attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for encode/django-rest-framework

Objective: Compromise the application using Django REST Framework by exploiting DRF-specific weaknesses to achieve unauthorized access, data manipulation, or denial of service.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise DRF Application (High-Risk Focus) ├─── 1. Exploit Input Validation/Deserialization Weaknesses [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └─── 1.1. Mass Assignment Vulnerability [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └─── 1.1.1. Bypass Serializer Field Restrictions │ ├─── 1.1.1.1. Submit Unexpected Fields in Request Data │ └─── 1.1.2. Modify Read-Only Fields │ └─── 1.1.2.1. Send Read-Only Fields in Update/Create Requests ├─── 2. Exploit Authentication and Authorization Weaknesses [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├─── 2.1. Authentication Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └─── 2.1.1. Misconfigured Authentication Classes [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├─── 2.1.1.1. Remove or Comment Out Authentication Classes Accidentally │ │ └─── 2.1.1.2. Use Insecure or Weak Authentication Classes in Production (e.g., AllowAny unintentionally) │ └─── 2.2. Authorization Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └─── 2.2.1. Misconfigured Permission Classes [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├─── 2.2.1.1. Use Insecure or Weak Permission Classes (e.g., AllowAny or IsAuthenticatedOrReadOnly where IsAuthenticated is required) ├─── 3. Exploit API Logic and Endpoint Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├─── 3.1. Insecure API Endpoints [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── 3.1.1. Information Disclosure via Verbose Error Messages (in Debug Mode) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └─── 3.1.1.1. Access API in Debug Mode to Obtain Sensitive Information │ │ ├─── 3.1.2. Unprotected Administrative Endpoints [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └─── 3.1.2.1. Access Administrative Actions without Proper Authorization │ │ ├─── 3.1.3. Lack of Rate Limiting leading to Brute-Force or DoS [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├─── 3.1.3.1. Perform Brute-Force Attacks on Authentication Endpoints │ │ │ └─── 3.1.4. Insecure File Upload Endpoints (if implemented using DRF) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├─── 3.1.4.1. Unrestricted File Type Upload │ │ │ └─── 3.2. Parameter Tampering [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── 3.2.1. Modify Request Parameters to Alter Application Logic │ │ │ └─── 3.2.1.1. Change IDs, Quantities, or other Parameters to Gain Unauthorized Benefits ├─── 4. Dependency Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├─── 4.1. Vulnerable DRF Version [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └─── 4.1.1. Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Outdated DRF Version │ └─── 4.2. Vulnerable Dependencies of DRF [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └─── 4.2.1. Exploit Vulnerabilities in DRF's Dependencies └─── 5. Misconfiguration and Operational Issues [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE - 5.3] ├─── 5.1. Debug Mode Enabled in Production [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE - 5.1] │ └─── 5.1.1. Information Disclosure via Debug Pages └─── 5.3. Inadequate Logging and Monitoring [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] └─── 5.3.1. Delayed Incident Detection and Response

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Input Validation/Deserialization Weaknesses -> Mass Assignment Vulnerability

Attack Vector Name: Mass Assignment Vulnerability via Serializer Bypass

• Why High-Risk: Medium Likelihood, Moderate Impact. Misconfigurations in serializers are relatively common, and successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized data modification and unexpected application states.
• Exploitation:
  • Attacker submits unexpected fields in request data (e.g., in POST or PUT requests) that are not explicitly defined as writable in the serializer.
  • If serializers are not strictly configured with fields or exclude, or if read_only_fields are inconsistently defined, attackers might be able to modify fields they should not have access to.
  • Specifically, attackers might try to modify read-only fields by including them in update or create requests.
• Mitigation:
  • Strict Serializer Configuration: Always explicitly define fields or exclude in serializers to control writable fields.
  • Correct read_only_fields Usage: Ensure read_only_fields are consistently and correctly defined for fields that should not be modified by users.
  • Input Validation Logging: Implement logging for serializer validation failures to detect potential mass assignment attempts.
  • Serializer Testing: Thoroughly test serializers with unexpected and malicious input data to ensure they behave as expected.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Authentication and Authorization Weaknesses -> Authentication Bypass -> Misconfigured Authentication Classes

Attack Vector Name: Authentication Bypass due to Misconfigured Authentication Classes

• Why High-Risk: Low Likelihood (if proper processes are in place), Critical Impact. A misconfiguration here can completely disable authentication, allowing anyone to access protected resources.
• Exploitation:
  • Accidental removal or commenting out of authentication classes in DRF view settings.
  • Unintentionally using insecure or permissive authentication classes like AllowAny in production views that should be protected.
• Mitigation:
  • Code Review: Rigorous code reviews to ensure authentication classes are correctly configured for all protected views.
  • Security Testing: Automated and manual security testing to verify that authentication is enforced as expected.
  • Configuration Management: Use configuration management tools to ensure consistent and secure authentication settings across environments.
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Default to secure authentication settings and explicitly allow less secure settings only when absolutely necessary and with careful justification.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Authentication and Authorization Weaknesses -> Authorization Bypass -> Misconfigured Permission Classes

