vulnerabilities-workflow-1.md

Combined List of Vulnerabilities

This document combines identified vulnerabilities from multiple lists into a single comprehensive list, removing any duplicates. Each vulnerability is detailed with its description, impact, rank, mitigation status, preconditions, source code analysis, and a security test case.

1. Server-Side Template Injection in TemplateColumn

• Description:
  • An attacker can inject malicious template code into the template_code or template_name parameters of the TemplateColumn.
  • When the table is rendered and the TemplateColumn is processed, the injected template code will be executed by the Django template engine.
  • Step 1: An attacker crafts a request to an application using django-tables2 that somehow allows control over data rendered in a TemplateColumn. This could be through URL parameters, form input, or database content that is displayed in a table.
  • Step 2: The attacker injects malicious Django template code into the controlled data. For example, {% load os %}{% os.system "malicious command" %} or similar constructs that execute arbitrary code.
  • Step 3: The application renders the table, and the TemplateColumn processes the attacker-controlled template code.
  • Step 4: The Django template engine executes the malicious code, leading to server-side template injection.
• Impact:
  • Critical: Full server compromise. An attacker can execute arbitrary code on the server, read sensitive data, modify data, or cause a denial of service. The impact is only limited by the permissions of the user running the Django application.
• Vulnerability Rank: critical
• Currently Implemented Mitigations:
  • None: The code directly uses Template and Context to render the provided template code without any sanitization or escaping of potentially malicious input.
• Missing Mitigations:
  • Sandboxed template environment: Instead of using the default Django template engine, a sandboxed template environment should be used for rendering TemplateColumn content. This would restrict the available template tags and filters, preventing the execution of dangerous code.
• Preconditions:
  • The application using django-tables2 must be using TemplateColumn to render data in tables.
  • An attacker must be able to control the input data that is rendered by the TemplateColumn (either directly or indirectly, e.g., through stored data).
• Source Code Analysis:
  • File: /code/django_tables2/columns/templatecolumn.py
  • Class: TemplateColumn
  • Method: render
  • Code snippet:

    def render(self, record, table, value, bound_column, **kwargs):
        if self.template:
            template = self.template
        elif self.template_name:
            template = get_template(self.template_name)
        elif self.template_code:
            template = Template(self.template_code) # Vulnerability: Directly using Template on user input
        else:
            return super().render(record=record, table=table, value=value, bound_column=bound_column, **kwargs)
    
        context = Context(self.get_context_data(
            record=record, table=table, value=value, bound_column=bound_column, extra_context=getattr(table, 'context', None)
        ))
        return template.render(context) # Vulnerability: Rendering template with Context

  • Visualization:

    graph LR
        A[Request with malicious payload] --> B(Application using django-tables2);
        B --> C{Data source with attacker payload for TemplateColumn};
        C --> D[TemplateColumn.render];
        D --> E{Template instantiation with attacker payload: Template(template_code)};
        E --> F[Template engine execution: template.render(Context)];
        F --> G[Server-Side Code Execution];
    

    Loading
  • Step-by-step analysis:
    1. The TemplateColumn.render method is called to render a cell in the table.
    2. If template_code is provided during TemplateColumn initialization, a Template object is created directly from self.template_code. This is where the vulnerability lies, as template_code can be directly controlled by developers using the library, and potentially indirectly by attackers if developers are not careful about data sources.
    3. A Context is created, which includes the record, table, value, bound_column, and any extra context from the table.
    4. template.render(context) is called, which renders the template using the created context. If the template_code contains malicious code, it will be executed at this point.
• Security Test Case:
  • Step 1: Create a Django project and install django-tables2.
  • Step 2: Define a Django model that will be used in the table.
  • Step 3: Create a Django view that renders a table.
  • Step 4: Define a tables.Table class with a TemplateColumn. Pass a template string to template_code parameter of TemplateColumn which executes system command, e.g., {% load os %}{{ os.popen "id" }}. Ensure that the data source for the table allows rendering of this TemplateColumn.
  • Step 5: Access the view in a web browser.
  • Step 6: Observe that the output of the id command is executed and rendered on the page, demonstrating server-side template injection.

2. Unauthenticated Data Export Vulnerability

• Vulnerability Name: Unauthenticated Data Export Vulnerability
• Description:
  • The ExportMixin (used in views like FilteredPersonListView) automatically exports a table’s complete dataset when it detects a valid export trigger (by default, the GET parameter _export).
  • An external attacker can simply append (for example, ?_export=csv) to the URL of any publicly accessible view that uses ExportMixin and receive an export of all rows—even bypassing any pagination or UI restrictions.
  • Step‑by-step trigger:
    1. Identify a view (such as the one provided by FilteredPersonListView) that employs ExportMixin.
    2. Issue a GET request to the view URL (e.g. /filtered/) without authentication.
    3. Append ?_export=csv (or another supported format) to the URL.
    4. Receive an export (CSV or XLS) of the entire dataset.
• Impact:
  • An attacker is able to exfiltrate potentially sensitive or confidential data in bulk, bypassing any UI restrictions or client‑side pagination. This can lead to serious data breaches.
• Vulnerability Rank: High
• Currently Implemented Mitigations:
  • The export mixin validates the export trigger and format but does not enforce any authentication or authorization checks.
• Missing Mitigations:
  • Access control measures (such as authentication and authorization checks) or CSRF/non‑GET method verification must be implemented before triggering export.
• Preconditions:
  • A publicly accessible view employing ExportMixin exists and it lacks proper authentication/authorization checks.
• Source Code Analysis:
  • In /code/example/app/views.py, the class FilteredPersonListView extends ExportMixin without any additional checks.
  • The GET parameter _export (e.g. /?_export=csv) is used to trigger the export of the table data, and the mixin immediately returns the export response without verifying the requestor’s identity.
• Security Test Case:
  • Step 1: Deploy the Django application using the view that employs ExportMixin (with no extra access control).
  • Step 2: In a browser or via a tool like curl, visit the URL normally (e.g. http://example.com/filtered/).
  • Step 3: Append the export trigger to the query string (e.g. http://example.com/filtered/?_export=csv).
  • Step 4: Verify that the response is a complete CSV (or XLS) export of the full dataset without any authentication prompt.

