attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for getredash/redash

Objective: Achieve Unauthorized Data Access and/or System Control via Redash Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Achieve Unauthorized Data Access and/or System Control via Redash Exploitation └── AND: Exploit Redash Weaknesses ├── OR: Exploit Data Source Connections │ ├── Data Source Credential Theft CRITICAL NODE │ │ └── Exploit Weak Credential Storage HIGH RISK PATH │ │ ├── Access Redash Configuration Files (e.g., environment variables, settings files) HIGH RISK PATH ├── OR: Exploit Query Execution Engine │ ├── Query Injection Vulnerabilities CRITICAL NODE HIGH RISK PATH │ │ └── Exploit Insufficient Input Sanitization in Query Parameters HIGH RISK PATH │ │ ├── SQL Injection (if using SQL-based data sources) HIGH RISK PATH │ │ │ └── Execute Malicious SQL Queries (e.g., data exfiltration, data modification, command execution via xp_cmdshell if applicable) CRITICAL NODE HIGH RISK PATH ├── OR: Exploit User Interface (UI) and Client-Side Vulnerabilities │ ├── Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) CRITICAL NODE HIGH RISK PATH │ │ └── Inject Malicious JavaScript into Redash UI HIGH RISK PATH │ │ ├── Stored XSS (e.g., in dashboard names, query descriptions, visualization titles) HIGH RISK PATH │ │ │ └── Execute Malicious Scripts on Other Users' Browsers (session hijacking, credential theft, further attacks) CRITICAL NODE HIGH RISK PATH ├── OR: Exploit Redash Infrastructure and Dependencies │ ├── Vulnerable Dependencies CRITICAL NODE HIGH RISK PATH │ │ └── Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Redash's Dependencies (Libraries, Frameworks) HIGH RISK PATH │ │ └── Leverage Publicly Disclosed Vulnerabilities (CVEs) in Used Libraries CRITICAL NODE HIGH RISK PATH │ └── Configuration and Deployment Issues HIGH RISK PATH │ └── Exploit Misconfigurations in Redash Deployment HIGH RISK PATH │ ├── Default Credentials CRITICAL NODE HIGH RISK PATH │ │ └── Use Default Passwords for Redash Admin or Database Accounts HIGH RISK PATH │ ├── Insecure Server Configuration HIGH RISK PATH │ │ └── Exploit Weak Server Settings (e.g., exposed ports, insecure protocols, weak TLS configuration) HIGH RISK PATH │ ├── Insufficient Security Hardening HIGH RISK PATH │ │ └── Leverage Lack of Security Hardening on Redash Server (e.g., missing security patches, unnecessary services running) HIGH RISK PATH └── OR: Social Engineering Redash Users (Indirectly related to Redash weaknesses, but relevant) HIGH RISK PATH └── Phishing/Credential Harvesting HIGH RISK PATH └── Trick Redash Users into Revealing Credentials HIGH RISK PATH └── Obtain Usernames and Passwords via Phishing Emails or Fake Login Pages HIGH RISK PATH

Attack Tree Path: 1. Data Source Credential Theft (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Data Source Credential Theft

• Description: Attackers aim to steal credentials used by Redash to connect to data sources (databases, APIs, etc.). This allows them to directly access and potentially exfiltrate data from these sources, bypassing Redash's intended access controls.
• Potential Impact:
  • Direct access to sensitive data in connected data sources.
  • Data breaches and exfiltration.
  • Potential for further attacks on data sources if credentials allow write access.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Secure Credential Storage: Use robust encryption for storing data source credentials within Redash. Consider using dedicated secrets management systems (like HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, etc.) instead of storing credentials directly in Redash configuration files or environment variables.
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant Redash data source connection users only the minimum necessary permissions on the data sources.
  • Regular Security Audits: Audit Redash configurations and credential storage mechanisms regularly.
  • Access Control: Restrict access to Redash configuration files and environment variables to only authorized personnel and systems.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Weak Credential Storage (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Exploit Weak Credential Storage

