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Attack Tree Analysis for graphite-project/graphite-web

Objective: To gain unauthorized access to Graphite data, manipulate Graphite data, or disrupt the Graphite service (DoS).

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     +-------------------------------------------------+
                                     |  Attacker Goal: Compromise Graphite Data/Service |
                                     +-------------------------------------------------+
                                                     |
         +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
         |                                                                                                                |
+---------------------+                                                                                  +---------------------+
|  Unauthorized Data  |                                                                                  |  Denial of Service  |
|       Access        |                                                                                  |        (DoS)        |
+---------------------+                                                                                  +---------------------+
         |                                                                                                                |
+--------+--------+                                                                                  +---------------------+
|                 |                                                                                  |                     |
|  Exploit Render |  |  Exploit Find   |                                                                                  |  Resource Exhaustion |
|    Endpoint     |  |    Endpoint     |                                                                                  |        [CN]         |
|  Vulnerabilities|  |  Vulnerabilities|                                                                                  +---------------------+
|       [CN]       |  |       [CN]       |                                                                                                |
+--------+--------+  +--------+--------+                                                                                  +---+---+---+---+
         |                 |                                                                                                |   |   |   |   |
+---+---+---+---+  +---+---+---+---+                                                                                  | M | C | D | S |
|   |   |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |                                                                                  | e | P | i | L |
| X |   |   | I |  |   |   | I |                                                                                  | m | U | s | o |
| S |   |   | n |  |   |   | n |                                                                                  | o |   | k | w |
| S |   |   | j |  |   |   | j |                                                                                  | r |   |   |   |
|   |   |   | e |  |   |   | e |                                                                                  | y |   |   |   |
+[HR]|   |   |[HR]|  |   |   |[HR]|                                                                                  +---+---+---+---+
  |           |           |
  |           +
  |                   |
  V                   V
Pickle Inj.     Command Inj.

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: Exploit Render Endpoint Vulnerabilities

  • Description: The /render endpoint in Graphite-web is a primary target for attackers because it processes user-supplied data, making it vulnerable to several injection attacks.

  • Attack Vectors:

    • High-Risk Path: XSS (Cross-Site Scripting)

      • Mechanism: An attacker injects malicious JavaScript code into parameters of the /render endpoint (e.g., target, from, until). If the application doesn't properly sanitize these parameters before including them in the response (e.g., in error messages or reflected in the URL), the injected script will be executed in the victim's browser.
      • Consequences:
        • Stealing cookies and session tokens, leading to session hijacking.
        • Redirecting users to phishing sites.
        • Defacing the web page.
        • Performing actions on behalf of the user.
      • Mitigation:
        • Rigorous input validation: Check all input parameters against a strict whitelist of allowed characters and formats.
        • Output encoding: Encode all output data to prevent the browser from interpreting it as code (e.g., HTML entity encoding).
        • Content Security Policy (CSP): Use a CSP to restrict the sources from which scripts can be loaded, mitigating the impact of XSS even if injection occurs.
        • Use a well-vetted HTML sanitization library.

    • High-Risk Path: Pickle Injection

      • Mechanism: Graphite-web uses the Python pickle module for serialization in some parts of its code. If an attacker can control the data that is deserialized using pickle.loads(), they can craft a malicious pickle payload that executes arbitrary code when deserialized. This is a very serious vulnerability.
      • Consequences:
        • Remote Code Execution (RCE): The attacker gains complete control over the server running Graphite-web.
        • Data theft, modification, or deletion.
        • Installation of malware.
        • Use of the server for further attacks (e.g., botnet participation).
      • Mitigation:
        • Strongly Preferred: Replace Pickle with a safer serialization format like JSON.
        • If Pickle is unavoidable: Never deserialize data from untrusted sources (e.g., user input). Implement extremely strict input validation before any deserialization, ensuring that the data conforms to the expected format and does not contain any malicious code. This is very difficult to do reliably.

    • High-Risk Path: Command Injection

      • Mechanism: If Graphite-web constructs shell commands using user-supplied input without proper sanitization or escaping, an attacker can inject arbitrary commands to be executed on the server.
      • Consequences:
        • Remote Code Execution (RCE): Similar to Pickle injection, the attacker gains complete control over the server.
        • Data theft, modification, or deletion.
        • System compromise.
      • Mitigation:
        • Avoid constructing shell commands directly from user input.
        • If unavoidable, use parameterized commands or a well-vetted library that handles escaping properly (e.g., subprocess.run with shell=False and a list of arguments in Python). Never use shell=True with untrusted input.
        • Strict input validation: Whitelist allowed characters and patterns for any input that might influence command execution.

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: Exploit Find Endpoint Vulnerabilities

  • Description: The /metrics/find endpoint is used for searching metrics and is also susceptible to injection attacks if user input is not handled correctly.
  • Attack Vectors:

    • High-Risk Path: Pickle Injection:

      • Mechanism: Similar to the render endpoint, if the find endpoint uses pickle to deserialize data related to the search query, an attacker could inject a malicious pickle payload.
      • Consequences: Remote Code Execution (RCE).
      • Mitigation: Same as for the render endpoint (replace Pickle or never deserialize untrusted data).

    • High-Risk Path: Command Injection:

      • Mechanism: If the find endpoint constructs shell commands based on the search query, an attacker could inject arbitrary commands.
      • Consequences: Remote Code Execution (RCE).
      • Mitigation: Same as for the render endpoint (avoid shell commands, use parameterized commands, strict input validation).

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: Resource Exhaustion (DoS)

  • Description: Attackers can attempt to deny service by overwhelming Graphite-web with requests, consuming excessive resources.

  • Attack Vectors:

    • Memory Exhaustion:

      • Mechanism: Sending requests that cause Graphite-web to allocate large amounts of memory, such as requesting a huge number of metrics, a very long time range, or exploiting memory leaks.
      • Consequences: Service unavailability, application crashes.
      • Mitigation:
        • Limit the number of metrics, time range, and data points per request.
        • Monitor memory usage and set resource limits (e.g., using ulimit or container resource limits).
        • Implement request throttling.

    • CPU Exhaustion:

      • Mechanism: Sending computationally expensive requests, such as complex queries or rendering requests with many data points.
      • Consequences: Service slowdown or unavailability.
      • Mitigation:
        • Rate limiting and request throttling.
        • Optimize rendering and data retrieval code.
        • Monitor CPU usage and set resource limits.

    • Disk Space Exhaustion:

      • Mechanism: Causing Graphite-web to write excessive data to disk, potentially filling up the storage and causing the service to fail. This could be through excessive logging or manipulating data storage mechanisms.
      • Consequences: Service unavailability, data loss.
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement data retention policies.
        • Rotate logs regularly.
        • Monitor disk space usage and set alerts.

    • Slowloris (Not explicitly in the sub-tree, but relevant to the Resource Exhaustion node):

      • Mechanism: Holding many connections open to the web server and sending data very slowly, tying up server resources.
      • Consequences: Service unavailability.
      • Mitigation: Configure the web server (Apache, Nginx, etc.) to mitigate Slowloris attacks, typically by setting appropriate timeouts and connection limits.