Mitigation Strategy: Strict mark_safe
and safe
Filter Usage
1. Mitigation Strategy: Strict mark_safe
and safe
Filter Usage
-
Description:
- Identify all instances: Search the entire codebase (templates, views, custom template tags/filters) for uses of
mark_safe
and thesafe
filter. - Justify each use: For each instance, document why it's being used. Is there a safer alternative (built-in filter, custom filter with sanitization)?
- Sanitize input: If
mark_safe
orsafe
is absolutely necessary, ensure the input is rigorously sanitized before being marked as safe. This might involve:- Using a dedicated HTML sanitization library (e.g.,
bleach
). - Creating a custom template filter that performs specific, targeted sanitization (e.g., removing only
<script>
tags, allowing only specific HTML tags and attributes). - Validating the input against a strict whitelist of allowed characters/patterns.
- Using a dedicated HTML sanitization library (e.g.,
- Document and Audit: Maintain a record of all
mark_safe
/safe
uses, including the justification and sanitization steps. Regularly audit these instances. - Code Reviews: Make reviewing
mark_safe
/safe
usage a mandatory part of code reviews.
- Identify all instances: Search the entire codebase (templates, views, custom template tags/filters) for uses of
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): (Severity: High) - Prevents attackers from injecting malicious JavaScript code.
- HTML Injection: (Severity: Medium) - Prevents attackers from injecting arbitrary HTML.
-
Impact:
- XSS: Risk reduction: High.
- HTML Injection: Risk reduction: High.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Templates: Partially implemented. Sanitization via
sanitize_html
inutils/templatetags/custom_filters.py
. - Views: Not implemented (needs verification).
- Templates: Partially implemented. Sanitization via
-
Missing Implementation:
- Full codebase audit.
- Formal documentation.
- Implementation of
bleach
. - Verification of no
mark_safe
in views.
Mitigation Strategy: Parameterized Raw SQL Queries
2. Mitigation Strategy: Parameterized Raw SQL Queries
-
Description:
- Identify Raw SQL: Search for
cursor.execute()
,raw()
, andextra()
. - Convert to ORM: Refactor to use Django's ORM where possible.
- Parameterize Remaining Raw SQL: If unavoidable, always use parameterized queries.
- Good:
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM myapp_mymodel WHERE id = %s", [user_id])
- Bad:
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM myapp_mymodel WHERE id = " + user_id)
- Good:
- Review
extra()
: Scrutinizeextra()
for proper parameterization/sanitization. - Code Reviews: Enforce strict code review for raw SQL.
- Identify Raw SQL: Search for
-
Threats Mitigated:
- SQL Injection: (Severity: Critical) - Prevents malicious SQL code injection.
-
Impact:
- SQL Injection: Risk reduction: Very High.
-
Currently Implemented:
myapp/views.py
: Raw SQL converted to ORM.myapp/models.py
: Custom manager method refactored.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Comprehensive codebase search for all raw SQL.
- Verification of parameterization for all remaining raw SQL.
- Formal documentation.
Mitigation Strategy: Consistent CSRF Protection (Django Features)
3. Mitigation Strategy: Consistent CSRF Protection (Django Features)
-
Description:
- Template Forms: Ensure
{% csrf_token %}
is in every POST form. - AJAX Requests: Include the CSRF token in request headers (usually
X-CSRFToken
). Use Django's documented methods. csrf_exempt
Review: Search for and strongly consider removing@csrf_exempt
. If unavoidable, document the reason and implement alternative CSRF mitigation.- Subdomain Configuration: Review
CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN
if using subdomains. - Testing: Include automated tests for CSRF protection.
- Template Forms: Ensure
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF): (Severity: High)
-
Impact:
- CSRF: Risk reduction: High.
-
Currently Implemented:
{% csrf_token %}
in standard HTML forms.X-CSRFToken
instatic/js/main.js
.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Review of all AJAX requests.
- Automated CSRF tests.
- Verification of no
@csrf_exempt
. CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN
review (if subdomains are used).
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Session Management (Django Settings)
4. Mitigation Strategy: Secure Session Management (Django Settings)
-
Description:
- Settings Review: Verify in
settings.py
:SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE = True
SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY = True
SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE = 'Strict'
(or'Lax'
)SESSION_COOKIE_AGE
(appropriate expiration)SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE = True
(orFalse
)
- Session Data: Avoid storing sensitive data directly. If necessary, use a secure session backend and encrypt data.
- Session ID Regeneration: Confirm Django's default session ID regeneration on login. If custom authentication, call
request.session.cycle_key()
. - Session Backend: Use database or cached based sessions instead of cookie based sessions.
- Settings Review: Verify in
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Session Hijacking: (Severity: High)
- Session Fixation: (Severity: High)
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (indirectly): (Severity: High)
- Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) (indirectly): (Severity: High)
-
Impact:
- Session Hijacking: Risk reduction: High.
- Session Fixation: Risk reduction: High.
- XSS (indirect): Risk reduction: Medium.
- CSRF (indirect): Risk reduction: Medium.
-
Currently Implemented:
SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE = True
SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY = True
SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE = 'Strict'
SESSION_COOKIE_AGE
set.SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE = True
- Using database backed sessions.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Review of session data.
- Verification of session ID regeneration in custom authentication.
Mitigation Strategy: Secure File Uploads (Django Features)
5. Mitigation Strategy: Secure File Uploads (Django Features)
-
Description:
MEDIA_ROOT
andMEDIA_URL
:MEDIA_ROOT
outside web server's document root.MEDIA_URL
is a separate, non-directly-mapped path.
- File Validation:
- Strict validation for
FileField
andImageField
. - Use
FileExtensionValidator
. - Consider
ContentTypeValidator
. - For images, consider a library like Pillow.
