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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for locustio/locust

Attack Surface: Web UI Default/Weak Authentication

1. Web UI Default/Weak Authentication

  • Description: The Locust web UI, if exposed without proper authentication or with default/weak credentials, allows unauthorized access.
  • Locust Contribution: Locust, by default, might not enforce strong authentication on its web UI, relying on user configuration for security. This default behavior directly contributes to the attack surface if users fail to implement proper authentication.
  • Example: A Locust master node is deployed on a publicly accessible server without setting up authentication. An attacker discovers the open web UI and gains full control over the load test, potentially using it to launch attacks against other systems or exfiltrate data from the monitoring information.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to load test control, information disclosure, potential for further attacks leveraging the Locust infrastructure.
  • Risk Severity: High (if exposed to a wider network)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement Authentication: Configure Locust to use authentication for the web UI. Utilize strong password policies or integrate with existing authentication systems (e.g., OAuth, LDAP).
    • Restrict Network Access: Limit network access to the web UI to only authorized users and networks using firewalls or network segmentation.

Attack Surface: Web UI Vulnerabilities (XSS, CSRF, Injection)

2. Web UI Vulnerabilities (XSS, CSRF, Injection)

  • Description: The Locust web UI, like any web application, can be vulnerable to common web security flaws such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), and injection vulnerabilities.
  • Locust Contribution: Locust's web UI code, being part of the Locust application, can inherently contain vulnerabilities if not developed with robust security practices. This is a direct attack surface introduced by the Locust application itself.
  • Example: An attacker finds an XSS vulnerability in the Locust web UI. They craft a malicious link and trick an administrator into clicking it. The attacker can then execute JavaScript code in the administrator's browser, potentially stealing session cookies and gaining control of the Locust session, or even potentially pivoting to the server.
  • Impact: Account compromise, data theft, manipulation of load test results, potential for further attacks against the master node or connected systems.
  • Risk Severity: High (depending on the severity and exploitability of the vulnerability).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Coding Practices: Implement secure coding practices during Locust web UI development, including input validation, output encoding, and protection against common web vulnerabilities. (For Locust developers)
    • Regular Security Scanning: Perform regular vulnerability scanning and penetration testing of the Locust web UI. (For Locust users and maintainers)
    • Keep Locust Updated: Ensure Locust is updated to the latest versions, including security patches that address web UI vulnerabilities.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strong Content Security Policy to mitigate XSS risks.

Attack Surface: Insecure Locustfile Handling

3. Insecure Locustfile Handling

  • Description: Locustfiles, being Python scripts, can introduce vulnerabilities if processed insecurely by the master node or if they contain malicious code.
  • Locust Contribution: Locust's architecture relies on executing user-provided Python scripts (Locustfiles) on the master and worker nodes. This design directly introduces the risk of insecure script handling if not properly managed.
  • Example: An attacker gains access to upload or modify Locustfiles on the master node. They inject malicious Python code into a Locustfile that, when executed by the master or workers, grants them shell access to the server, compromises the Locust infrastructure, or performs other malicious actions.
  • Impact: Code execution on master and/or worker nodes, system compromise, data breach, complete control over the Locust testing environment.
  • Risk Severity: Critical (if code execution is achievable).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Restrict Locustfile Upload/Modification: Limit who can upload or modify Locustfiles on the master node. Implement strict access controls and audit logging.
    • Code Review of Locustfiles: Implement a mandatory code review process for all Locustfiles to identify and prevent malicious or insecure code before deployment.
    • Sandboxing/Limited Execution Environment: Explore options to run Locustfile execution in a sandboxed or restricted environment to limit the impact of malicious code. (Feature request for Locust development)
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Run Locust master and worker processes with the minimum necessary privileges to reduce the impact if a Locustfile is exploited.

Attack Surface: Exposure of Sensitive Information in Locustfiles

4. Exposure of Sensitive Information in Locustfiles

  • Description: Locustfiles might inadvertently contain sensitive information like API keys, credentials, or internal network details, leading to information disclosure if these files are not secured.
  • Locust Contribution: Locust's design encourages users to define test logic within Python scripts (Locustfiles). This inherently creates a risk that developers might unintentionally embed sensitive information directly within these files, making Locust indirectly contribute to this attack surface through its script-based configuration approach.
  • Example: A developer hardcodes an API key directly into a Locustfile for testing purposes and commits this file to a public repository or shares it insecurely. The API key is then exposed to unauthorized individuals, allowing them to access the protected API.
  • Impact: Information disclosure, unauthorized access to APIs or internal systems, potential data breaches, compromise of external services if API keys are leaked.
  • Risk Severity: High (depending on the sensitivity of the exposed information).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid Hardcoding Secrets: Strictly prohibit hardcoding sensitive information like API keys, passwords, or credentials directly into Locustfiles. Educate developers on secure coding practices.
    • Environment Variables/Secret Management: Mandate the use of environment variables or dedicated secret management solutions to securely manage and inject sensitive information into Locustfiles at runtime.
    • Secure Storage of Locustfiles: Store Locustfiles in secure, private repositories with appropriate access controls.
    • Regular Code Reviews: Implement regular code reviews of Locustfiles specifically looking for accidental inclusion of sensitive information before deployment.
    • Secret Scanning Tools: Utilize automated secret scanning tools to detect accidentally committed secrets in Locustfile repositories.