• Description: Attackers target weaknesses in how Redash stores data source credentials. This could involve exploiting weak encryption algorithms, insecure storage locations (e.g., plain text configuration files), or vulnerabilities in Redash's code that expose credentials.
• Potential Impact:
  • Compromise of data source credentials.
  • Leads directly to Data Source Credential Theft and its impacts.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Strong Encryption: Use strong, industry-standard encryption algorithms to protect stored credentials.
  • Secure Storage Locations: Store configuration files and sensitive data in secure locations with restricted access permissions. Avoid storing credentials in easily accessible locations like web-accessible directories.
  • Code Reviews: Conduct regular code reviews to identify and fix potential credential leakage vulnerabilities in Redash's codebase.
  • Penetration Testing: Include credential storage security in penetration testing scopes.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Access Redash Configuration Files (e.g., environment variables, settings files) (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Access Redash Configuration Files

• Description: Attackers attempt to gain unauthorized access to Redash's configuration files (e.g., redash.conf, environment variables, settings databases). These files often contain sensitive information, including data source credentials, API keys, and internal configuration details.
• Potential Impact:
  • Exposure of data source credentials.
  • Exposure of API keys and other sensitive configuration data.
  • Information disclosure that can aid in further attacks.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Secure File Permissions: Implement strict file system permissions on Redash configuration files, ensuring only the Redash application user and authorized administrators have read access.
  • Environment Variable Security: If using environment variables, ensure the environment where Redash runs is securely configured and access to environment variables is restricted.
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Limit access to the Redash server and its file system to only necessary personnel and processes.
  • Regular Security Audits: Audit file permissions and access controls regularly.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Query Injection Vulnerabilities (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Query Injection Vulnerabilities

• Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in Redash's query execution engine that allow them to inject malicious code into queries sent to data sources. This is most commonly SQL Injection, but can also apply to NoSQL databases or APIs if Redash doesn't properly sanitize user input used in queries.
• Potential Impact:
  • Data Breach: Exfiltration of sensitive data from data sources.
  • Data Modification: Modification or deletion of data in data sources.
  • System Compromise: In some cases (especially with SQL Injection), attackers can achieve command execution on the database server or even the Redash server itself.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Parameterized Queries: Always use parameterized queries or prepared statements when constructing queries in Redash, especially when incorporating user-provided input. This prevents user input from being interpreted as code.
  • Input Sanitization: Sanitize user input used in query parameters, even with parameterized queries, to prevent unexpected behavior or bypasses.
  • Principle of Least Privilege (Database Users): Use database users for Redash connections that have minimal necessary privileges. Avoid using highly privileged database accounts.
  • Web Application Firewall (WAF): Consider using a WAF to detect and block common query injection attempts.
  • Regular Security Testing: Conduct regular penetration testing and vulnerability scanning specifically targeting query injection vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Exploit Insufficient Input Sanitization in Query Parameters (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Exploit Insufficient Input Sanitization in Query Parameters

• Description: This is the underlying weakness that enables Query Injection. Redash fails to properly sanitize or validate user-provided input before incorporating it into database queries. This allows attackers to craft malicious input that is then executed as part of the query.
• Potential Impact:
  • Leads directly to Query Injection Vulnerabilities and their impacts.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Input Validation: Implement robust input validation on all user-provided input that is used in queries. Validate data type, format, and length.
  • Output Encoding (Context-Aware): While primarily for XSS, context-aware output encoding can also help in some cases to prevent injection by ensuring user input is treated as data, not code, in the query context.
  • Code Reviews: Focus code reviews on areas where user input is processed and incorporated into queries.

Attack Tree Path: 6. SQL Injection (if using SQL-based data sources) (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: SQL Injection

• Description: A specific type of Query Injection targeting SQL databases. Attackers inject malicious SQL code into queries, exploiting insufficient input sanitization to manipulate the database.
• Potential Impact:
  • Data Breach: Exfiltration of data from SQL databases.
  • Data Modification/Deletion: Altering or deleting data in SQL databases.
  • Privilege Escalation: Potentially gaining higher privileges within the database.
  • Command Execution (in some cases): In some database systems (like SQL Server with xp_cmdshell), SQL Injection can lead to OS command execution on the database server.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Parameterized Queries (Crucial): This is the primary defense against SQL Injection.
  • Input Sanitization (Defense in Depth): While parameterized queries are key, input sanitization adds an extra layer of defense.
  • Principle of Least Privilege (Database Users): Use database users with minimal privileges for Redash connections.
  • Database Security Hardening: Harden the underlying SQL database server itself according to security best practices.
  • WAF (Web Application Firewall): A WAF can help detect and block SQL Injection attempts.