- Do not rely on filename or user-provided content type.
- Strict validation for
- Filename Sanitization: Sanitize filenames to prevent directory traversal. Django's
FileSystemStorage
provides some, but additional checks may be needed. - Storage Backend: Consider a dedicated file storage service (e.g., S3, Azure Blob Storage) with Django's support.
- Limit Upload Size:
- Use
DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE
andFILE_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE
to limit upload size.
- Use
- Code Reviews: Include file uploads in code reviews.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Arbitrary File Upload: (Severity: Critical)
- Directory Traversal: (Severity: High)
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): (Severity: High)
- Denial of Service (DoS): (Severity: Medium)
-
Impact:
- Arbitrary File Upload: Risk reduction: Very High.
- Directory Traversal: Risk reduction: High.
- XSS: Risk reduction: High.
- DoS: Risk reduction: Medium.
-
Currently Implemented:
MEDIA_ROOT
andMEDIA_URL
configured correctly.FileExtensionValidator
inmyapp/models.py
.DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE
andFILE_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE
are set.
-
Missing Implementation:
ContentTypeValidator
not implemented.- Image validation with Pillow not implemented.
- Additional filename sanitization checks may be needed.
- Cloud storage migration planned but not implemented.
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Email Handling (Django Functions)
6. Mitigation Strategy: Secure Email Handling (Django Functions)
-
Description:
- Header Injection: Never directly include user-supplied data in email headers (
Subject
,From
,To
). Use Django's email functions (send_mail
,EmailMessage
) to handle header encoding.- Good:
send_mail('Subject', 'Message', '[email protected]', [user_email])
- Bad:
EmailMessage('Subject: ' + user_input, 'Message', '[email protected]', [user_email]).send()
- Good:
- Header Injection: Never directly include user-supplied data in email headers (
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Email Header Injection: (Severity: High) - Prevents attackers from injecting malicious headers, which could be used for phishing or spam.
-
Impact:
- Email Header Injection: Risk reduction: High.
-
Currently Implemented:
- All email sending uses
send_mail
with properly separated parameters.
- All email sending uses
-
Missing Implementation:
- Code review to confirm no direct user input in email headers.
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Settings and Configuration (Django Settings)
7. Mitigation Strategy: Secure Settings and Configuration (Django Settings)
-
Description:
SECRET_KEY
: Keep it secret, not in version control. Use environment variables or a secrets management system.DEBUG
: SetDEBUG = False
in production.ALLOWED_HOSTS
: Set to specific domain names.STATIC_ROOT
andSTATIC_URL
: Similar toMEDIA_ROOT
, ensureSTATIC_ROOT
is outside the document root if serving static files directly.- Database Settings: Use strong passwords and secure storage for credentials.
-
Threats Mitigated: * Information Disclosure: (Severity: High) * Host Header Attacks: (Severity: High) * Various attacks due to exposed debug information: (Severity: High)
-
Impact: * Risk reduction for all listed threats: High
-
Currently Implemented:
SECRET_KEY
is stored in environment variable.DEBUG = False
in production environment.ALLOWED_HOSTS
is properly set.STATIC_ROOT
andSTATIC_URL
are configured correctly.- Database credentials are in environment variables.
-
Missing Implementation:
- None.
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Admin Interface (Django Admin)
8. Mitigation Strategy: Secure Admin Interface (Django Admin)
-
Description:
- Strong Passwords: Enforce strong passwords for admin users.
- Two-Factor Authentication (2FA): Implement 2FA (e.g.,
django-otp
). - Restricting Access: Limit access to specific IPs/networks (via web server config).
- Customizing the Admin: Consider changing the URL and templates.
- Auditing: Enable logging for the admin interface (
LogEntry
model).
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Unauthorized Access: (Severity: High)
- Brute-Force Attacks: (Severity: Medium)
- Credential Stuffing: (Severity: Medium)
-
Impact:
- Unauthorized Access: Risk reduction: High.
- Brute-Force/Credential Stuffing: Risk reduction: Medium (2FA significantly improves this).
-
Currently Implemented:
- Strong password policy enforced.
- Admin interface logging enabled.
-
Missing Implementation:
- 2FA not implemented.
- IP-based access restriction not implemented.
- Admin interface not customized.
Mitigation Strategy: Secure URL Routing (Django URL Patterns)
9. Mitigation Strategy: Secure URL Routing (Django URL Patterns)
-
Description:
- Regular Expressions: Use specific, well-tested regexes in URL patterns. Avoid overly broad or complex regexes (ReDoS risk).
- URL Parameter Validation: Validate parameters in views.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS): (Severity: Medium)
- Unexpected Behavior/Vulnerabilities due to invalid URL parameters: (Severity: Medium)
-
Impact:
- ReDoS: Risk reduction: Medium.
- Invalid Parameters: Risk reduction: Medium.
-
Currently Implemented:
- URL parameters are validated in most views.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Comprehensive review of all URL patterns for ReDoS vulnerabilities.
- Ensure all URL parameters are validated in all views.
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Caching (Django Caching)
10. Mitigation Strategy: Secure Caching (Django Caching)
-
Description:
- Vary Headers: Use
Vary
headers to ensure cached responses are specific to request headers (e.g.,Vary: Cookie
). - Cache Control Headers: Set appropriate
Cache-Control
headers. - Private Data: Avoid caching pages with sensitive data without proper cache key variations and security.
- Vary Headers: Use
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Information Disclosure (via caching): (Severity: Medium)
-
Impact:
- Information Disclosure: Risk reduction: Medium.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Basic
Cache-Control
headers are set.
- Basic
-
Missing Implementation:
- Comprehensive review of caching configuration.
- Proper use of
Vary
headers. - Careful consideration of caching for pages with dynamic/user-specific content.