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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for encode/django-rest-framework

Attack Surface: Mass Assignment Vulnerabilities via Serializers

  • Description: Attackers can modify fields that should be read-only or internal by manipulating request data, leading to data corruption or privilege escalation.
  • DRF Contribution: DRF serializers, especially with broad field definitions (fields = '__all__') or insufficient explicit field control, can expose more fields than intended for modification during updates or creations.
  • Example: A user can modify the is_staff field of their user profile through an API endpoint if the serializer unintentionally includes it, granting themselves administrative privileges.
  • Impact: Privilege escalation, data corruption, unauthorized modification of sensitive data.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Explicitly define serializer fields using fields or exclude. Avoid fields = '__all__'.
    • Utilize read_only_fields to prevent modification of specific fields via API requests.
    • Implement custom validation within serializers to enforce business logic and data integrity.
    • Adhere to the principle of least privilege, exposing only necessary fields for modification.

Attack Surface: Deserialization Vulnerabilities in Custom Serializers

  • Description: Unsafe handling of input data within custom serializers can lead to injection vulnerabilities (SQL, command injection) or code execution.
  • DRF Contribution: DRF encourages custom serializers for complex data transformations, increasing the potential for developers to introduce vulnerabilities if input data is not properly sanitized and validated within these custom serializers.
  • Example: A custom serializer parses JSON and directly uses user-provided data in a raw SQL query without escaping, leading to SQL injection when a malicious JSON payload is submitted.
  • Impact: Data breach, data manipulation, server compromise, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Thoroughly sanitize and validate all user inputs within custom serializers before using them in database queries, system commands, or other sensitive operations.
    • Prefer using Django's ORM and queryset methods for database interactions to leverage built-in SQL injection protection. Avoid raw SQL queries where possible.
    • If using external deserialization libraries, ensure they are up-to-date and known to be secure.
    • Apply the principle of least privilege to database access, limiting the application user's permissions.

Attack Surface: Insecure Default Authentication Schemes in Production

  • Description: Using default DRF authentication schemes like BasicAuthentication or SessionAuthentication over unencrypted HTTP connections exposes credentials and session information.
  • DRF Contribution: DRF provides these schemes out-of-the-box, which are convenient for development but can be insecure if used directly in production without proper HTTPS configuration.
  • Example: Using BasicAuthentication over HTTP transmits username and password in base64 encoding, easily intercepted by network sniffers.
  • Impact: Credential theft, session hijacking, unauthorized access.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce HTTPS in production to encrypt all communication and protect credentials and session data in transit.
    • Choose secure authentication schemes for production, such as Token-based authentication (e.g., JWT) or OAuth 2.0, especially for public APIs.
    • Configure secure session settings (e.g., SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE, SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY) to mitigate session hijacking risks.

Attack Surface: Misconfigured or Weak Permission Classes

  • Description: Overly permissive permission classes or logic flaws in custom permission classes can grant unauthorized access to API endpoints and sensitive data.
  • DRF Contribution: DRF's permission system relies on developers to choose and configure appropriate permission classes. Misconfiguration or poorly implemented custom permissions directly weaken access control.
  • Example: Using AllowAny on an endpoint that should only be accessible to authenticated administrators grants public access to sensitive administrative functionalities.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to data, privilege escalation, data breaches, unauthorized actions.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Apply the principle of least privilege when configuring permissions, granting only necessary access based on user roles and authentication status.
    • Utilize appropriate built-in DRF permission classes (e.g., IsAuthenticated, IsAdminUser, DjangoModelPermissions) that match the required access control level.
    • Thoroughly test custom permission classes to ensure they enforce intended access control logic without bypasses.
    • Conduct regular security audits to review and rectify permission configurations.

Attack Surface: Unsafe Filtering Implementation

  • Description: Directly using user-provided filter parameters in database queries without sanitization can lead to SQL injection.
  • DRF Contribution: DRF's filtering system, while powerful, requires careful implementation to avoid vulnerabilities when handling user-provided filter parameters.
  • Example: Using filter(field__startswith=request.query_params['search']) directly without sanitization can lead to SQL injection if a malicious value is provided in the search query parameter.
  • Impact: SQL injection, data breach, data manipulation.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Utilize DRF's built-in filtering backends and filter fields, which often provide safer ways to handle filtering and can help prevent SQL injection.
    • Validate and sanitize all user-provided filter parameters before using them in database queries. Use Django's ORM methods and avoid raw SQL.
    • Parameterize queries when constructing dynamic queries to prevent SQL injection.