Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
60 lines (49 loc) · 6.23 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

60 lines (49 loc) · 6.23 KB

Threat Model Analysis for gradio-app/gradio

Threat: Unintentional Data Exposure in Interface

  • Description: Developers inadvertently display sensitive information (API keys, internal file paths, database credentials, debug messages) within the Gradio interface itself. This might occur in output components, error messages, or through improper handling of exceptions. This is a direct threat because the vulnerability lies in how Gradio is used to present information.
    • Impact: Exposure of sensitive information to unauthorized users, potentially leading to further attacks or data breaches.
    • Gradio Component Affected: Any output component (e.g., gr.Textbox, gr.Label, gr.Image, gr.Dataframe, etc.) and error handling within the Gradio application.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Careful Output Review: Thoroughly review all output components and ensure they do not display sensitive data.
      • Robust Error Handling: Implement proper error handling that displays generic error messages to the user and logs detailed error information server-side. Never expose internal error details in the Gradio interface.
      • Secure Configuration: Never hardcode secrets in the Gradio application code. Use environment variables or a secure configuration management system.
      • Disable Gradio's debug mode (debug=False) in production.

Threat: gr.File Data Leakage

  • Description: If using the gr.File component for file uploads, improper handling of uploaded files on the server can lead to information disclosure. This includes storing files in publicly accessible directories, failing to restrict access, or using predictable filenames. This is a direct threat because it stems from the misuse of a specific Gradio component.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to uploaded files, potentially exposing sensitive data.
    • Gradio Component Affected: gr.File
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure File Storage: Store uploaded files in a secure, non-publicly accessible directory.
      • Strict Access Control: Implement strict access controls to limit who can access uploaded files.
      • Random Filenames: Generate unique, random filenames for uploaded files to prevent overwriting and potential information disclosure.
      • File Scanning: Scan uploaded files for malware before processing them.

Threat: Resource Exhaustion (DoS)

  • Description: An attacker submits excessively large inputs (e.g., huge text strings, massive images, or a flood of rapid requests) to Gradio components. This overwhelms the server's resources (CPU, memory, network bandwidth), causing a denial of service for legitimate users. This is a direct threat because Gradio's input handling is the target.
    • Impact: The Gradio application becomes unavailable or unresponsive, preventing legitimate users from accessing it.
    • Gradio Component Affected: Any input component, particularly those handling large data types (e.g., gr.Textbox, gr.Image, gr.Video, gr.Audio, gr.File).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting (server-side or via a reverse proxy) to restrict the number of requests per user within a given time period. Gradio does not provide this natively.
      • Input Size Limits: Set reasonable limits on the size of inputs accepted by Gradio components (e.g., maximum file size, maximum text length). Enforce these limits server-side.
      • Robust Web Server: Use a production-ready web server (e.g., Gunicorn, uWSGI) configured to handle concurrent requests efficiently.
      • Resource Monitoring: Monitor server resource usage and set up alerts for unusual activity.

Threat: Queue Overload (DoS)

  • Description: When using Gradio's queuing feature (queue=True), an attacker sends a large number of requests, filling the queue and preventing legitimate users from accessing the application. This is a direct threat because it targets Gradio's queuing mechanism.
    • Impact: The Gradio application becomes unavailable or experiences significant delays for legitimate users.
    • Gradio Component Affected: gradio.Interface (specifically, the queue parameter).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Queue Size Limit: Limit the maximum size of the queue.
      • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting (as above) to prevent queue flooding.
      • Queue Monitoring: Monitor the queue length and set up alerts for excessive queue buildup.

Threat: Unauthorized Backend Access

  • Description: If Gradio interfaces with backend systems requiring authentication, an attacker attempts to bypass authentication or gain unauthorized access to privileged functions. This could occur if Gradio's authentication is misconfigured or if the backend functions lack proper authorization checks. While the backend is involved, the entry point is the Gradio interface, making it a direct threat in the context of Gradio security.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive data or functionality, potentially leading to data breaches, system compromise, or other malicious actions.
    • Gradio Component Affected: gradio.Interface (specifically, the auth parameter and the backend functions connected to the interface).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strong Authentication: Use Gradio's built-in authentication features (auth) or integrate with a robust external authentication system.
      • Mandatory Authorization Checks: Always perform authorization checks within the backend functions to ensure the user has the necessary permissions. Do not rely solely on the Gradio interface for access control.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant users only the minimum necessary permissions.