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Attack Tree Analysis for locustio/locust

Objective: Disrupt Availability/Integrity of Target Application or Gain Unauthorized Access to Locust Infrastructure via Locust Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     +-----------------------------------------------------+
                                     |  Attacker's Goal: Disrupt Availability/Integrity  |
                                     |  of Target Application or Gain Unauthorized Access |
                                     |  to Locust Infrastructure via Locust Exploitation  |
                                     +-----------------------------------------------------+
                                                        |
         +--------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+
         |                                |                                |                                |
+--------+--------+             +--------+--------+             +--------+--------+
|  Abuse Locust   |             |  Exploit Locust |             |  Compromise    |
|  Configuration  |             |  Vulnerabilities|             |  Locust Master |
+--------+--------+             +--------+--------+             +--------+--------+
         | [HIGH RISK]                       |                                | [HIGH RISK]
+--------+--------+             +--------+--------+             +--------+--------+
| Overload Target|             |  Code Injection| [CRITICAL]    |   Weak/Default |
|  with Locust   |             |  in Test Script|             |  Credentials   | [CRITICAL]
+--------+--------+             +--------+--------+             +--------+--------+
         |                                |                                |
+--------+--------+             +--------+--------+             +--------+--------+
|  Exceed Resource|             |  Data Leakage  |             |  Unauthorized  |
|  Limits         |             |  via Test      |             |  Access to     |
+--------+--------+             |  Scripts       |             |  Web UI/API    |
         |                                |                                |
+--------+--------+             +--------+--------+             +--------+--------+
|  DoS/DDoS       | [HIGH RISK]    |  Access         |
|  Target App    |             |  Sensitive Data| [CRITICAL]
+--------+--------+             +--------+--------+

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path: Abuse Locust Configuration

  • Attack Vector: Overload Target with Locust -> Exceed Resource Limits -> DoS/DDoS Target App
  • Description: An attacker with access to the Locust configuration modifies parameters (e.g., number of users, hatch rate, target host) to generate an excessive load on the target application. This overwhelms the application's resources (CPU, memory, network bandwidth), leading to a denial-of-service condition.
  • Likelihood: Medium to High (Dependent on access to configuration. Higher if insiders are a threat or CI/CD pipeline security is weak.)
  • Impact: High to Very High (Denial of service directly impacts application availability.)
  • Effort: Low (Requires only basic modification of configuration settings.)
  • Skill Level: Very Low (Requires only a basic understanding of Locust configuration.)
  • Detection Difficulty: Low (Significant increase in traffic and application errors are easily noticeable through standard monitoring tools.)

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path: Compromise Locust Master

  • Attack Vector: Weak/Default Credentials -> Unauthorized Access to Web UI/API
  • Description: An attacker exploits weak or default credentials on the Locust master's web interface or API to gain unauthorized access. This grants them full control over the Locust instance.
  • Likelihood: Medium (If the Locust master is exposed to the internet and security best practices are not followed.)
  • Impact: High (Full control over the Locust instance, potential access to configuration, test results, and potentially sensitive data exposed through test scripts.)
  • Effort: Very Low (Trying default credentials or common passwords is a trivial attack.)
  • Skill Level: Very Low (Script kiddie level.)
  • Detection Difficulty: Low to Medium (Failed login attempts can be logged, but successful logins using valid (though weak) credentials might not be immediately suspicious without further behavioral analysis.)

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: Code Injection in Test Script

  • Attack Vector: Code Injection in Test Script -> Data Leakage via Test Scripts -> Access Sensitive Data
  • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the Locust test scripts (e.g., improper input sanitization) to inject malicious code. This code is then executed by the Locust workers. The injected code can be used to exfiltrate sensitive data that the worker has access to, such as API keys, credentials, or data from the target application.
  • Likelihood: Low to Medium (Requires a vulnerability in how test scripts handle input and access to modify those scripts.)
  • Impact: Very High (Potential for data breaches, complete system compromise, and significant reputational damage.)
  • Effort: Medium to High (Requires finding and exploiting a code injection vulnerability, which may involve code analysis and understanding of the target application.)
  • Skill Level: Medium to High (Requires understanding of code injection techniques, Locust's scripting language, and potentially the target application's vulnerabilities.)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to High (May require static code analysis, dynamic analysis during test execution, intrusion detection systems, and careful monitoring of system behavior and network traffic for unusual data exfiltration patterns.)

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: Weak/Default Credentials

Already covered in High-Risk Path 2

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: Access Sensitive Data

Already covered in Critical Node 3, as the ultimate consequence