Here is the combined list of vulnerabilities, formatted as markdown:

Combined Vulnerability List

This document outlines the identified vulnerabilities, combining information from the provided lists and removing duplicates. Each vulnerability is detailed with its description, potential impact, severity ranking, mitigation status, and steps for verification and remediation.

Vulnerability 1: Insecure Redis Configuration in Docker Compose

Vulnerability Name: Insecure Redis Configuration in Docker Compose

Description:

The docker-compose.yml file provided with the application configures a Redis service.
The command used to start the Redis server includes --enable-debug-command yes and --protected-mode no.
--enable-debug-command yes activates debug commands in Redis, which are intended for development and debugging, not for production environments. These commands can expose sensitive internal server details and allow for advanced server manipulation.
--protected-mode no disables a crucial security feature in Redis. Protected mode, when enabled, restricts access from remote clients if no explicit bind or requirepass configuration is set. Disabling it without implementing other access control measures makes the Redis instance vulnerable to unauthorized access if the Redis port is publicly accessible.
Furthermore, the docker-compose.yml exposes Redis ports 6379 (and Sentinel port 26379) to the host machine using the ports directive, making them potentially accessible from outside the Docker host.
If a publicly accessible instance of the application is deployed using this docker-compose.yml, and the Redis port (6379) is exposed to the internet, an external attacker can directly connect to the Redis instance without any authentication.
Once connected, the attacker can execute any Redis commands, including debug commands enabled by --enable-debug-command yes. This allows them to retrieve sensitive information, manipulate data, or even potentially achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by leveraging Redis configuration commands if the server user has sufficient write permissions on the filesystem.

Impact:

Critical. Unauthorized access to the Redis instance by an attacker can lead to severe consequences:
- Information Disclosure: Attackers can use debug and other Redis commands to retrieve sensitive information about the Redis server's internal state, configuration, cached data, and potentially application data stored in Redis.
- Data Manipulation and Corruption: Attackers can modify, delete, or add data within the Redis cache, leading to data corruption, application malfunction, or denial of service.
- Remote Code Execution (RCE): In certain misconfigurations where the Redis server process has sufficient filesystem write permissions, attackers can leverage Redis commands like CONFIG SET dir and CONFIG SET dbfilename combined with SAVE to write malicious files (e.g., web shells) to the server's filesystem. If the web server can then access and execute these files, it can result in complete server compromise and remote code execution.
- System Information Leakage: Debug commands expose internal system information which can be valuable for further attacks.

Vulnerability Rank: Critical

Currently implemented mitigations:

None. The described vulnerability originates from an insecure default configuration within the provided docker-compose.yml file. There are no mitigations implemented in the docker-compose.yml or the application code by default to address this misconfiguration.

Missing mitigations:

Secure default configuration in docker-compose.yml for production deployments:
- Enable protected mode: Remove --protected-mode no from the redis-server command. Redis default is protected mode yes, so simply removing the flag will enable it. Alternatively, explicitly set --protected-mode yes.
- Disable debug commands: Remove --enable-debug-command yes from the redis-server command. Debug commands should be strictly disabled in production environments.
- Implement Authentication: Configure Redis to require authentication by setting the requirepass option in a redis.conf file. Mount this configuration file into the Redis container.
- Restrict Network Exposure: Avoid exposing Redis ports directly to the public internet. If external access is necessary, implement strict firewall rules or network segmentation to limit access to only authorized IP addresses or networks. For development environments, consider binding Redis to localhost only.
- Principle of Least Privilege: Ensure that the Redis server process runs with the minimum necessary privileges to reduce the impact of potential RCE vulnerabilities.

Preconditions:

The application is deployed using the provided, insecure docker-compose.yml configuration.
The server where the docker-compose.yml is deployed is publicly accessible, or the Redis ports (6379 and/or 26379) are reachable from an attacker's network.
No additional network security measures (like firewalls) are in place to restrict access to the Redis ports.

Source code analysis:

The root cause of this vulnerability is not within the application's Python source code, but in the configuration specified in the docker/docker-compose.yml file.

The insecure configuration is introduced by the following lines in the docker-compose.yml:

File: /code/docker/docker-compose.yml
Content:
services:
  redis:
    image: redis:latest
    container_name: redis-primary
    command: redis-server --enable-debug-command yes --protected-mode no
    ports:
      - 6379:6379
    # ...

Specifically, the command: redis-server --enable-debug-command yes --protected-mode no line sets the insecure flags. The ports: - "6379:6379" line exposes the port, making the misconfiguration exploitable if deployed in a public environment.

