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attack-tree.md

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Attack Tree Analysis for locustio/locust

Objective: Compromise the target application by exploiting vulnerabilities introduced or amplified by the use of Locust for load testing.

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Compromise Target Application via Locust [CRITICAL NODE] |- OR - Exploit Locust Functionality [CRITICAL NODE] | |- OR - Denial of Service (DoS) / Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) [HIGH RISK PATH] | |- OR - Injection Attacks (SQLi, XSS, Command Injection, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH] |- OR - Exploit Locust Web UI Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] | |- OR - Credential Theft for Web UI Access [HIGH RISK PATH] |- OR - Exploit Locust Infrastructure [CRITICAL NODE] |- OR - Compromise Locust Host System [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise Target Application via Locust [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Description: This is the overarching goal. Success at any of the sub-nodes contributes to achieving this goal. It's critical because it represents the ultimate objective of the attacker and encompasses all the identified high-risk attack vectors related to Locust.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Locust Functionality [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Description: Attackers leverage the intended functionalities of Locust (load generation, request crafting) for malicious purposes. This is a critical node because it directly exploits the core purpose of Locust to attack the target application.
  • High-Risk Paths branching from this node:
    • Denial of Service (DoS) / Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vectors:
        • Excessive Request Volume: Locust is designed to generate high traffic. Attackers can configure Locust to send overwhelming volumes of requests to the target application, causing service disruption.
        • Resource Exhaustion Attacks: Attackers can use Locust to target specific resource-intensive endpoints, sending crafted requests that consume excessive server resources (CPU, memory, bandwidth), leading to service degradation or failure.
      • Mitigation Actions:
        • Implement robust rate limiting and traffic shaping mechanisms.
        • Ensure infrastructure scalability to handle high traffic volumes.
        • Optimize resource usage and implement resource quotas.
        • Deploy anomaly detection systems to identify and respond to DoS/DDoS attacks.
    • Injection Attacks (SQLi, XSS, Command Injection, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vectors:
        • Parameter Manipulation in Locust Scripts: Locust scripts allow full control over request parameters. Attackers can craft scripts to inject malicious payloads into parameters, targeting injection vulnerabilities in the target application (SQLi, XSS, etc.).
        • Header Manipulation in Locust Scripts: Locust scripts can modify HTTP headers. Attackers can inject malicious payloads into headers, targeting header-based injection vulnerabilities.
      • Mitigation Actions:
        • Implement robust input validation and sanitization for all user-supplied data (parameters and headers) on the target application.
        • Adhere to secure coding practices to prevent injection vulnerabilities.
        • Deploy a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to detect and block common injection attacks.
        • Conduct regular security testing, focusing on injection vulnerabilities under load.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Locust Web UI Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Description: The Locust Web UI, while intended for internal use, can be a point of vulnerability. Compromising it can provide attackers with control over Locust and potentially access to sensitive information or further attack vectors.
  • High-Risk Paths branching from this node:
    • Credential Theft for Web UI Access [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vectors:
        • Default or Weak Credentials: Using default or easily guessable credentials for the Locust Web UI. Attackers can exploit these weak credentials through brute-force attacks or by simply using default login information.
        • Credential Stuffing: If credentials used for the Locust Web UI are reused across other services, attackers might use stolen credentials from other breaches to gain access.
      • Mitigation Actions:
        • Enforce strong and unique passwords for all Locust Web UI users.
        • Implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for Web UI access.
        • Implement account lockout policies to prevent brute-force attacks.
        • Regularly monitor login attempts for suspicious activity.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit Locust Infrastructure [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Description: Compromising the infrastructure hosting Locust (servers, dependencies) can give attackers significant control and the ability to launch attacks against the target application or other systems. This is a critical node because it represents a broader compromise beyond just Locust itself.
  • High-Risk Paths branching from this node:
    • Compromise Locust Host System [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vectors:
        • OS Vulnerabilities on Locust Server: Unpatched operating systems or software on the Locust server can contain known vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit to gain unauthorized access.
        • Misconfiguration of Locust Server: Incorrect or insecure configurations of the Locust server (e.g., exposed ports, weak permissions, insecure services) can create vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit.
      • Mitigation Actions:
        • Keep the Locust server OS and all software up-to-date with security patches.
        • Harden the Locust server configuration following security best practices (disable unnecessary services, configure firewalls, implement least privilege).
        • Conduct regular security audits and vulnerability scans of the Locust server infrastructure.
        • Implement intrusion detection and prevention systems on the Locust server.