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Attack Tree Analysis for mesonbuild/meson

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code/Inject Malicious Code via Meson

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code/Inject Malicious Code via Meson

├── 1. Compromise Meson Build Configuration (meson.build) [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.1 Supply Malicious meson.build File [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.1 Social Engineering (Phishing, Tricking Developer) [HIGH RISK] │ │ └── 1.1.4 Supply malicious dependency, that contains malicious meson.build [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.2 Exploit Vulnerabilities in meson.build Parsing/Processing │ │ ├── 1.2.2 Exploit Logic Errors in Custom Build Scripts/Commands [HIGH RISK] │ │ └── 1.2.3 Leverage Unsafe Function Calls (e.g., run_command with user-controlled input) [HIGH RISK] │ └── 1.3 Exploit vulnerabilities in custom meson modules │ ├── 1.3.1 Inject code via module input [HIGH RISK] │ └── 1.3.2 Use unsafe functions in module [HIGH RISK] ├── 2. Exploit Meson's Dependency Handling [CRITICAL] │ ├── 2.1 Supply Malicious Dependency (Wrap, Subproject) [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 2.1.3 Social Engineering (Trick Developer into Using Malicious Wrap) [HIGH RISK] │ │ └── 2.1.4 Typosquatting/Namesquatting of Dependencies [HIGH RISK] │ └── 2.3 Exploit vulnerabilities in dependency itself [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 2.3.1 Dependency contains malicious code │ └── 2.3.2 Dependency contains malicious meson.build └── 3. Exploit Meson's Core Functionality └── 3.2 Exploit Misconfiguration of Meson (Beyond meson.build) └── 3.2.3 Using Untrusted Build Environments (e.g., compromised CI/CD pipeline) [HIGH RISK]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise Meson Build Configuration (meson.build) [CRITICAL]

  • Description: This is the central point of control for the build process. Compromising meson.build allows an attacker to directly control how the application is built.
  • Why Critical: It's the primary configuration file, and any changes here directly affect the build output.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Supply Malicious meson.build File [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker replaces the legitimate meson.build file with a crafted one containing malicious code.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1 Social Engineering (Phishing, Tricking Developer) [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker uses social engineering techniques to trick a developer into using a malicious meson.build file or committing it to the repository.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Developer training on phishing and social engineering, strong repository access controls, mandatory code reviews.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.4 Supply malicious dependency, that contains malicious meson.build [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker publishes a malicious dependency (e.g., on a public package repository) that includes a malicious meson.build file. When the legitimate project includes this dependency, the malicious build file is executed.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Careful dependency selection, checksum verification, regular dependency audits, use of private/curated dependency repositories.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2 Exploit Vulnerabilities in meson.build Parsing/Processing

  • Description:

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.2 Exploit Logic Errors in Custom Build Scripts/Commands [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker exploits flaws in the logic of custom build scripts or commands defined within a legitimate meson.build file. This might involve incorrect input validation, improper handling of user-supplied data, or other programming errors.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Thorough code reviews, static analysis of meson.build files, secure coding practices.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.3 Leverage Unsafe Function Calls (e.g., run_command with user-controlled input) [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker exploits the use of functions like run_command within meson.build by injecting malicious commands through user-controlled input. This is a classic command injection vulnerability.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Strictly validate and sanitize all user-supplied input used within run_command or any function that executes external processes. Avoid run_command if possible; use Meson's built-in functions instead.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3 Exploit vulnerabilities in custom meson modules

  • Description: Custom modules can introduce new vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1 Inject code via module input [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker crafts malicious input to a custom Meson module, exploiting vulnerabilities in how the module processes that input.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Thoroughly review and test custom modules. Validate all inputs to the module.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.2 Use unsafe functions in module [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The custom Meson module itself uses unsafe functions (like run_command without proper input sanitization), creating a vulnerability.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Avoid using unsafe functions within the module. If unavoidable, implement rigorous input validation and sanitization.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Meson's Dependency Handling [CRITICAL]

  • Description: Meson relies on external dependencies (Wraps, subprojects). Compromising the dependency mechanism can lead to the inclusion of malicious code.
  • Why Critical: Dependencies are often external to the project's direct control, making them a potential weak point.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1 Supply Malicious Dependency (Wrap, Subproject) [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker introduces a malicious dependency into the build process.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.3 Social Engineering (Trick Developer into Using Malicious Wrap) [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker convinces a developer to use a malicious Wrap (dependency) through social engineering.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Developer training, careful dependency selection, use of trusted sources.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.4 Typosquatting/Namesquatting of Dependencies [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker creates a malicious package with a name very similar to a legitimate dependency, hoping developers will accidentally install the wrong one.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Careful dependency specification, double-checking package names, using a curated list of dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3 Exploit vulnerabilities in dependency itself [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker leverages a vulnerability within a legitimate (but compromised) dependency.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: High
  • Mitigation: Regular dependency updates, vulnerability scanning, security audits of dependencies.
    • 2.3.1 Dependency contains malicious code: The dependency's source code itself contains malicious code.
    • 2.3.2 Dependency contains malicious meson.build: The dependency's meson.build file is malicious.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Meson's Core Functionality

Attack Tree Path: 3.2 Exploit Misconfiguration of Meson (Beyond meson.build)

Attack Tree Path: 3.2.3 Using Untrusted Build Environments (e.g., compromised CI/CD pipeline) [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker gains control of the build environment (e.g., a CI/CD server) and uses this access to inject malicious code or modify the build process.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: High
  • Skill Level: High
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Secure and harden the build environment (especially CI/CD pipelines). Use dedicated, isolated build environments. Implement strong access controls and monitoring.