Attack Tree Path: 7. Execute Malicious SQL Queries (e.g., data exfiltration, data modification, command execution via xp_cmdshell if applicable) (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Execute Malicious SQL Queries

• Description: This is the direct consequence of successful SQL Injection. Attackers leverage the injection vulnerability to execute arbitrary SQL queries of their choosing.
• Potential Impact:
  • Critical Data Breach: Mass exfiltration of highly sensitive data.
  • Complete Data Loss/Corruption: Deletion or corruption of critical data.
  • Full System Compromise: If command execution is possible, attackers can gain complete control of the database server and potentially pivot to other systems.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Prevent SQL Injection (Primary Focus): All mitigations for SQL Injection directly prevent this attack step.
  • Database Activity Monitoring: Implement database activity monitoring to detect and alert on suspicious or malicious SQL queries being executed.
  • Incident Response Plan: Have a well-defined incident response plan in place to handle potential SQL Injection attacks and data breaches.

Attack Tree Path: 8. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

• Description: Attackers inject malicious JavaScript code into the Redash UI. When other users view the affected parts of the UI (e.g., dashboards, queries, visualizations), the malicious script executes in their browsers.
• Potential Impact:
  • Account Compromise: Session hijacking, cookie theft, credential theft, allowing attackers to impersonate legitimate users.
  • Data Theft (Client-Side): Accessing data visible to the user within the Redash UI.
  • Malware Distribution: Redirecting users to malicious websites or serving malware.
  • Defacement: Altering the appearance of the Redash UI for other users.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Output Encoding/Escaping (Crucial): Implement robust output encoding/escaping for all user-provided content rendered in the Redash UI. Use context-aware escaping appropriate for HTML, JavaScript, and URLs.
  • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strong CSP to mitigate XSS risks by controlling the resources the browser is allowed to load and execute.
  • Input Validation (Defense in Depth): While output encoding is primary, input validation can help prevent some XSS by rejecting or sanitizing malicious input before it's stored.
  • Regular Security Testing: Conduct regular security testing, including XSS vulnerability scanning and manual testing.

Attack Tree Path: 9. Inject Malicious JavaScript into Redash UI (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Inject Malicious JavaScript into Redash UI

• Description: Attackers find ways to inject malicious JavaScript code into Redash. This can be through various means, including:
  • Stored XSS: Injecting scripts into persistent data like dashboard names, query descriptions, visualization titles.
  • Reflected XSS: Injecting scripts into URL parameters or error messages that are then reflected back in the page.
• Potential Impact:
  • Leads directly to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and its impacts.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Focus on Output Encoding/Escaping: This is the most effective mitigation for preventing JavaScript injection from becoming executable XSS.
  • Input Validation (Defense in Depth): Validate and sanitize user input to reduce the likelihood of malicious script injection in the first place.

Attack Tree Path: 10. Stored XSS (e.g., in dashboard names, query descriptions, visualization titles) (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Stored XSS

• Description: Attackers inject malicious JavaScript that is persistently stored within Redash's database. This could be in dashboard names, query descriptions, visualization titles, or other user-editable fields. When other users view these stored items, the malicious script executes.
• Potential Impact:
  • Persistent XSS attacks affecting all users who view the compromised content.
  • Higher impact than reflected XSS as it doesn't require social engineering to trigger for each user.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Robust Output Encoding/Escaping (Crucial for Stored XSS): Ensure all stored user-provided content is properly encoded/escaped when rendered in the UI.
  • Input Validation and Sanitization: Sanitize and validate user input before storing it in the database to prevent malicious script injection.
  • Regular Content Audits: Periodically audit stored content for suspicious or malicious scripts.

