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Attack Tree Analysis for lllyasviel/fooocus

Objective: Compromise Fooocus-based Application (Gain Unauthorized Access, Manipulate Output, or Cause DoS)

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Compromise Fooocus-based Application ├── 1. Unauthorized Access to Generated Images │ ├── 1.1.2. Brute-Force or Enumerate Filenames (if timestamps or sequential IDs are used) [HIGH-RISK] │ │ └── 1.1.2.1. Script to Iterate Through Potential Filenames [HIGH-RISK] │ └── 1.2.1. Fooocus Itself Lacks Authentication/Authorization for Output Access [HIGH-RISK] │ └── 1.2.1.1. Directly Access Files via Internal API (if exposed and unprotected) [HIGH-RISK] [CRITICAL] ├── 2. Manipulate Image Generation Parameters [HIGH-RISK] │ ├── 2.1. Inject Malicious Prompts [HIGH-RISK] │ │ ├── 2.1.1. Bypass Input Sanitization/Validation in Fooocus [HIGH-RISK] [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── 2.1.1.1. Craft Prompts to Generate Inappropriate/Harmful Content [HIGH-RISK] │ │ │ └── 2.1.1.2. Craft Prompts to Exploit Vulnerabilities in Underlying Libraries [HIGH-RISK] │ │ │ └── 2.1.1.2.1. Command Injection via Image Processing Library [HIGH-RISK] [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 2.1.2. Manipulate API Calls (if Fooocus exposes an API) [HIGH-RISK] │ │ └── 2.1.2.1. Send Crafted Requests with Malicious Parameters [HIGH-RISK] [CRITICAL] │ └── 2.2.1.2.1. Path Traversal to Load Malicious Configuration [CRITICAL] ├── 3. Cause Denial-of-Service (DoS) │ ├── 3.1. Resource Exhaustion [HIGH-RISK] │ │ ├── 3.1.1. Submit Extremely Large or Complex Prompts [HIGH-RISK] │ │ │ └── 3.1.1.1. Overload CPU/GPU/Memory Resources [HIGH-RISK] │ │ └── 3.1.2. Submit a High Volume of Requests [HIGH-RISK] │ │ └── 3.1.2.1. Flood the Application with Generation Requests [HIGH-RISK] │ └── 3.3. Dependency Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK] │ ├── 3.3.1. Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in PyTorch, Gradio, or Other Dependencies [HIGH-RISK] [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 3.3.1.1. Use Publicly Available Exploits [HIGH-RISK] │ └── 3.3.2.1 Malicious package is used instead of legitimate one. [CRITICAL] └── 4. Information Disclosure └── 4.2.2.1. Fooocus debug mode enabled in production. [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Unauthorized Access to Generated Images

  • 1.1.2 & 1.1.2.1 Brute-Force/Enumerate Filenames:

    • Description: The attacker attempts to guess the filenames of generated images by trying various combinations of timestamps, sequential IDs, or other predictable patterns.
    • Likelihood: Medium (if predictable filenames are used)
    • Impact: Medium (access to some generated images)
    • Effort: Low (with scripting)
    • Skill Level: Intermediate (scripting required)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (unusual access patterns in logs)
    • Mitigation: Use cryptographically secure random filenames or UUIDs.

  • 1.2.1 & 1.2.1.1 Access via Internal API:

    • Description: Fooocus exposes an internal API that allows access to generated images without proper authentication or authorization. The attacker directly interacts with this API.
    • Likelihood: Medium (depends on API design and exposure)
    • Impact: High (full access to generated images)
    • Effort: Medium (requires understanding the API)
    • Skill Level: Intermediate (API interaction)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (API logs, if implemented)
    • Mitigation: Implement authentication and authorization for all API endpoints.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Manipulate Image Generation Parameters

  • 2.1.1 Bypass Input Sanitization/Validation [CRITICAL]:

    • Description: This is the root cause of many attacks. Fooocus fails to properly sanitize or validate user-provided inputs (prompts, parameters), allowing attackers to inject malicious content.
    • Likelihood: High (common vulnerability)
    • Impact: Very High (can lead to various attacks, including code execution)
    • Effort: Low to High (depends on the specific attack)
    • Skill Level: Novice to Expert (depends on the attack)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (depends on the attack)
    • Mitigation: Implement rigorous input sanitization and validation (length limits, character filtering, keyword blacklisting/whitelisting, regular expressions).

