sec-design-deep-analysis.md

Deep Security Analysis of Redash Application

1. Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Objective:

This deep security analysis aims to provide a thorough evaluation of the Redash application's security posture based on the provided security design review. The objective is to identify potential security vulnerabilities and risks associated with Redash's architecture, components, and data flow, and to recommend specific, actionable mitigation strategies tailored to the Redash platform. This analysis will focus on understanding the security implications of each key component, inferring the system's architecture from the provided diagrams and descriptions, and delivering concrete security recommendations relevant to a Redash deployment.

Scope:

This analysis covers the following aspects of Redash, as outlined in the security design review:

• Architecture and Components: Web Application, API Server, Scheduler, Message Queue, Database, Cache, and their interactions.
• Deployment Environment: Cloud-based deployment scenario, including Load Balancer, Instances, and Managed Services.
• Build Process: Development lifecycle components including Version Control, Build System, Testing, and Artifact Management.
• User Roles and Responsibilities: Business User, Data Analyst, Data Engineer, System Administrator and their interactions with Redash.
• Data Flow: From Data Sources through Redash components to users and external systems.
• Identified Security Controls and Requirements: Existing and recommended security controls, authentication, authorization, input validation, and cryptography requirements.

The analysis will primarily focus on the security aspects derived from the provided design review document and will not involve live testing or code inspection of the Redash codebase.

Methodology:

This deep security analysis will be conducted using the following methodology:

1. Document Review: Thoroughly review the provided security design review document, including business posture, security posture, design diagrams (C4 Context, Container, Deployment, Build), risk assessment, questions, and assumptions.
2. Component-Based Analysis: Break down Redash into its key components (as identified in the Container and Deployment diagrams). For each component, analyze its function, data flow, and potential security vulnerabilities based on common security best practices and the context of a data visualization platform.
3. Threat Modeling (Implicit): While not explicitly stated as threat modeling, the analysis will implicitly identify potential threats by considering the attack surface of each component, potential attacker motivations (data breach, disruption, etc.), and common web application vulnerabilities.
4. Control Mapping: Map the existing and recommended security controls from the design review to the identified threats and vulnerabilities. Assess the effectiveness of these controls and identify gaps.
5. Mitigation Strategy Development: For each identified threat or vulnerability, develop specific and actionable mitigation strategies tailored to Redash. These strategies will consider the Redash architecture, functionalities, and the assumed cloud deployment environment.
6. Prioritization and Actionability: Focus on providing actionable recommendations that are directly applicable to securing a Redash deployment, prioritizing based on potential impact and feasibility of implementation.

2. Security Implications of Key Components

Based on the provided design review, we can break down the security implications of each key component of Redash:

2.1. Web Application (Frontend - React):

• Security Implications:
  • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): As a frontend application handling user inputs and displaying data, XSS vulnerabilities are a significant risk. If not properly sanitized, data from queries or data sources could be injected into the frontend and executed in users' browsers, potentially leading to session hijacking, data theft, or defacement.
  • Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF): If proper CSRF protection is not implemented, attackers could potentially perform actions on behalf of authenticated users without their knowledge, such as modifying dashboards, queries, or user settings.
  • Client-Side Input Validation Bypass: While client-side validation can improve user experience, it's not a security control. Attackers can bypass client-side validation and send malicious requests directly to the API server.
  • Session Management Vulnerabilities: Weak session management can lead to session hijacking or fixation, allowing attackers to impersonate legitimate users.
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities: React applications rely on numerous JavaScript libraries. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies can introduce security risks if not regularly updated and managed.