Attack Tree Path: 11. Execute Malicious Scripts on Other Users' Browsers (session hijacking, credential theft, further attacks) (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Execute Malicious Scripts on Other Users' Browsers

• Description: This is the direct consequence of successful XSS. The injected JavaScript code executes in the browsers of other Redash users, allowing the attacker to perform various malicious actions on their behalf.
• Potential Impact:
  • Account Takeover: Session hijacking allows attackers to fully control user accounts.
  • Credential Theft: Stealing user credentials for Redash or other systems.
  • Data Theft (Client-Side): Accessing and exfiltrating data visible to the user in the Redash UI.
  • Further Attacks: Using compromised accounts to launch further attacks within Redash or against connected systems.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Prevent XSS (Primary Focus): All mitigations for XSS directly prevent this attack step.
  • Session Management Security: Implement robust session management practices (e.g., HTTP-only cookies, secure flags, session timeouts) to minimize the impact of session hijacking.
  • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): MFA can help mitigate the impact of credential theft by adding an extra layer of security.

Attack Tree Path: 12. Vulnerable Dependencies (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Vulnerable Dependencies

• Description: Redash, like most applications, relies on third-party libraries and frameworks. These dependencies may contain known security vulnerabilities. Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities to compromise Redash.
• Potential Impact:
  • Remote Code Execution (RCE): Vulnerabilities in dependencies can often lead to RCE on the Redash server.
  • Data Breach: Exploiting vulnerabilities to access sensitive data.
  • Denial of Service (DoS): Some dependency vulnerabilities can lead to DoS.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Dependency Management: Maintain a comprehensive inventory of Redash's dependencies.
  • Dependency Scanning: Use automated dependency scanning tools (e.g., OWASP Dependency-Check, Snyk) to identify known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
  • Regular Updates: Keep Redash and its dependencies updated to the latest secure versions. Patch vulnerabilities promptly.
  • Vulnerability Monitoring: Subscribe to security advisories and vulnerability databases to stay informed about new vulnerabilities affecting Redash's dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: 13. Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Redash's Dependencies (Libraries, Frameworks) (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Redash's Dependencies

• Description: Attackers actively search for and exploit publicly disclosed vulnerabilities (CVEs) in the libraries and frameworks used by Redash.
• Potential Impact:
  • Leads directly to Vulnerable Dependencies exploitation and its impacts.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Proactive Vulnerability Management: Implement a proactive vulnerability management process that includes dependency scanning, vulnerability monitoring, and timely patching.
  • Security Patching Process: Establish a clear and efficient process for applying security patches to Redash and its dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: 14. Leverage Publicly Disclosed Vulnerabilities (CVEs) in Used Libraries (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Leverage Publicly Disclosed Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

• Description: Attackers utilize publicly available information about known vulnerabilities (CVEs) in Redash's dependencies to craft exploits and compromise Redash instances. Exploit code is often publicly available for known CVEs, lowering the skill barrier for attackers.
• Potential Impact:
  • Exploitation of known vulnerabilities can be very efficient and impactful due to readily available exploit information.
  • Leads to Remote Code Execution, Data Breach, or DoS depending on the specific vulnerability.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Rapid Patching: Prioritize rapid patching of known vulnerabilities, especially those with publicly available exploits.
  • Vulnerability Scanning and Monitoring: Continuously scan for and monitor known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
  • Security Awareness: Stay informed about security advisories and CVEs related to Redash and its dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: 15. Configuration and Deployment Issues (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Configuration and Deployment Issues

• Description: Misconfigurations during Redash deployment or insecure default settings can create significant security vulnerabilities. This includes issues like default credentials, insecure server configurations, and insufficient security hardening.
• Potential Impact:
  • Wide range of impacts depending on the specific misconfiguration, from full system compromise (default credentials) to information disclosure and increased attack surface.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Secure Configuration Management: Implement a robust configuration management process that enforces secure settings and prevents misconfigurations.
  • Security Hardening Guides: Follow security hardening guides and best practices for Redash deployment and server configuration.
  • Regular Security Audits: Audit Redash configurations and deployment settings regularly for security weaknesses.
  • Infrastructure as Code (IaC): Use IaC to automate and standardize Redash deployments, ensuring consistent and secure configurations.