Security test case:

Deploy the application using the provided docker-compose.yml by running docker compose -f docker/docker-compose.yml up -d.
Determine the public IP address or hostname of the server where the Docker containers are running. Let's assume it is <YOUR_PUBLIC_IP>. Ensure that port 6379 on this server is accessible from your testing environment.
On your attacker machine, install redis-cli if it's not already installed.
Open a terminal and connect to the exposed Redis instance using redis-cli -h <YOUR_PUBLIC_IP> -p 6379.
If the connection is established successfully without prompting for a password (you should see the Redis prompt 127.0.0.1:6379>), the vulnerability is present.
Execute the INFO command in the redis-cli console. Examine the output and verify that protected_mode:no is listed.
Execute the CONFIG GET debug-output-options command. Verify that debug commands are enabled by checking the output.
Attempt to set and retrieve a key to confirm basic Redis functionality:
- SET testkey testvalue
- GET testkey
- Verify that GET testkey returns testvalue.
Attempt to execute a debug command, for example, DEBUG OBJECT testkey. Verify that debug information related to the key is returned, confirming that debug commands are enabled.
The successful execution of these steps (unauthenticated connection, protected_mode:no, debug commands enabled, basic Redis command execution) confirms the insecure Redis configuration vulnerability.

Vulnerability 2: Unsafe Deserialization via PickleSerializer

Vulnerability Name: Unsafe Deserialization via PickleSerializer

Description:

The django-redis package, by default, utilizes PickleSerializer for serializing and deserializing data stored in the Redis cache.
The PickleSerializer relies on Python's built-in pickle module.
The loads method of PickleSerializer directly calls pickle.loads(value) on data retrieved from the Redis cache without any sanitization or verification.
Python's pickle module is known to be insecure when used to deserialize data from untrusted sources. Deserializing a malicious pickle payload can lead to arbitrary code execution.
If an attacker can inject a specially crafted, malicious pickle payload into the Redis cache (cache poisoning), for instance, by directly accessing a misconfigured Redis instance or through another vulnerability in the application that allows cache manipulation, the application becomes vulnerable.
When the application subsequently retrieves this poisoned data from the cache using methods like cache.get(), the PickleSerializer will deserialize the malicious payload using pickle.loads().
This deserialization process will execute the embedded malicious code within the context of the application server, potentially leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) and complete compromise of the hosting server.

Impact:

Critical. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to:
- Remote Code Execution (RCE): An attacker can execute arbitrary code on the server hosting the application. This is the most severe impact, potentially allowing for full system takeover.
- Data Leakage: Attackers can use RCE to access sensitive data stored on the server, including application secrets, database credentials, and user data.
- System Takeover: RCE allows attackers to gain complete control over the compromised server, enabling them to install backdoors, manipulate application functionality, and use the server for further malicious activities, such as lateral movement within a network.

Vulnerability Rank: Critical

Currently implemented mitigations:

The django-redis package does not enforce or provide a safe serialization mechanism by default.
While django-redis allows administrators to configure alternative serializers (like JSON or msgpack) through the SERIALIZER setting in the cache configuration, the default remains PickleSerializer.
There are no built-in checks, signatures, or validation mechanisms to ensure the integrity and trustworthiness of data being deserialized using PickleSerializer.
No warnings or runtime flags are raised when PickleSerializer is used in environments where the Redis instance might be accessible to untrusted actors, potentially leading to accidental insecure deployments.

Missing mitigations:

Enforce or Recommend a Safer Default Serializer: The package should default to a safer serializer, such as JSON or msgpack, which do not inherently carry the risk of arbitrary code execution during deserialization.
Provide Clear Security Guidance: Documentation should prominently warn against the security risks of using PickleSerializer, especially in production environments or when the Redis cache might be exposed to untrusted networks or potential cache poisoning attacks. Recommendations for safer alternatives and secure Redis configuration should be clearly provided.
Implement Optional Integrity Checks: Consider adding optional mechanisms to verify the integrity and origin of cached data, such as digital signatures or HMAC, especially when using serializers like Pickle. However, switching to a safer serializer is generally a more effective first step.
Runtime Warning for Insecure Default in Production: Implement a runtime warning or configuration check that alerts administrators if PickleSerializer is being used in a production-like environment where Redis might be accessible to untrusted actors.

Preconditions:

The django-redis cache backend is configured to use the default PickleSerializer.
The Redis cache instance is reachable by an external attacker. This could be due to misconfiguration, exposure to a public network without proper authentication or firewalling, or other network vulnerabilities.
The application stores data in the cache that could potentially be influenced or poisoned by external input, or the application operates in an environment where untrusted sources can inject data into the cache.

Source code analysis:

The vulnerability resides in the PickleSerializer class within django_redis/serializers/pickle.py:

# File: django_redis/serializers/pickle.py
import pickle

class PickleSerializer:
    def __init__(self, pickle_version=pickle.HIGHEST_PROTOCOL):
        self._pickle_version = pickle_version

    def dumps(self, value):
        return pickle.dumps(value, self._pickle_version)

    def loads(self, value):
        return pickle.loads(value) # UNSAFE DESERIALIZATION

The loads(value) method directly calls pickle.loads(value) without any safety checks.

