- Description: An attacker could attempt to access the Locust master node's web UI by guessing default credentials, exploiting vulnerabilities in the authentication mechanism (if any), or through network access if the UI is exposed to the public internet. Once accessed, the attacker can control running tests, view results, and potentially manipulate the Locust environment.
- Impact:
- Start, stop, or modify load tests without authorization, disrupting testing schedules.
- Access sensitive test results and performance data, potentially revealing confidential information about the target application.
- Use the Locust infrastructure to launch attacks against other targets by modifying test scripts or configurations.
- Denial of Service by intentionally overloading the target application or the Locust infrastructure itself through manipulated tests.
- Affected Locust Component: Locust Master Node, Web UI
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Implement strong authentication and authorization for the Locust web UI.
- Restrict network access to the web UI using firewalls or VPNs, allowing only authorized networks or IPs.
- Utilize Locust's built-in HTTP authentication or integrate with an external authentication provider like OAuth 2.0 or LDAP.
- Regularly review and update access control lists for the web UI.
- Disable default or weak credentials if any are present.
Threat: Master Node Compromise
- Description: An attacker could exploit vulnerabilities in the Locust master node's operating system, Locust software, or related dependencies to gain unauthorized access. This could be achieved through remote code execution exploits, privilege escalation, or social engineering. Once compromised, the attacker gains full control over the master node.
- Impact:
- Full control over load tests, enabling injection of malicious requests into the target application during testing.
- Access to sensitive data collected by the master node, including test results, configuration files, and potentially credentials.
- Use the compromised master node as a pivot point to attack other systems within the network.
- Utilize the master node's resources for malicious activities like cryptocurrency mining or botnet operations.
- Affected Locust Component: Locust Master Node, Operating System, Dependencies
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Harden the master node operating system by disabling unnecessary services, applying security configurations, and using a minimal installation.
- Keep the master node operating system, Locust software, and all dependencies up-to-date with the latest security patches.
- Implement strong access controls and the principle of least privilege for the master node, limiting user permissions and access.
- Monitor master node activity for suspicious behavior using intrusion detection systems (IDS) and security information and event management (SIEM) tools.
- Run the master node in a secure, isolated environment, ideally separate from production systems.
Threat: Worker Node Compromise
- Description: Similar to the master node, worker nodes can be compromised through vulnerabilities in their operating system, Locust software, or dependencies. Attackers might target worker nodes as they are often less secured than master nodes, especially in dynamic or cloud environments. Compromise can occur through similar methods as master node compromise.
- Impact:
- Use compromised worker nodes to launch attacks against the target application or other systems, leveraging their network access and resources.
- Inject malicious requests into the target application during load tests, potentially exploiting vulnerabilities or causing damage.
- Utilize worker node resources for malicious activities like cryptocurrency mining or botnet participation, consuming resources and potentially incurring costs.
- Disrupt load testing activities by manipulating or disabling worker nodes.
- Affected Locust Component: Locust Worker Node, Operating System, Dependencies
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Harden worker node operating systems and software, applying similar security measures as for master nodes.
- Keep worker node operating systems, Locust software, and dependencies up-to-date with security patches.
- Implement strong access controls and least privilege principles for worker nodes, limiting access and permissions.
- Monitor worker node activity for suspicious behavior, although this might be more challenging in dynamic environments.
- Run worker nodes in a secure, isolated environment, ideally ephemeral and automatically destroyed after tests.
- Consider using containerized worker nodes for better isolation and easier management.
Threat: Malicious Locustfile Content
- Description: Locustfiles are Python scripts and can execute arbitrary code. If a malicious Locustfile is introduced, either intentionally by an insider or through compromised development pipelines, it can execute malicious code on the Locust infrastructure.
- Impact:
- Compromise of Locust master or worker nodes by executing malicious code within the Locust process.
- Denial of service to the target application or the Locust infrastructure by intentionally overloading or crashing systems.
- Data exfiltration from the Locust infrastructure or the target application by accessing files or network resources.
- Affected Locust Component: Locustfile, Python Interpreter, Locust Master and Worker Nodes
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Implement mandatory code review processes for all Locustfiles before deployment, ensuring scrutiny by security-aware personnel.
- Restrict access to Locustfile development and modification to authorized personnel only, using version control and access control systems.
- Use static code analysis tools to scan Locustfiles for potential vulnerabilities, malicious code patterns, or insecure coding practices.
- Avoid using untrusted or external code in Locustfiles, and carefully vet any dependencies.
- Implement input validation and sanitization within Locustfiles to prevent injection vulnerabilities.