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vulnerabilities-workflow-1.md

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Vulnerability List

Based on the provided project files, no high or critical vulnerabilities directly introduced by the django-imagekit project and exploitable by an external attacker in a publicly available instance were identified.

It's important to note that this analysis is based on the provided files and might not be exhaustive. A more in-depth security audit, including dynamic analysis and dependency checks, could potentially reveal further vulnerabilities. However, within the scope of the provided files and the given criteria, no high or critical vulnerabilities were found.

Hardcoded Insecure Django SECRET_KEY in Testing Settings

Description:

An external attacker who browses the public repository can easily read the hardcoded Django secret key contained in the testing settings file. In the file /code/tests/settings.py the secret is defined as follows:

SECRET_KEY = '_uobce43e5osp8xgzle*yag2_16%y$sf*5(12vfg25hpnxik_*'

If, due to misconfiguration or oversight, an instance of the application is deployed using these test settings instead of a properly secured production configuration, an attacker can use the publicly known secret key to:

  1. Forge or tamper with session cookies and CSRF tokens.
  2. Impersonate users (including administrators) by crafting valid-signed cookies.
  3. Potentially bypass other cryptographic safeguards provided by Django.

Impact:

Exploitation of this vulnerability would compromise the integrity of session data and cryptographic tokens. An attacker could hijack user sessions, forge requests, and thereby gain unauthorized access to sensitive components of the application.

Vulnerability Rank:

High

Currently Implemented Mitigations:

  • There are no mitigations present in the project itself. The secret key is statically defined in the file and is not derived from an environment‐dependent or other secure external secret management system.

Missing Mitigations:

  • The application must never use a hardcoded secret key in settings that might be deployed publicly.
  • Production settings should instead obtain the secret key from a secure environment variable or a dedicated secret management system.
  • Developers should ensure that the test configuration (which contains an insecure key) is never used to deploy a publicly accessible instance.

Preconditions:

  • The production instance (or any publicly accessible instance) must be misconfigured to use this testing settings file (/code/tests/settings.py) or an equivalent configuration that hardcodes the insecure SECRET_KEY.
  • An attacker must be able to read the public repository and then induce the application to use these settings.

Source Code Analysis:

  • In the file /code/tests/settings.py, the line 
    SECRET_KEY = '_uobce43e5osp8xgzle*yag2_16%y$sf*5(12vfg25hpnxik_*'
    clearly hardcodes the cryptographic key that Django uses for signing session cookies, CSRF tokens, and other sensitive data.
  • Since this file is publicly available in the repository, any attacker can quickly locate and extract the secret key.
  • Using a known secret key makes it trivial for an attacker to generate valid signatures for arbitrary payloads.

Security Test Case:

  1. Retrieve the Secret:
    • Visit the public repository (or use a source‐code search engine) to locate the file /code/tests/settings.py and copy the hardcoded SECRET_KEY.
  2. Deploy or Simulate an Instance:
    • Set up a test instance of the application configured to use the settings file that contains the hardcoded secret key.
  3. Craft a Forged Cookie:
    • Using the known secret key, generate a forged session cookie (or CSRF token) that mimics a valid user session. Tools such as Django’s signing functions or custom scripts (using the same algorithm) can be used to do this.
  4. Submit a Request:
    • Send an HTTP request to the deployed test instance including the forged cookie.
  5. Verify Exploitation:
    • Check whether the application accepts the forged cookie and grants unauthorized access (for example, accessing a page that requires user authentication).
    • A successful test demonstrates that an attacker could hijack sessions or forge requests, thereby confirming the vulnerability.