In django_redis/client/default.py (and similar client code), when retrieving data from the cache:

# File: django_redis/client/default.py (example)
def get(self, key, default=None, version=None, client=None):
    # ...
    value = self.connection.get(key) # Raw data from Redis
    if value is None:
        return default
    value = self.decode(value) # Decode from bytes (if needed)
    value = self._serializer.loads(value) # UNSAFE DESERIALIZATION
    return value

The retrieved raw data from Redis is passed to self._serializer.loads(value), which, if using PickleSerializer, will execute the unsafe pickle.loads() call.
If an attacker can inject a malicious pickle payload into Redis under a key that the application retrieves, the get() operation will trigger the unsafe deserialization and execute the attacker's code.

Security test case:

Setup:
- Deploy the application with the default cache configuration, ensuring PickleSerializer is in use.
- For testing, make the Redis instance accessible to your attacker machine (this could be in a controlled test environment simulating a misconfigured production setup).
Payload Creation:
- On your attacker machine, create a malicious pickle payload. This payload should contain Python code that, when deserialized, will perform an observable action, such as writing a specific message to a file on the server.
- Example payload generation (attacker machine):
```
import pickle
import os

class MaliciousPayload:
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (os.system, ('echo "Vulnerable" > /tmp/vuln.txt',))

payload = pickle.dumps(MaliciousPayload())
print(payload)
```

Injection:

Manually inject the generated malicious pickle payload into the Redis store. You can use redis-cli or a Redis client library for this. Choose a key that you know the application will later attempt to retrieve from the cache (e.g., test_pickle_key).

Using redis-cli:

redis-cli -h <REDIS_HOST> -p <REDIS_PORT>
SET test_pickle_key "$(python -c 'import pickle; import os; class MaliciousPayload: def __reduce__(self): return (os.system, ("echo \"Vulnerable\" > /tmp/vuln.txt",)); print(pickle.dumps(MaliciousPayload()).decode("latin-1"))')"

Trigger:
- Trigger the application to retrieve the value associated with the key test_pickle_key from the cache. This might involve accessing a specific URL or performing an action in the application that results in a cache.get('test_pickle_key') call.
Verification:
- After triggering the cache retrieval, check for the observable action on the server. In the example payload, this is checking for the existence of the /tmp/vuln.txt file and verifying its content is "Vulnerable".
- If the file /tmp/vuln.txt exists and contains "Vulnerable", it confirms that the malicious pickle payload was successfully deserialized and executed, demonstrating the Unsafe Deserialization vulnerability.

Recommendation:

For both vulnerabilities, immediate remediation is strongly advised, especially for any deployments resembling production environments.

For Insecure Redis Configuration: Harden the Redis configuration by enabling protected mode, disabling debug commands, implementing authentication, and restricting network access. Review and adjust the docker-compose.yml to reflect these secure settings for non-development deployments.
For Unsafe Deserialization: Switch the default serializer from PickleSerializer to a safer alternative like JSON or msgpack by configuring the SERIALIZER option in the django-redis cache settings. Ensure that Redis instances are properly secured to prevent unauthorized access and cache poisoning attacks, regardless of the serializer in use.

These vulnerabilities, particularly when combined, pose a significant risk to the application's security and should be addressed with high priority.

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Combined Vulnerability List

Vulnerability 1: Insecure Redis Configuration in Docker Compose

Vulnerability Name: Insecure Redis Configuration in Docker Compose

Description:

Impact:

Vulnerability Rank: Critical

Currently implemented mitigations:

Missing mitigations:

Preconditions:

Source code analysis:

Security test case:

Vulnerability 2: Unsafe Deserialization via PickleSerializer

Vulnerability Name: Unsafe Deserialization via PickleSerializer

Description:

Impact:

Vulnerability Rank: Critical

Currently implemented mitigations:

Missing mitigations:

Preconditions:

Source code analysis:

Security test case:

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Combined Vulnerability List

Vulnerability 1: Insecure Redis Configuration in Docker Compose

Vulnerability Name: Insecure Redis Configuration in Docker Compose

Description:

Impact:

Vulnerability Rank: Critical

Currently implemented mitigations:

Missing mitigations:

Preconditions:

Source code analysis:

Security test case:

Vulnerability 2: Unsafe Deserialization via PickleSerializer

Vulnerability Name: Unsafe Deserialization via PickleSerializer

Description:

Impact:

Vulnerability Rank: Critical

Currently implemented mitigations:

Missing mitigations:

Preconditions:

Source code analysis:

Security test case: