Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
65 lines (55 loc) · 4.31 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

65 lines (55 loc) · 4.31 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for httpie/cli

Objective: To gain unauthorized access to data or functionality exposed by the target application, leveraging vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in how the application utilizes HTTPie.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                 Compromise Application via HTTPie
                                              |
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    |                                               |

Data Exfiltration Unauthorized Actions | | -------------|----------------- ------------- | | |

  1. Session 2. Auth 6. Input Hijacking Token Leak Validation

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Session Hijacking (via HTTPie Session Files)

Description: HTTPie's session management feature allows saving HTTP session data (headers, cookies, etc.) to files. If an attacker gains access to these files, they can replay the session and impersonate the application, gaining access to any data or functionality the application has. HTTPie Involvement: The --session and --session-read-only flags are used to create and utilize session files. Likelihood: Medium Impact: High to Very High Effort: Low to Medium Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard Mitigation: Strictly control file permissions on session files (e.g., chmod 600). Store session files in secure, encrypted locations, especially in CI/CD environments. Avoid committing session files to version control. Use short-lived sessions and rotate credentials frequently. Monitor access to session files.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2 Authentication Token Leakage (via Command History/Logs)

Description: If authentication tokens (API keys, passwords) are passed directly on the HTTPie command line, they are likely to be stored in shell history files (e.g., .bash_history), system logs, or process monitoring tools. An attacker with access to these locations can easily extract the credentials. HTTPie Involvement: The method of providing authentication to HTTPie (e.g., --auth, --headers, directly in the URL) directly impacts the risk of leakage. Likelihood: High Impact: High to Very High Effort: Very Low Skill Level: Novice Detection Difficulty: Medium Mitigation: Never hardcode credentials in scripts or command lines. Use environment variables to store sensitive credentials. Develop or use HTTPie authentication plugins that securely manage credentials (e.g., retrieving them from a secure vault). This is the best practice. Consider disabling shell history (extreme measure with usability drawbacks). Implement log redaction to automatically remove sensitive data from logs. Pass sensitive data via stdin instead of command-line arguments.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3 Input Validation (via Crafted Payloads)

Description: If the application that uses HTTPie does not properly validate the input it receives from HTTPie (or, more accurately, the data sent via HTTPie), an attacker can inject malicious data. This could exploit vulnerabilities in the application, leading to various consequences, from data corruption to code execution. This is primarily a server-side vulnerability, but HTTPie is the tool used to deliver the malicious input. HTTPie Involvement: HTTPie is used to send the crafted request, including any malicious payloads in the request body, headers, or URL parameters. Likelihood: Medium to High Impact: Medium to Very High Effort: Low to Medium Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard Mitigation: Implement strict input validation on the server-side for all data received from clients, regardless of the tool used (including HTTPie). Use parameterized queries (if interacting with a database) to prevent SQL injection. Employ a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to filter out malicious requests. Sanitize and validate all data, treating it as untrusted.