  • 2.1.1.1 Craft Inappropriate Prompts:

    • Description: The attacker provides prompts designed to generate inappropriate, harmful, or offensive content.
    • Likelihood: High (easy to try)
    • Impact: Medium (reputational damage, ethical concerns)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Novice
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (monitoring generated images)
    • Mitigation: Input sanitization, content filtering.

  • 2.1.1.2 & 2.1.1.2.1 Command Injection via Image Library [CRITICAL]:

    • Description: The attacker crafts a prompt that exploits a vulnerability in an underlying image processing library (e.g., ImageMagick, PIL) to execute arbitrary commands on the server.
    • Likelihood: Low (requires a specific vulnerability)
    • Impact: Very High (full system compromise)
    • Effort: High (finding and exploiting the vulnerability)
    • Skill Level: Expert
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard (requires deep packet inspection, IDS)
    • Mitigation: Keep image processing libraries up-to-date, input sanitization, sandboxing.

  • 2.1.2 & 2.1.2.1 Manipulate API Calls [CRITICAL]:

    • Description: If Fooocus exposes an API, the attacker sends crafted requests with malicious parameters to manipulate image generation.
    • Likelihood: Medium (depends on API design)
    • Impact: High (control over image generation)
    • Effort: Medium (requires understanding the API)
    • Skill Level: Intermediate (API interaction)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (API logs)
    • Mitigation: Implement authentication, authorization, and input validation for all API endpoints.

  • 2.2.1.2.1 Path Traversal to Load Malicious Configuration [CRITICAL]:

    • Description: The attacker exploits a vulnerability in Fooocus's configuration loading mechanism to load a malicious configuration file from an arbitrary location on the file system.
    • Likelihood: Low (requires a specific vulnerability)
    • Impact: High (control over application behavior)
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Advanced
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard (file integrity monitoring)
    • Mitigation: Secure configuration loading, input validation, avoid relative paths.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Cause Denial-of-Service (DoS)

  • 3.1.1 & 3.1.1.1 Overload Resources (Large Prompts):

    • Description: The attacker submits extremely large or complex prompts that consume excessive CPU, GPU, or memory resources, causing the application to become unresponsive.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium (temporary service disruption)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Novice
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (resource monitoring)
    • Mitigation: Input length limits, resource quotas.

  • 3.1.2 & 3.1.2.1 Flood with Requests:

    • Description: The attacker sends a high volume of image generation requests to overwhelm the application's capacity.
    • Likelihood: High (common attack)
    • Impact: Medium (temporary disruption)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Intermediate (using flooding tools)
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (network monitoring)
    • Mitigation: Rate limiting.

  • 3.3.1 & 3.3.1.1 Exploit Known Dependency Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]:

    • Description: The attacker exploits a known vulnerability in one of Fooocus's dependencies (e.g., PyTorch, Gradio) to cause a denial-of-service or other harmful effects.
    • Likelihood: Medium (vulnerabilities are regularly discovered)
    • Impact: High (potential for various attacks)
    • Effort: Medium (using public exploits)
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (vulnerability scanning)
    • Mitigation: Keep dependencies up-to-date, vulnerability scanning.

  • 3.3.2.1 Malicious package is used instead of legitimate one. [CRITICAL]:

    • Description: Supply chain attack, where attacker is able to replace legitimate package with malicious one.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: Very High
    • Effort: Very High
    • Skill Level: Expert
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard
    • Mitigation: Implement measures to verify the integrity of dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Information Disclosure

  • 4.2.2.1 Fooocus debug mode enabled in production [CRITICAL]:
    • Description: Debug mode, which often reveals sensitive information, is accidentally left enabled in the production environment.
    • Likelihood: Low (should not happen)
    • Impact: High (exposes sensitive debug information)
    • Effort: Very Low
    • Skill Level: Novice
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (checking configuration)
    • Mitigation: Disable debug mode in production.