3. DEBUG Mode Enabled in Production

• Vulnerability Name: DEBUG Mode Enabled in Production
• Description:
  • The example project settings (in /code/example/settings.py) have DEBUG = True and ALLOWED_HOSTS = ["*"].
  • When an application is deployed with DEBUG enabled, any error (for example, visiting a non‑existent URL) results in a detailed error page that includes stack traces, settings, and potentially sensitive configuration details.
  • Step‑by-step trigger:
    1. Deploy the application with the provided example settings.
    2. Visit an invalid URL or trigger an error.
    3. The application returns a detailed error page with internal information.
• Impact:
  • Detailed error pages may disclose internal file paths, configuration settings (such as database settings), and portions of the source code. This information facilitates reconnaissance against the application.
• Vulnerability Rank: Critical
• Currently Implemented Mitigations:
  • No mitigation exists; the application uses development settings unconditionally.
• Missing Mitigations:
  • In production, DEBUG must be set to False and ALLOWED_HOSTS should be restricted to trusted domain names.
• Preconditions:
  • The application is deployed using the /code/example/settings.py configuration without modifications.
• Source Code Analysis:
  • The settings file (/code/example/settings.py) includes:

    DEBUG = True
    ALLOWED_HOSTS = ["*"]
    

  • This configuration causes any unhandled exception to display detailed debug information publicly.
• Security Test Case:
  • Step 1: Deploy the application using the provided settings.
  • Step 2: Navigate to a URL that will trigger an error (for example, a non‑existent page).
  • Step 3: Confirm that a detailed error page with a stack trace and configuration details is shown.

4. Weak SECRET_KEY in Production

• Vulnerability Name: Weak SECRET_KEY in Production
• Description:
  • The SECRET_KEY is hard‑coded in the example settings (SECRET_KEY = "this is super secret"), making it easily guessable.
  • In Django, the SECRET_KEY is used for cryptographic signing (for sessions, CSRF protection, password reset tokens, etc.).
  • Step‑by-step trigger:
    1. Deploy the application using the provided settings.
    2. An attacker who discovers the weak key can use it to forge session cookies or CSRF tokens.
• Impact:
  • With a known secret key, an attacker can forge cryptographically signed data. This may result in session hijacking, unauthorized actions, or data tampering.
• Vulnerability Rank: Critical
• Currently Implemented Mitigations:
  • There is no mitigation; the insecure key is statically defined in the settings.
• Missing Mitigations:
  • A strong, randomly generated secret key must be used for production – ideally supplied via a secure environment variable.
• Preconditions:
  • The application is deployed unmodified from /code/example/settings.py, thereby using the weak secret key.
• Source Code Analysis:
  • In /code/example/settings.py, the line

    SECRET_KEY = "this is super secret"
    

    is used, which is not unique or random.
• Security Test Case:
  • Step 1: Deploy the application with the provided settings.
  • Step 2: Using the known value of the SECRET_KEY, attempt to craft a session cookie or CSRF token that the server accepts.
  • Step 3: If successful, this confirms that the cryptographic signing is compromised by the weak key.

5. Insecure Media File Serving Vulnerability

• Vulnerability Name: Insecure Media File Serving Vulnerability
• Description:
  • The URL configuration (in /code/example/urls.py) includes a route that serves media files via Django’s built‑in static file server:

    path("media/<path>", static.serve, {"document_root": settings.MEDIA_ROOT}),
    

  • This view is intended only for development and lacks production‑grade security controls.
  • Step‑by-step trigger:
    1. Deploy the application in a production‑like environment using the example URL configuration.
    2. Access files under /media/ using crafted URLs (or directory traversal strings).
• Impact:
  • An attacker may be able to access or traverse directories within the MEDIA_ROOT, potentially leading to unauthorized disclosure of sensitive files.
• Vulnerability Rank: High
• Currently Implemented Mitigations:
  • The project relies on Django’s development static file server (django.views.static.serve), which does not enforce strict protections.
• Missing Mitigations:
  • In production, media files should be served by a dedicated web server (e.g. Nginx or Apache) that applies proper access restrictions rather than using Django’s development view.
• Preconditions:
  • The application is deployed in a production‑like environment with the provided URL configuration, leaving /media/ openly accessible.
• Source Code Analysis:
  • The URL configuration in /code/example/urls.py includes:

    path("media/<path>", static.serve, {"document_root": settings.MEDIA_ROOT}),
    

    which means that any file under MEDIA_ROOT can be served without additional security checks.
• Security Test Case:
  • Step 1: Deploy the application with the example URL configuration (simulating production).
  • Step 2: Request known media files (or attempt directory traversal via paths such as ../) using URLs like http://example.com/media/sensitive_file.pdf.
  • Step 3: Verify that files are served without authentication or access control.