2.2. API Server (Backend - Python):

• Security Implications:
  • Authentication and Authorization Bypass: The API server is responsible for enforcing authentication and authorization. Vulnerabilities in these mechanisms could allow unauthorized access to data and functionalities.
  • SQL Injection: If queries to data sources are not properly parameterized or prepared statements are not used, SQL injection vulnerabilities are highly likely, especially given Redash's core function of executing user-defined queries against databases. This could lead to data breaches, data manipulation, or denial of service.
  • Command Injection: If the API server executes system commands based on user input (e.g., in data source connection configurations or custom scripts), command injection vulnerabilities could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the server.
  • API Rate Limiting and Denial of Service (DoS): Without rate limiting, the API server could be vulnerable to DoS attacks, impacting the availability of Redash.
  • Insecure Deserialization: If the API server deserializes data from untrusted sources, insecure deserialization vulnerabilities could lead to remote code execution.
  • Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): If the API server makes requests to external resources based on user input without proper validation, SSRF vulnerabilities could allow attackers to access internal resources or interact with external systems on behalf of the server.
  • Data Source Connection String Security: Storing data source connection strings insecurely (e.g., in plain text configuration files) could lead to credential theft and unauthorized access to data sources.
  • Logging and Monitoring Gaps: Insufficient logging and monitoring can hinder incident detection and response, making it difficult to identify and mitigate security breaches.
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities: Python backend applications rely on libraries. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies can introduce security risks.

2.3. Scheduler:

• Security Implications:
  • Unauthorized Task Scheduling/Execution: If the scheduler is not properly secured, attackers could potentially schedule malicious tasks or manipulate existing schedules to gain unauthorized access or disrupt operations.
  • Privilege Escalation: If scheduled tasks run with elevated privileges, vulnerabilities in the scheduler could be exploited for privilege escalation.
  • Task Queue Poisoning: If the scheduler interacts with the message queue insecurely, attackers could potentially inject malicious tasks into the queue.

2.4. Message Queue (e.g., Redis, RabbitMQ):

• Security Implications:
  • Unauthorized Access: If the message queue is not properly secured with access controls, unauthorized parties could read or write messages, potentially leading to data breaches or disruption of Redash functionality.
  • Message Tampering/Spoofing: Without message integrity checks, attackers could potentially tamper with messages in the queue or inject spoofed messages.
  • Denial of Service: Flooding the message queue with messages could lead to DoS.

2.5. Database (e.g., PostgreSQL):

• Security Implications:
  • Data Breach (Confidentiality): The database stores sensitive Redash metadata, including user credentials, dashboard definitions, and data source connection details. Unauthorized access to the database could lead to a significant data breach.
  • Data Integrity Issues: SQL injection vulnerabilities in the API server could be used to manipulate data in the database, leading to data integrity issues and potentially misleading visualizations and reports.
  • Availability Issues: Database vulnerabilities or DoS attacks could impact the availability of Redash.
  • Insufficient Access Control: Weak database access controls could allow unauthorized access from within the Redash infrastructure or from compromised instances.
  • Lack of Encryption at Rest: If sensitive data in the database is not encrypted at rest, it could be exposed in case of physical theft or unauthorized access to the storage media.

2.6. Cache (e.g., Redis, Memcached):

• Security Implications:
  • Unauthorized Access to Cached Data: While cached data is typically less sensitive than the primary database, it can still contain sensitive query results or metadata. Unauthorized access to the cache could expose this data.
  • Cache Poisoning: In certain scenarios, attackers might be able to poison the cache with malicious data, leading to incorrect visualizations or potentially other security issues.
  • Denial of Service: Cache exhaustion or DoS attacks against the cache could impact Redash performance and availability.

2.7. Data Sources (External Systems):

• Security Implications:
  • Data Breach via Redash: Vulnerabilities in Redash, particularly SQL injection, could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to connected data sources and exfiltrate sensitive data.
  • Data Source Credential Compromise: If Redash stores data source credentials insecurely, they could be compromised and used to access data sources directly, bypassing Redash.
  • Data Source DoS: Malicious queries executed through Redash could potentially overload or crash connected data sources, leading to DoS.
  • Data Modification in Data Sources: In some cases, vulnerabilities in Redash or misconfigurations could potentially allow attackers to modify data in connected data sources.

