage backend is configured to allow writes (preferably in a controlled test environment).
2. Attack:
  - Construct a POST request where the file payload is supplied as a list:
    - ["../../malicious.txt", "<base64_encoded_payload>"]
    - Ensure that <base64_encoded_payload> is a valid base64 encoding of test file content.
3. Execution:
  - Submit the crafted request using an external tool (such as curl or Burp Suite) while the request is made under an authenticated session (courtesy of the CSRF bypass).
4. Verification:
  - Check the file storage to determine whether a file named with directory traversal sequences (or its sanitized equivalent, if any) has been created or overwritten in an unintended location.
  - Confirm that the contents of the file match the supplied payload.
5. Expected Result:
  - Without proper sanitization, the storage backend will save the file using the attacker‑supplied filename. With appropriate filename validation, the malicious filename should be rejected or sanitized, thereby preventing the arbitrary file overwrite.

Vulnerability Name: Insecure Default File Serving Backend for Private Media
Description: If FILER_PRIVATEMEDIA_SERVER and FILER_PRIVATEMEDIA_THUMBNAIL_SERVER are not configured in Django settings, django-filer defaults to using DefaultServer to serve private files. DefaultServer serves files directly through Django, which is less performant and potentially less secure than using a dedicated web server backend like Nginx X-Accel-Redirect or Apache X-Sendfile. Directly serving files through Django for private media bypasses web server optimizations and increases the load on the Django application. It also might expose potential vulnerabilities in Django's static file serving if any exist. An attacker could potentially exploit this by causing performance issues or exploiting any vulnerabilities in Django's file serving mechanism when accessing private files, although direct exploitation by external attacker is less likely and more of misconfiguration issue.
Impact:
- Performance degradation when serving private files.
- Increased load on the Django application.
- Potential exposure of Django application to vulnerabilities in Django's static file serving mechanism.
Vulnerability Rank: High
Currently Implemented Mitigations:
- The project provides configuration options (FILER_PRIVATEMEDIA_SERVER, FILER_PRIVATEMEDIA_THUMBNAIL_SERVER) to configure secure backends.
Missing Mitigations:
- Enforce or strongly recommend secure backends: Enforce or strongly recommend configuring FILER_PRIVATEMEDIA_SERVER and FILER_PRIVATEMEDIA_THUMBNAIL_SERVER to use secure backends (Nginx X-Accel-Redirect or Apache X-Sendfile) in production environments.
- Documentation and warnings: Provide documentation and warnings about the security and performance implications of using DefaultServer in production.
Preconditions:
- FILER_PRIVATEMEDIA_SERVER and FILER_PRIVATEMEDIA_THUMBNAIL_SERVER settings are not configured in settings.py.
- The application is deployed in a production environment where performance and security are critical.
- Private files are served using django-filer's protected file serving views.
Source Code Analysis:
- File: /code/filer/server/views.py (from previous context - file not provided in current batch, assuming structure is consistent)
  - serve_protected_file and serve_protected_thumbnail views use server.serve and thumbnail_server.serve to serve files.
  - server and thumbnail_server are loaded from filer_settings.FILER_PRIVATEMEDIA_SERVER and filer_settings.FILER_PRIVATEMEDIA_THUMBNAIL_SERVER.
- File: /code/filer/settings.py (from previous context, actual file not provided in current batch, assuming settings are loaded)
  - If FILER_PRIVATEMEDIA_SERVER and FILER_PRIVATEMEDIA_THUMBNAIL_SERVER are not set, defaults are used, likely DefaultServer. (Need to confirm default settings).
- File: /code/filer/server/backends/default.py (from previous context - file not provided in current batch, assuming structure is consistent)
  - DefaultServer.serve reads file content and returns HttpResponse, serving files directly through Django.
- File: /code/filer/server/backends/nginx.py, /code/filer/server/backends/xsendfile.py (from previous context - files not provided in current batch, assuming structure is consistent)
  - NginxXAccelRedirectServer.serve and ApacheXSendfileServer.serve return HttpResponse with headers for web server to serve files, offloading file serving from Django.
Security Test Case:
1. Deploy a django-filer instance in a test environment without configuring FILER_PRIVATEMEDIA_SERVER and FILER_PRIVATEMEDIA_THUMBNAIL_SERVER in settings.py. Ensure DEBUG mode is False to simulate production.
2. Upload a private file through django-filer.
3. Access the private file through the protected file serving view (e.g., construct a URL that maps to serve_protected_file view based on the file path, after authenticating as a user with read permission if necessary).
4. Monitor the network traffic and server logs. Observe that the file content is served directly by the Django application server.
5. Compare the performance of serving the private file via DefaultServer with a scenario where FILER_PRIVATEMEDIA_SERVER is configured to use NginxXAccelRedirectServer (or similar). Measure the response time and resource usage of the Django application server in both scenarios to highlight performance impact.
6. Document the observation that without explicit configuration, DefaultServer is used, and serving private files puts load on Django directly instead of offloading to webserver, demonstrating the insecure default configuration.

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