Attack Tree Path: 16. Exploit Misconfigurations in Redash Deployment (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Exploit Misconfigurations in Redash Deployment

• Description: Attackers actively look for and exploit common misconfigurations in Redash deployments. These are often easy to find and exploit, requiring low skill and effort.
• Potential Impact:
  • Leads directly to Configuration and Deployment Issues exploitation and its impacts.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Security Baselines: Establish and enforce security baselines for Redash deployments.
  • Automated Configuration Checks: Use automated tools to regularly check Redash configurations against security baselines.
  • Security Training for Operations: Train operations teams on secure Redash deployment and configuration practices.

Attack Tree Path: 17. Default Credentials (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Default Credentials

• Description: Redash, or its underlying components (like databases), might come with default usernames and passwords. If these are not changed during deployment, attackers can easily use them to gain unauthorized access.
• Potential Impact:
  • Critical System Compromise: Default admin credentials can grant full administrative access to Redash and potentially the underlying server.
  • Data Breach: Full access to data managed by Redash.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Change Default Credentials Immediately (Critical): The first and most crucial step is to change all default usernames and passwords for Redash, its database, and any related services during initial deployment.
  • Password Management Policies: Enforce strong password policies and encourage the use of password managers.
  • Regular Security Audits: Periodically audit user accounts and credentials to ensure default credentials are not still in use.

Attack Tree Path: 18. Use Default Passwords for Redash Admin or Database Accounts (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Use Default Passwords for Redash Admin or Database Accounts

• Description: Attackers attempt to log in to Redash or its database using well-known default usernames and passwords. This is a very common and often successful attack vector if default credentials are not changed.
• Potential Impact:
  • Leads directly to Default Credentials exploitation and its critical impacts.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Prevent Default Credentials Usage (Primary Focus): All mitigations for Default Credentials directly prevent this attack step.
  • Account Lockout Policies: Implement account lockout policies to limit brute-force attempts against default accounts (though changing defaults is far more effective).

Attack Tree Path: 19. Insecure Server Configuration (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Insecure Server Configuration

• Description: Weak server settings for the Redash server can create vulnerabilities. This includes exposed ports, insecure protocols (e.g., unencrypted HTTP), weak TLS/SSL configuration, and unnecessary services running.
• Potential Impact:
  • Information Disclosure: Exposed ports or insecure protocols can leak sensitive information.
  • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: Weak TLS/SSL can allow MITM attacks.
  • Increased Attack Surface: Unnecessary services increase the attack surface.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Security Hardening: Follow server security hardening guides and best practices.
  • Minimize Exposed Ports: Only expose necessary ports and services. Use firewalls to restrict access.
  • Enforce HTTPS: Always use HTTPS and enforce secure TLS/SSL configurations.
  • Disable Unnecessary Services: Disable or remove any unnecessary services running on the Redash server.
  • Regular Security Audits: Audit server configurations regularly for security weaknesses.

Attack Tree Path: 20. Exploit Weak Server Settings (e.g., exposed ports, insecure protocols, weak TLS configuration) (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Exploit Weak Server Settings

• Description: Attackers scan for and exploit common weak server settings in Redash deployments. This is often automated and requires low skill.
• Potential Impact:
  • Leads directly to Insecure Server Configuration exploitation and its impacts.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Proactive Security Hardening (Primary Focus): All mitigations for Insecure Server Configuration directly prevent this attack step.
  • Vulnerability Scanning: Use vulnerability scanners to identify weak server settings.