2.8. Deployment Infrastructure (Cloud Provider):

• Security Implications:
  • Compromise of Instances: Insecurely configured or unpatched instances (Web Application, API Server, Scheduler) could be compromised, allowing attackers to gain access to Redash components and potentially the underlying infrastructure.
  • Network Security Misconfigurations: Misconfigured security groups, network ACLs, or VPC settings could expose Redash components to unauthorized access from the internet or other parts of the cloud environment.
  • Load Balancer Vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities in the load balancer could be exploited to bypass security controls or disrupt Redash availability.
  • Managed Service Security: Security of managed services (Database, Cache, Message Queue) depends on the cloud provider's security posture and proper configuration. Misconfigurations or vulnerabilities in these services could impact Redash security.
  • Insecure Secrets Management: If secrets (API keys, database passwords, etc.) are not managed securely in the cloud environment, they could be exposed and lead to unauthorized access.

2.9. Build Process (CI/CD):

• Security Implications:
  • Compromised Build Pipeline: If the CI/CD pipeline is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code into Redash builds, leading to widespread security breaches in deployed instances.
  • Secret Leakage in CI/CD: If secrets are not handled securely in the CI/CD pipeline, they could be leaked and used for unauthorized access.
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities Introduced During Build: If dependency scanning and management are not properly integrated into the build process, vulnerable dependencies could be included in Redash builds.
  • Artifact Tampering: Without artifact signing and verification, attackers could potentially tamper with build artifacts, distributing malicious versions of Redash.

3. Actionable and Tailored Mitigation Strategies

Based on the identified security implications, here are actionable and tailored mitigation strategies for Redash:

3.1. Web Application (Frontend):

• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Implement Robust Output Encoding: Use a framework like React's built-in mechanisms to automatically encode output and prevent XSS vulnerabilities. Specifically, ensure all user-provided data and data retrieved from the API is properly encoded before being rendered in the browser. Action: Review React components and ensure proper output encoding is consistently applied.
  • Implement CSRF Protection: Enable and properly configure CSRF protection mechanisms provided by the backend framework (e.g., Django's CSRF middleware if using Django REST Framework). Action: Verify CSRF protection is enabled and correctly configured in the backend and frontend.
  • Strict Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strict CSP to mitigate XSS risks by controlling the sources from which the browser is allowed to load resources. Action: Define and implement a CSP header for the Redash web application, starting with a restrictive policy and gradually relaxing it as needed.
  • Regular Dependency Scanning and Updates: Implement automated dependency scanning for frontend dependencies and regularly update to the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities. Action: Integrate a frontend dependency scanning tool into the build process and establish a process for regularly updating dependencies.
  • Secure Session Management: Use secure session cookies (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite attributes) and implement appropriate session timeout and invalidation mechanisms. Action: Review session management configuration in both frontend and backend to ensure secure session handling.

3.2. API Server (Backend):

• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Parameterized Queries/Prepared Statements: Enforce the use of parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions to prevent SQL injection vulnerabilities. Action: Conduct a thorough code review to identify and refactor all database queries to use parameterized queries. Implement static analysis tools to enforce this practice in the future.
  • Input Validation and Sanitization: Implement comprehensive input validation and sanitization on the API server for all user-provided data, including query parameters, form inputs, and API requests. Use allow-lists where possible and sanitize data before processing or using it in queries. Action: Define input validation rules for all API endpoints and implement validation logic. Use a validation library to streamline this process.
  • Implement Role-Based Access Control (RBAC): Enforce RBAC to control access to data sources, queries, dashboards, and API endpoints based on user roles and permissions. Action: Review and refine the existing RBAC model in Redash. Ensure granular permissions are defined and enforced for all resources and actions.
  • API Rate Limiting and Throttling: Implement rate limiting and request throttling to protect the API server from DoS attacks and brute-force attempts. Action: Implement rate limiting middleware or use a dedicated API gateway to enforce rate limits on API endpoints.
  • Secure Data Source Connection Management: Store data source connection strings securely, preferably using a secrets management service (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager). Avoid storing credentials in plain text configuration files. Action: Migrate data source connection string storage to a secrets management service. Update Redash configuration to retrieve credentials from the secrets manager.
  • Comprehensive Security Logging and Monitoring: Implement detailed logging of security-relevant events, including authentication attempts, authorization decisions, API requests, and errors. Integrate with a SIEM system for centralized logging and monitoring. Action: Enhance logging to include security-relevant events. Integrate Redash logs with a SIEM system for monitoring and alerting.
  • Regular Dependency Scanning and Updates: Implement automated dependency scanning for backend dependencies and regularly update to the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities. Action: Integrate a backend dependency scanning tool into the build process and establish a process for regularly updating dependencies.
  • Implement Output Encoding for API Responses: Ensure API responses are properly encoded to prevent potential injection vulnerabilities if responses are directly consumed by clients without proper handling. Action: Review API response serialization and ensure appropriate encoding is applied.

