Attack Surface: Exposed Internal Services (Self-Hosted)
Description: Unintentionally exposing Sentry's internal services (PostgreSQL, Redis, ClickHouse, Kafka, etc.) to the public internet. Sentry Contribution: Sentry's architecture relies on these services; improper deployment exposes them. This is a direct consequence of how Sentry is built and deployed. Example: A misconfigured firewall allows direct access to the PostgreSQL database port (5432) from the internet. Impact: Complete compromise of Sentry data, potential lateral movement to other systems, denial of service. Risk Severity: Critical Mitigation Strategies: * Network Segmentation: Isolate Sentry's internal services on a private network. * Firewall Rules: Strict firewall rules to block all external access to internal service ports. * Reverse Proxy: Use a reverse proxy (Nginx, HAProxy) to handle external traffic. * Regular Audits: Periodically audit network configurations.
Attack Surface: Outdated Sentry Version (Self-Hosted)
Description: Running an outdated version of Sentry with known security vulnerabilities. Sentry Contribution: Sentry, as a software product, has vulnerabilities that are addressed in updates. This risk is directly tied to the Sentry software itself. Example: Using a Sentry version with a known remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability. Impact: Remote code execution, data breaches, denial of service. Risk Severity: Critical (if a known RCE exists), High (otherwise) Mitigation Strategies: * Update Process: Establish a clear process for updating Sentry. * Monitoring: Monitor Sentry's release notes and security advisories. * Testing: Thoroughly test updates before deploying to production. * Automated Updates (with caution): Consider, but only after rigorous testing.
Attack Surface: Weak Database Credentials (Self-Hosted)
Description: Using default or easily guessable passwords for the databases used by Sentry. Sentry Contribution: Sentry requires and directly uses these databases; weak credentials directly impact Sentry's security. Example: Using "postgres" as the password for the PostgreSQL database. Impact: Complete compromise of Sentry data. Risk Severity: Critical Mitigation Strategies: * Strong Passwords: Use strong, randomly generated passwords. * Password Rotation: Regularly rotate database passwords. * Database Access Control: Implement database-level access controls.
Attack Surface: Sensitive Data Leakage in Error Reports
Description: Accidentally including sensitive information (PII, API keys, secrets) in error reports sent to Sentry. Sentry Contribution: Sentry's core function is to collect error data, making it the direct recipient of this potentially sensitive information. Example: An error message containing a user's full credit card number is sent to Sentry. Impact: Data breaches, privacy violations, regulatory non-compliance. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: * Data Scrubbing (Server-Side): Configure Sentry's server-side data scrubbing. * SDK Configuration (Client-Side): Configure the Sentry SDK to exclude sensitive data. * Code Review: Review code to prevent sensitive data inclusion in errors. * Avoid Sensitive Data in Logs: Avoid logging sensitive data.
Attack Surface: Weak Authentication to Sentry (Self-Hosted and SaaS)
Description: Using weak passwords or not enforcing multi-factor authentication (MFA) for Sentry user accounts. Sentry Contribution: Sentry provides and relies on its own user authentication system (or integrates with external ones). Weak authentication directly compromises Sentry access. Example: A Sentry user account with the password "password123" and no MFA. Impact: Unauthorized access to Sentry data and configuration, potential data breaches. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: * Strong Password Policies: Enforce strong password policies. * Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Require MFA for all users. * SSO/Identity Provider Integration: Integrate with an existing identity provider.
Attack Surface: Exposed Secret DSN
Description: The secret Sentry DSN is exposed. Sentry Contribution: The secret DSN is used for authentication with Sentry. Example: The secret DSN is hardcoded in a JavaScript file that is publicly accessible or missconfigured in server. Impact: Attackers could send fake or malicious events to your Sentry project, potentially causing noise, exceeding quotas, or triggering a denial of service. Attackers can reconfigure Sentry instance. Risk Severity: Critical Mitigation Strategies: * Environment Variables: Use environment variables or server-side configuration to inject the DSN into the application, rather than hardcoding it in client-side code or server configuration. * Secrets Management: Use secrets management system.