Attack Vector Name: Authorization Bypass due to Misconfigured Permission Classes

• Why High-Risk: Low Likelihood (if proper processes are in place), Significant Impact. Misconfigured permissions can lead to unauthorized access to resources, data manipulation, or privilege escalation.
• Exploitation:
  • Using overly permissive permission classes like AllowAny or IsAuthenticatedOrReadOnly when more restrictive permissions like IsAuthenticated or custom permissions are required.
  • Incorrectly implementing custom permission classes, leading to logic flaws that bypass intended access controls.
• Mitigation:
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Apply the principle of least privilege when configuring permission classes. Use the most restrictive permissions necessary.
  • Code Review: Thoroughly review permission class configurations for each view to ensure they align with access control requirements.
  • Permission Testing: Specifically test permission configurations to verify that unauthorized users cannot access protected resources and that authorized users have the correct level of access.
  • Custom Permission Class Audits: Regularly audit custom permission classes for logic errors and potential bypasses.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit API Logic and Endpoint Vulnerabilities -> Insecure API Endpoints -> Information Disclosure via Verbose Error Messages (in Debug Mode)

Attack Vector Name: Information Disclosure via Debug Mode Error Messages

• Why High-Risk: Very Low Likelihood (should be avoided in production), Significant Impact. Accidentally leaving debug mode enabled in production can expose sensitive information that aids further attacks.
• Exploitation:
  • Accessing the API in a production environment where DEBUG = True is enabled in Django settings.
  • Verbose error messages in debug mode can reveal sensitive information like:
    • Source code snippets
    • Database connection strings
    • Internal paths
    • Environment variables
    • Settings values
• Mitigation:
  • Disable Debug Mode in Production: Ensure DEBUG = False in Django settings for all production environments. This is a fundamental security best practice.
  • Environment-Specific Configuration: Use environment variables or separate settings files to manage debug mode configuration for different environments (development, staging, production).
  • Monitoring for Debug Pages: Implement monitoring to detect any attempts to access debug-related URLs in production environments.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit API Logic and Endpoint Vulnerabilities -> Insecure API Endpoints -> Unprotected Administrative Endpoints

Attack Vector Name: Unauthorized Access to Administrative Endpoints

• Why High-Risk: Low Likelihood (if designed with security in mind), Significant to Critical Impact. Exposing administrative actions without proper authorization can lead to complete system compromise.
• Exploitation:
  • DRF routers might inadvertently expose administrative actions or endpoints without proper permission checks.
  • Attackers might discover and access these endpoints if they are not adequately protected by authentication and authorization.
• Mitigation:
  • Explicit Authorization for Admin Actions: Ensure all administrative actions and endpoints are protected by strong authentication and authorization mechanisms (e.g., IsAdminUser permission or custom admin-specific permissions).
  • Endpoint Review: Carefully review API endpoint configurations, especially when using routers, to ensure that administrative actions are not unintentionally exposed or unprotected.
  • Principle of Least Exposure: Avoid exposing administrative endpoints publicly if possible. Consider using separate networks or VPNs for administrative access.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit API Logic and Endpoint Vulnerabilities -> Insecure API Endpoints -> Lack of Rate Limiting leading to Brute-Force or DoS

Attack Vector Name: Brute-Force and Denial of Service due to Lack of Rate Limiting

• Why High-Risk: Medium Likelihood, Moderate to Significant Impact. Lack of rate limiting makes applications vulnerable to brute-force attacks and DoS attempts, potentially leading to account compromise or service disruption.
• Exploitation:
  • Brute-Force Attacks: Attackers can perform brute-force attacks against authentication endpoints (e.g., login, password reset) to guess user credentials.
  • Denial of Service (DoS): Attackers can flood the API with excessive requests, overwhelming server resources and causing service unavailability for legitimate users.
• Mitigation:
  • Implement Rate Limiting: Use DRF's built-in rate limiting or third-party libraries to limit the number of requests from a single IP address or user within a given time frame.
  • Authentication Endpoint Rate Limiting: Apply stricter rate limits to authentication endpoints to mitigate brute-force attacks.
  • Global Rate Limiting: Consider implementing global rate limiting to protect against DoS attacks targeting the entire API.
  • Web Application Firewall (WAF): Use a WAF to provide an additional layer of DoS protection and rate limiting.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit API Logic and Endpoint Vulnerabilities -> Insecure API Endpoints -> Insecure File Upload Endpoints

Attack Vector Name: Insecure File Upload Vulnerabilities

• Why High-Risk: Low Likelihood (if file uploads are handled carefully), Critical Impact. Insecure file uploads can lead to remote code execution, file system access, and denial of service.
• Exploitation:
  • Unrestricted File Type Upload: Uploading malicious executable files if file type validation is not implemented.
  • Path Traversal: Crafting filenames to write files outside the intended upload directory, potentially overwriting system files or application code.
  • Denial of Service: Uploading extremely large files to exhaust server disk space or processing resources.
• Mitigation:
  • File Type Validation: Implement strict file type validation to only allow expected and safe file types. Use libraries to verify file content type, not just file extensions.
  • Filename Sanitization: Sanitize filenames to remove or encode potentially dangerous characters and prevent path traversal attacks.
  • File Size Limits: Enforce file size limits to prevent DoS attacks via large file uploads.
  • Secure Storage: Store uploaded files in a secure location outside the web root and with appropriate permissions.
  • Antivirus Scanning: Consider integrating antivirus scanning for uploaded files to detect and prevent malicious uploads.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit API Logic and Endpoint Vulnerabilities -> Parameter Tampering

