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vulnerabilities-workflow-1.md

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Okay, here is the combined list of vulnerabilities, formatted as markdown, with duplicate vulnerabilities removed:

Combined Vulnerability List

This document outlines the security vulnerabilities identified in the django-reversion project. Each vulnerability is detailed with its description, potential impact, assigned rank, current mitigations, missing mitigations, preconditions, source code analysis, and a security test case.

Vulnerability: Insecure Django Deployment Configuration

  • Description: The test project settings (in tests/test_project/settings.py) define a hard‐coded secret key, enable debug mode (DEBUG = True), and leave ALLOWED_HOSTS empty. An external attacker can trigger error conditions (for example, by accessing a nonexistent URL) that cause Django to display its full debug error page. This error page would include sensitive configuration information such as the hard‐coded SECRET_KEY and complete stack traces, which can then be used to plan further compromise of the application.

    Step-by-step trigger example:

    1. Deploy the application using these settings (mistakenly for production).
    2. Access a resource or URL that does not exist (e.g. /nonexistent).
    3. Observe that Django’s error page is displayed with full diagnostic details.

  • Impact: If an attacker learns the secret key and sees internal configuration details, they can forge session cookies or otherwise tamper with cryptographic operations. This may lead to session hijacking, bypassing of security controls, or further exploitation of sensitive application logic.

  • Vulnerability Rank: Critical

  • Currently Implemented Mitigations: No changes are applied in the code. The settings file in the test project is configured for development rather than production.

  • Missing Mitigations:

    • Set DEBUG = False when deployed publicly.
    • Do not use a hard-coded secret key in a production setting (instead read it from a secure environment variable or configuration management system).
    • Define a proper list of trusted host names in ALLOWED_HOSTS.

  • Preconditions: The application must be deployed using these test project settings rather than a proper production configuration.

  • Source Code Analysis: In the file tests/test_project/settings.py, the following insecure settings are present:

    • SECRET_KEY = "lzu78x^s$rit0p*vdt)$1e&hh*)4y=xv))=@zsx(am7t=7406a"
    • DEBUG = True
    • ALLOWED_HOSTS = [] With DEBUG enabled, any error (for example, accessing an invalid URL) causes Django to show its entire debug page including the settings and secret key.

  • Security Test Case:

    1. Deploy the application using the settings defined in tests/test_project/settings.py.
    2. From an unauthenticated client (such as a browser or using cURL), request a nonexistent URL (e.g. GET /nonexistent).
    3. Verify that Django’s debug error page is returned and that the page displays stack traces and configuration details—including the SECRET_KEY.
    4. Confirm that these details would enable an attacker to compromise further aspects of the application.

Vulnerability: Exposed Test Endpoints for Unauthenticated Data Creation

  • Description: The test application (located under tests/test_app/) defines several endpoints (for example, /test-app/save-obj/, /test-app/create-revision/, and /test-app/revision-mixin/) that perform database writes and create revision records with no authentication or access controls. An external attacker can call these endpoints—even using simple POST requests—to create or manipulate records in the database without any restriction.

    Step-by-step trigger example:

    1. Deploy the application including the test endpoints.
    2. As an unauthenticated external user, send a POST request to /test-app/save-obj/.
    3. Observe that a new record is created and its primary key is returned as a plain response.
    4. Similarly, send POST requests to /test-app/create-revision/ or /test-app/revision-mixin/ to trigger revision creation.

  • Impact: Unauthorized creation or manipulation of model and revision records can corrupt the revision history (the audit trail) and can be used to pollute or sabotage critical data. In a worst‐case scenario, repeated exploitation might also play a role in data integrity issues that could eventually lead to unauthorized data recovery or rollback.

  • Vulnerability Rank: High

  • Currently Implemented Mitigations: There is no authentication or access control logic on these endpoints. In the source code of tests/test_app/views.py, the views simply create model instances and commit revisions without checking the caller’s identity.

  • Missing Mitigations:

    • Protect these endpoints behind proper authentication (or remove them entirely from any production deployment).
    • Enforce access control (for example, by using Django’s built‑in login-required decorators or other authorization mechanisms) on any endpoints that alter data.

  • Preconditions: The test endpoints must be deployed and accessible in a publicly reachable instance. (Normally, test applications should not be included in production, but if mistakenly deployed they pose a significant risk.)

  • Source Code Analysis:

    • In tests/test_app/urls.py, endpoints such as save-obj/ are defined and mapped to view functions in tests/test_app/views.py.
    • The save_obj_view(request) function simply executes: 
      def save_obj_view(request):
    return HttpResponse(TestModel.objects.create().id)
      with no authentication check.
    • Similarly, the create_revision_view and the class‑based RevisionMixinView are wrapped with the revision decorator but not protected by any authentication mechanism.

  • Security Test Case:

    1. Deploy the application with the test endpoints active.
    2. Without authenticating, use a tool (e.g., cURL or Postman) to send a POST request to /test-app/save-obj/.
    3. Verify that the response returns a new object ID, confirming that an anonymous user was able to create a database record.
    4. Repeat the test for /test-app/create-revision/ and /test-app/revision-mixin/ to verify that a revision record is created with each request.
    5. Confirm that no authentication prompt or error is produced, validating the absence of access controls.