Attack Tree Path: 21. Insufficient Security Hardening (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Insufficient Security Hardening

• Description: Lack of comprehensive security hardening on the Redash server leaves it vulnerable to various attacks. This includes missing security patches, default configurations, unnecessary services, and weak access controls.
• Potential Impact:
  • Increased attack surface and easier exploitation of vulnerabilities.
  • Can lead to various compromises depending on the specific hardening deficiencies.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Security Hardening Guides: Follow comprehensive security hardening guides for the Redash server's operating system and related components.
  • Regular Security Patching: Implement a process for regular security patching of the operating system and all installed software.
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Apply the principle of least privilege throughout the server configuration.
  • Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Regularly audit security hardening measures and conduct penetration testing to identify weaknesses.

Attack Tree Path: 22. Leverage Lack of Security Hardening on Redash Server (e.g., missing security patches, unnecessary services running) (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Leverage Lack of Security Hardening on Redash Server

• Description: Attackers exploit the overall lack of security hardening on the Redash server. This can involve exploiting known vulnerabilities in unpatched software, leveraging unnecessary services for attacks, or exploiting weak access controls.
• Potential Impact:
  • Leads directly to Insufficient Security Hardening exploitation and its impacts.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Implement Security Hardening (Primary Focus): All mitigations for Insufficient Security Hardening directly prevent this attack step.
  • Continuous Security Monitoring: Continuously monitor the Redash server for security events and potential compromises.

Attack Tree Path: 23. Social Engineering Redash Users (Indirectly related to Redash weaknesses, but relevant) (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Social Engineering Redash Users

• Description: Attackers target Redash users through social engineering tactics, such as phishing, to trick them into revealing their credentials or performing malicious actions. While not a direct Redash vulnerability, it's a significant threat to any system with human users.
• Potential Impact:
  • Account Compromise: User accounts are compromised, allowing attackers to access Redash and potentially connected data sources.
  • Data Breach: Attackers can use compromised accounts to access and exfiltrate data.
  • Malware Infection: Users can be tricked into downloading and executing malware.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Security Awareness Training (Crucial): Provide regular security awareness training to Redash users to recognize and avoid social engineering attacks, especially phishing.
  • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Implement MFA for Redash user accounts to add an extra layer of security against credential theft, even if users fall for phishing attacks.
  • Phishing Simulations: Conduct phishing simulations to test user awareness and identify areas for improvement in training.
  • Email Security Measures: Implement email security measures (e.g., spam filters, DMARC, SPF, DKIM) to reduce the likelihood of phishing emails reaching users.

Attack Tree Path: 24. Phishing/Credential Harvesting (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Phishing/Credential Harvesting

• Description: Attackers use phishing techniques (e.g., fake login pages, deceptive emails) to trick Redash users into entering their usernames and passwords, allowing the attacker to harvest these credentials.
• Potential Impact:
  • Leads directly to Social Engineering Redash Users and its impacts.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Prevent Phishing Attacks (Primary Focus): All mitigations for Social Engineering and Phishing directly prevent this attack step.
  • User Education on Phishing: Educate users specifically about phishing tactics and how to identify them.

Attack Tree Path: 25. Trick Redash Users into Revealing Credentials (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Trick Redash Users into Revealing Credentials

• Description: Attackers employ various social engineering tricks and manipulations to deceive Redash users into willingly providing their login credentials.
• Potential Impact:
  • Leads directly to Phishing/Credential Harvesting and its impacts.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • User Security Awareness (Primary Focus): All mitigations for Social Engineering and Phishing directly prevent this attack step.
  • Promote Secure Password Practices: Encourage users to use strong, unique passwords and password managers, and to be cautious about where they enter their credentials.

Attack Tree Path: 26. Obtain Usernames and Passwords via Phishing Emails or Fake Login Pages (HIGH RISK PATH)

Attack Vector Name: Obtain Usernames and Passwords via Phishing Emails or Fake Login Pages

• Description: Attackers specifically use phishing emails that link to fake Redash login pages (or similar deceptive websites) designed to steal user credentials when they are entered.
• Potential Impact:
  • Successful credential harvesting, leading to account compromise and further attacks.
• Recommended Mitigations:
  • Prevent Phishing Emails Reaching Users: Implement strong email security measures.
  • User Education on Fake Login Pages: Train users to recognize fake login pages and to always check the URL before entering credentials.
  • Browser Security Features: Encourage users to use browsers with built-in phishing protection features.