Attack Vector Name: Parameter Tampering

• Why High-Risk: Medium Likelihood, Moderate to Significant Impact. Parameter tampering is a common web attack that can bypass application logic and lead to unauthorized actions or data manipulation.
• Exploitation:
  • Attackers modify request parameters (e.g., in query strings, request bodies) to alter application behavior.
  • This can include changing IDs, quantities, prices, permissions, or other parameters to gain unauthorized benefits, access data, or perform actions they should not be allowed to.
• Mitigation:
  • Input Validation: Thoroughly validate all request parameters on the server-side. Do not rely solely on client-side validation.
  • Data Integrity Checks: Implement data integrity checks to ensure that parameters have not been tampered with during transit. Use techniques like HMAC or digital signatures for sensitive parameters if necessary.
  • Authorization Checks: Always perform authorization checks based on the validated parameters to ensure users are allowed to perform the requested actions with the given data.
  • Immutable Parameters (where applicable): For certain parameters that should not be modifiable by users (e.g., IDs in some contexts), design the API to treat them as immutable and reject modification attempts.

Attack Tree Path: Dependency Vulnerabilities -> Vulnerable DRF Version & Vulnerable Dependencies of DRF

Attack Vector Name: Exploiting Known Vulnerabilities in Dependencies

• Why High-Risk: Low Likelihood (if dependency management is good), Critical Impact. Vulnerabilities in DRF itself or its dependencies (like Django) can have severe consequences, including remote code execution or authentication bypass.
• Exploitation:
  • Attackers research publicly disclosed vulnerabilities for the specific versions of DRF, Django, and other libraries used by the application.
  • If vulnerable versions are identified, attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities using publicly available exploit code or by crafting custom exploits.
• Mitigation:
  • Dependency Management: Implement robust dependency management practices using tools like pip and requirements.txt or Pipfile.
  • Regular Updates: Regularly update DRF, Django, and all other dependencies to the latest stable versions to patch known vulnerabilities.
  • Vulnerability Scanning: Use dependency scanning tools (e.g., safety, Snyk, OWASP Dependency-Check) to automatically identify and report vulnerabilities in project dependencies.
  • Security Monitoring: Subscribe to security mailing lists and vulnerability databases to stay informed about newly discovered vulnerabilities in DRF and its dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: Misconfiguration and Operational Issues -> Debug Mode Enabled in Production

Attack Vector Name: Information Disclosure and Further Exploitation via Debug Mode in Production

• Why High-Risk: Very Low Likelihood (should be strictly avoided), Critical Impact. Debug mode in production is a severe misconfiguration that exposes a wealth of sensitive information and significantly increases the attack surface.
• Exploitation:
  • As described in point 4, debug mode exposes verbose error messages.
  • Additionally, debug mode often enables interactive debuggers and other development tools that can be exploited for code execution, database access, and complete system compromise.
• Mitigation:
  • Strictly Disable Debug Mode in Production: Reinforce the absolute necessity of setting DEBUG = False in production environments.
  • Automated Checks: Implement automated checks in deployment pipelines to verify that debug mode is disabled in production.
  • Security Audits: Include checks for debug mode status in regular security audits and penetration tests.

Attack Tree Path: Misconfiguration and Operational Issues -> Inadequate Logging and Monitoring

Attack Vector Name: Delayed Incident Detection and Response due to Inadequate Logging and Monitoring

• Why High-Risk: High Likelihood (often an overlooked area), Catastrophic Impact. Lack of proper logging and monitoring doesn't directly cause vulnerabilities, but it drastically increases the impact of all other vulnerabilities by delaying detection and response, allowing attackers to operate undetected for longer periods and inflict more damage.
• Exploitation:
  • Attackers can exploit any of the vulnerabilities listed above and operate undetected for extended periods if there is no effective logging and monitoring in place.
  • This allows them to escalate their attacks, exfiltrate data, establish persistence, and cause more significant damage before the security incident is noticed and addressed.
• Mitigation:
  • Comprehensive Logging: Implement comprehensive logging for all critical application events, including:
    • Authentication attempts (successful and failed)
    • Authorization decisions
    • Input validation failures
    • API requests and responses (especially for sensitive endpoints)
    • Errors and exceptions
    • Security-related events
  • Centralized Logging: Use a centralized logging system to aggregate logs from all application components for easier analysis and correlation.
  • Real-time Monitoring and Alerting: Set up real-time monitoring and alerting for suspicious activity, anomalies, and security-related events in the logs.
  • Security Information and Event Management (SIEM): Consider using a SIEM system for advanced log analysis, threat detection, and incident response.
  • Incident Response Plan: Develop and regularly test an incident response plan to ensure timely and effective response to security incidents when they are detected.