3.3. Scheduler:

• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Secure Task Scheduling Logic: Ensure that task scheduling logic is secure and prevents unauthorized task creation or modification. Implement authorization checks before scheduling or executing tasks. Action: Review scheduler code and ensure proper authorization checks are in place for task management.
  • Principle of Least Privilege for Scheduled Tasks: Run scheduled tasks with the minimum necessary privileges. Avoid running tasks with root or administrator privileges unless absolutely necessary. Action: Configure scheduler and task execution environment to operate with least privilege.
  • Secure Communication with Message Queue: If the message queue supports encryption and authentication, enable these features to secure communication between the scheduler and the message queue. Action: Configure secure communication channels between scheduler and message queue (e.g., TLS for Redis, SASL/TLS for RabbitMQ).

3.4. Message Queue:

• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Implement Access Control: Configure access controls on the message queue to restrict access to authorized Redash components only (API Server, Scheduler). Action: Configure message queue access control lists (ACLs) or authentication mechanisms to restrict access.
  • Enable Encryption in Transit: If the message queue supports encryption in transit (e.g., TLS), enable it to protect message confidentiality and integrity during transmission. Action: Enable TLS encryption for communication with the message queue.
  • Monitor Message Queue Health and Security Events: Monitor the message queue for performance and security issues, including unauthorized access attempts or message queue overload. Action: Integrate message queue monitoring into the overall Redash monitoring system.

3.5. Database:

• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Enable Data Encryption at Rest: Enable database encryption at rest to protect sensitive data stored in the database. Use a robust encryption method and manage encryption keys securely. Action: Enable database encryption at rest using the cloud provider's managed encryption features or database-native encryption options.
  • Enforce Strong Database Access Controls: Implement strong authentication and authorization mechanisms for database access. Restrict database access to only authorized Redash components (API Server). Use separate database accounts with least privilege for different components if possible. Action: Review and strengthen database access controls. Use strong passwords or key-based authentication. Implement network segmentation to restrict database access.
  • Regular Database Security Audits and Patching: Conduct regular security audits of the database configuration and regularly apply security patches to address known vulnerabilities. Action: Establish a schedule for database security audits and patching. Automate patching where possible.
  • Database Activity Monitoring and Logging: Enable database activity monitoring and logging to detect and investigate suspicious database access or activities. Action: Enable database audit logging and integrate logs with the SIEM system.

3.6. Cache:

• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Implement Access Control: Configure access controls on the cache to restrict access to authorized Redash components (API Server). Action: Configure cache access control lists (ACLs) or authentication mechanisms to restrict access.
  • Consider Encryption in Transit and at Rest: Depending on the sensitivity of data cached, consider enabling encryption in transit and at rest for the cache. Action: Evaluate the sensitivity of cached data and enable encryption if necessary.
  • Regular Security Patching: Regularly apply security patches to the cache service to address known vulnerabilities. Action: Establish a schedule for cache security patching. Automate patching where possible.

3.7. Data Sources:

• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Principle of Least Privilege for Data Source Connections: Configure Redash data source connections with the minimum necessary privileges required to execute queries and retrieve data. Avoid using administrative or overly permissive accounts. Action: Review and restrict data source connection permissions to the minimum required for Redash functionality.
  • Secure Data Source Connection Configuration: Follow data source vendor security best practices for configuring secure connections. Use encrypted connections (e.g., TLS/SSL) where supported. Action: Configure encrypted connections to data sources where supported.
  • Data Source Query Auditing (If Possible): If data sources provide query auditing capabilities, enable them to monitor queries executed by Redash and detect potentially malicious or unauthorized queries. Action: Enable query auditing on data sources if available and integrate audit logs with the SIEM system.
  • Network Segmentation: Implement network segmentation to restrict network access from Redash components to data sources to only necessary ports and protocols. Action: Configure network security groups or firewalls to restrict network access between Redash and data sources.

3.8. Deployment Infrastructure:

• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Infrastructure as Code (IaC) and Security Automation: Use IaC to define and manage the Redash infrastructure in a secure and repeatable manner. Automate security configuration and patching processes. Action: Implement IaC for Redash infrastructure deployment and management. Automate security patching and configuration updates.
  • Regular Security Scanning and Penetration Testing: Regularly perform vulnerability scanning and penetration testing of the Redash infrastructure to identify and remediate security weaknesses. Action: Schedule regular vulnerability scans and penetration tests for the Redash infrastructure and application.
  • Security Hardening of Instances: Harden operating systems and configurations of all Redash instances (Web Application, API Server, Scheduler) according to security best practices. Action: Implement OS hardening guidelines for Redash instances. Use configuration management tools to enforce hardening policies.
  • Network Segmentation and Micro-segmentation: Implement network segmentation and micro-segmentation to isolate Redash components and limit the impact of potential breaches. Use private subnets for backend components and public subnets only for the load balancer. Action: Review and refine network segmentation. Implement micro-segmentation where possible to further isolate components.
  • Secure Secrets Management in Cloud Environment: Utilize cloud provider's secrets management services (e.g., AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault) to securely store and manage secrets used by Redash components. Action: Migrate all secrets to a cloud secrets management service and update Redash configuration to retrieve secrets from the service.
  • Implement Web Application Firewall (WAF): Consider deploying a WAF in front of the load balancer to protect the Web Application and API Server from common web attacks. Action: Evaluate and deploy a WAF to protect Redash web application and API server.

3.9. Build Process:

• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Secure CI/CD Pipeline Configuration: Secure the CI/CD pipeline configuration to prevent unauthorized modifications or access. Implement access controls and audit logging for the CI/CD system. Action: Review and harden CI/CD pipeline security. Implement access controls and audit logging.
  • Secrets Management in CI/CD: Use secure secrets management practices within the CI/CD pipeline to handle credentials and API keys. Avoid storing secrets directly in code or CI/CD configuration files. Action: Utilize CI/CD platform's secrets management features or integrate with a secrets management service for secure secret handling in the build process.
  • Automated Security Scanning in CI/CD: Integrate automated security scanners (SAST, DAST, dependency scanning) into the CI/CD pipeline to detect vulnerabilities early in the development lifecycle. Fail builds on critical findings. Action: Integrate SAST, DAST, and dependency scanning tools into the CI/CD pipeline. Configure build pipeline to fail on critical vulnerability findings.
  • Artifact Signing and Verification: Implement artifact signing for build artifacts (containers, packages) to ensure integrity and authenticity. Verify signatures before deployment. Action: Implement artifact signing for Redash build artifacts. Implement signature verification in the deployment process.
  • Regular Security Audits of Build Process: Conduct regular security audits of the build process to identify and address potential security weaknesses in the development lifecycle. Action: Schedule regular security audits of the Redash build process and CI/CD pipeline.

By implementing these tailored mitigation strategies, the organization can significantly enhance the security posture of their Redash deployment and mitigate the identified risks. It is crucial to prioritize these recommendations based on the organization's risk appetite, data sensitivity, and compliance requirements. Regular security reviews and continuous monitoring are essential to maintain a strong security posture over time.